State v. Bd. of Educ. of the Dayton Pub. Sch.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 27649,27649 |
| Citation | 2018 Ohio 676,96 N.E.3d 333 |
| Parties | STATE of Ohio EX REL. Craig A. JONES, et al., Plaintiffs–Appellants v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant–Appellee |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
DENNIS L. PERGRAM, Atty. Reg. No. 0010853, 50 North Sandusky Street, Delaware, Ohio 43015, Attorney for Plaintiffs–Appellants
BRIAN L. WILDERMUTH, Atty. Reg. No. 0066303, LAUREN K. EPPERLEY, Atty. Reg. No. 0082924, 50 Chestnut Street, Suite 230, Dayton, Ohio 45440, Attorneys for Defendant–Appellee
{¶ 1} This case is before us on the appeal of Plaintiff–Appellant, Craig Jones, from a judgment rendered in favor of Defendant–Appellee, Board of Education of the Dayton Public Schools ("Board").1 Jones contends that the trial court erred in finding that the Board complied with R.C. 3313.16, R.C. 121.22, and Board Policy BDDA when it refused to renew his contract. According to Jones, the nonrenewal of his contract exceeded the scope of the purpose set forth in the Board's special meeting notice, and was invalid.
{¶ 2} In addition, Jones contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant summary judgment in his favor on the issue of the Board's violation of R.C. 121.22(G), and in failing to require the Board to strictly comply with R.C. 3313.16.
{¶ 3} We conclude that the Board's special meeting notice failed to comply with R.C. 121.22(F), because the Board failed to properly state the purpose of the open session of the meeting. The Board's resolution not to renew Jones' contract, therefore, was invalid, and the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment in the Board's favor.
{¶ 4} Although the Board also failed to comply with certain requirements of R.C. 3313.16 when it sent out the notice for the special meeting, the trial court did not err in finding a lack of prejudice, because Jones had actual notice of the meeting. In addition, the Board's motion to go into executive session facially complied with R.C. 121.22(G)(1). Whether the Board improperly disguised its intentions in calling the meeting and in moving into executive session do not need to be considered, due to the invalidity of the resolution adopted at the special meeting. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court will be reversed, and this cause will be remanded for further proceedings.
{¶ 5} The facts in the case before us were largely stipulated and are not disputed. On May 7, 2013, Craig Jones and the Board entered into an employment contract, pursuant to which the Board employed Jones as Treasurer for the Dayton City School District ("DCSD") for a period of three years. The contract began on August 1, 2013, and was to last until July 31, 2016, unless terminated earlier by the parties' mutual agreement, by Jones' retirement, disability, or death, by a majority vote of the Board, or by Jones' failure to maintain a valid license as statutorily required.
{¶ 6} Under the contract, Jones acted as financial advisor to the Board and the Board's administration on matters pertaining to DCSD, and was to advise the Board on any actions taken on the Board's behalf. Ex. A to the complaint, p. 2.2
{¶ 7} Concerning employment of treasurers, R.C. 3313.22(A) provides that:
At the expiration of a treasurer's current term of employment, the treasurer is deemed re-employed for a term of one year at the same salary plus any increments that the board may authorize, unless the board, on or before the first day of March of the year in which the contract of employment expires, either re-employs the treasurer for a succeeding term as provided in division (C) of this section or gives to the treasurer written notice of its intention not to re-employ the treasurer.
{¶ 8} The Board did not terminate Jones' employment; instead, the Board held a special meeting on February 23, 2016, and voted not to renew his contract. At the same meeting, the Board also voted not to renew the contract of the DCSD Superintendent. The Board notified Jones in writing of the non-renewal on February 25, 2016.
{¶ 9} On September 9, 2016, Jones filed a complaint seeking both a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus against the Board. In the first claim for relief, Jones asked for a declaration that he was entitled to be re-employed by the Board under a one-year contract for 2016–2017, due to the Board's failure to comply with statutory requirements and the Board's own policies pertaining to scheduling special meetings. The second claim for relief alleged that the Board's special meeting notice failed to comply with R.C. 121.22, and that actions taken at the February 23, 2016 Board meeting were invalid. Finally, the third claim for relief asserted that Jones was a public official and that the Board's executive session on February 23, 2016, was unlawful because the Board's special meeting notice stated that the purpose of the executive session was to consider "employment of public employees," rather than to consider the employment of a public official.
{¶ 10} After the Board filed its answer, the trial court set a schedule for filing stipulations, briefs, and reply briefs. For the most part, the parties were able to agree on the facts, and filed stipulations on January 30, 2017. The briefing concluded on February 13, 2017. Subsequently, on June 27, 2017, the trial court rendered summary judgment in the Board's favor.
{¶ 11} The court rejected Jones' arguments about defects in the Board's procedure for calling a special meeting under R.C. 3313.16, because Jones had "actual knowledge" of the special meeting. In addition, the court concluded that the Board's notice of the special meeting did not violate R.C. 121.22(F). And finally, the court held that even if the court "humored" Jones by referring to him as a "public official," the definition of public official included employees; as a result, Jones' "argument asserted a distinction without a difference." Doc. # 23, p. 8.
{¶ 12} Jones now appeals from the court's decision rendering summary judgment in the Board's favor and overruling Jones' motion for summary judgment.
{¶ 13} Jones' First Assignment of Error states that:
The Trial Court Committed Prejudicial Error by Finding That the Board Complied With Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.16, Ohio Rev. Code § 121.22, and Board Policy BDDA[,] and Erred by Not Granting Summary Judgment as to Liability for Mr. Jones Because the Board's Nonrenewal of Mr. Jones's Contract Exceeded the Scope of the "Purpose" Set Forth in the Special Meeting Notice (Trial Court's Order).
{¶ 14} Under this assignment of error, Jones contends that the Board failed to comply with statutory requirements under R.C. 3313.16 and R.C. 121.22(F), and with its own Board policy concerning special meetings. Jones notes that the special meeting notice did not indicate that the Board would be voting on Jones' contract; instead, the notice misinformed the public that the Board may act on recommendations of the superintendent and/or treasurer when, in fact, no recommendations were going to be made and the Board knew that. Additionally, Jones argues that the Board disguised the purpose of the special meeting by omitting any mention of possible non-renewal, and then retroactively revised the agenda the following day (February 24, 2016) to reflect the non-renewal of the contracts of Jones and the superintendent.
{¶ 15} According to Jones, the trial court erred by failing to recognize the purpose of a special meeting notice, and further erred by concluding that such purpose was satisfied by a notice indicating that the Board would go into executive session to consider the employment of public employees.
{¶ 16} We noted in the statement of facts that R.C. 3313.22(A) states that "[a]t the expiration of a treasurer's current term of employment, the treasurer is deemed re-employed for a term of one year at the same salary plus any increments that the board may authorize, unless the board, on or before the first day of March of the year in which the contract of employment expires, either re-employs the treasurer for a succeeding term as provided in division (C) of this section or gives to the treasurer written notice of its intention not to re-employ the treasurer." R.C. 3313.22(D) further states that:
Each board shall adopt procedures for the evaluation of its treasurer and shall evaluate its treasurer in accordance with those procedures. The board shall consider an evaluation based upon those procedures in deciding whether to renew the treasurer's contract. The establishment of an evaluation procedure shall not create an expectancy of continued employment. Nothing in this division shall prevent a board from making the final determination regarding the renewal or nonrenewal of a treasurer's contract.
{¶ 17} If a treasurer's contract is terminated, R.C. 3313.22(E) indicates that termination shall be in accordance with R.C. 3319.16, which pertains to termination for cause of teaching and non-teaching employees. Of course, here, Jones was not terminated; instead, his contract was not renewed.
{¶ 18} "[T]he appropriate procedural vehicle for a school administrator to seek reemployment, damages, and back pay for the nonrenewal of his or her employment contract is a petition for a writ of mandamus." (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Jones v. Sandusky City Schools , 6th Dist. Erie No. E-05-041, 2006-Ohio-188, 2006 WL 146210, ¶ 7. "In order for a writ of mandamus to issue, a relator must demonstrate that (1) he or she has a clear legal right to the relief prayed for; (2) respondent is under a corresponding legal duty to perform the requested act; and (3) relator has no plain and adequate legal remedy." (Citations omitted.) State ex rel. Cassels v. Dayton City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 69 Ohio St.3d 217, 218–219, 631 N.E.2d 150 (1994).
{¶ 19} As was noted, this case was decided on cross motions for summary judgment. "A trial court may...
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