State v. Beach

• Decision Date: 02 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 76576,76576
• Citation: 592 So.2d 237
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Joseph BEACH, Respondent. 592 So.2d 237, 17 Fla. L. Week. S13
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 237

592 So.2d 237

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Joseph BEACH, Respondent.

No. 76576.

592 So.2d 237, 17 Fla. L. Week. S13

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 2, 1992.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., James W. Rogers, Bureau Chief, and Laura

Rush, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for petitioner.

William H. Webster of William H. Webster, P.A., Crawfordville, for respondent.

HARDING, Justice.

We have for review Beach v. State, 564 So.2d 614, 614 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), where the First District Court of Appeal certified the following question to be of great public importance:

IS THE DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT UNDER OATH THAT HE WAS NOT PROVIDED NOR OFFERED COUNSEL AT THE PROCEEDINGS RESULTING IN PRIOR CONVICTIONS SUFFICIENT TO PUT THE STATE TO THE BURDEN OF PROVING THAT SUCH CONVICTIONS WERE IN FACT COUNSELED OR THAT COUNSEL WAS KNOWINGLY WAIVED?

We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution, and we answer the question in the negative.

Joseph Beach ("Beach") pled nolo contendere to one count of lewd and lascivious assault on a child under sixteen years of age. Prior to sentencing, Beach filed a motion to correct his guidelines scoresheet. Beach contended that the sentencing scoresheet contained several prior misdemeanor convictions that were uncounseled ¹ and, therefore, invalid for purposes of scoring. Beach attached a sworn affidavit to the motion alleging that he neither had been provided nor offered counsel for these convictions. The trial court found Beach's affidavit insufficient to shift the burden to the State to show either that the prior convictions were counseled, or that Beach had validly waived his right to counsel in those cases. The trial court sentenced Beach within the guidelines to four and one-half years of incarceration, followed by five and one-half years of probation.

On appeal, the First District Court reversed Beach's sentence because the sentencing guidelines scoresheet included uncounseled convictions. Citing as authority State v. Troehler, 546 So.2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), and Smith v. State, 498 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986), the district court held that Beach's affidavit was sufficient to shift the burden to the State. The district court also certified the issue as a question of great public importance for purposes of review by this Court.

The State contends that a defendant who challenges prior misdemeanor convictions as invalid for guidelines scoring should bear the burden of establishing that: (1) the defendant had the right to counsel in the prior proceedings and (2) the defendant either was not provided counsel or did not knowingly and validly waive the right to counsel. Beach asserts that his sworn affidavit brought the validity of the prior uncounseled convictions to the court's attention. Thus, Beach concludes that the affidavit shifted the burden to the State to show that the prior convictions were correctly included on the guidelines scoresheet. We disagree with Beach's argument.

The underlying issue in this case is whether Beach was entitled to counsel in those previous convictions which he challenges as improperly included on the guidelines sheet. The Florida Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused ... shall have the right ... to be heard in person, by counsel or both." Art. I, Sec. 16, Fla. Const. To secure this constitutional right, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.160 requires the court to advise any person charged with the commission of a crime of a right to counsel and, if financially unable to obtain counsel, of a right to be assigned court-appointed counsel. The United States Supreme Court has also ruled that an indigent defendant cannot be imprisoned for any offense unless the defendant either is represented by counsel or knowingly and intelligently waives the right to counsel. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972).

The United States Supreme Court further defined the right to counsel in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980). In Baldasar, the Court addressed the issue of whether a sentencing court could use an earlier uncounseled conviction as a predicate to enhance a subsequent conviction. Justice Blackmun's concurrence cast the deciding vote by following a bright line rule that a defendant is entitled to counsel for any " 'nonpetty criminal offense, that is, one punishable by more than six months' imprisonment, ... or whenever the defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of imprisonment.' " Id. at 229, 100 S.Ct. at 1589 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389-390, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1170, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Accordingly, Justice Blackmun voted to prohibit enhancement of Baldasar's sentence because his prior uncounseled conviction was punishable by more than six months' imprisonment and thus invalid. Id. 446 U.S. at 230, 100 S.Ct. at 1589.

In Hlad v. State, 585 So.2d 928, 930 (Fla.1991), this Court applied Justice Blackmun's bright-line rule to determine that a defendant's prior uncounseled DUI conviction was valid for enhancement "because he did not receive imprisonment nor could he have been imprisoned for more than six months as a result of the uncounseled conviction." Following the reasoning in Hlad and Baldasar, if Beach was entitled to counsel for the offenses included on his guidelines scoresheet, then these uncounseled convictions would be invalid for purposes of scoring.

We now turn to the respective burdens of the parties in challenging the validity of prior convictions. The defendant bears the initial burden of showing entitlement to counsel because "[t]he key is that an uncounseled conviction may not be used for enhancement if the defendant in fact had a right to counsel in the prior proceedings." Leffew v. State, 518 So.2d 1376, 1378 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988). In order to meet this initial burden, the defendant must assert under oath: (1) that the offense involved was punishable by more than six months of imprisonment or that the defendant was actually subjected to a term of imprisonment; (2) that the defendant was...