State v. Beal

• Docket Number: P1-2022-2596A
• Decision Date: 24 August 2023
• Parties: STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. DAVID BEAL
• Court: Rhode Island Superior Court

1

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. DAVID BEAL

No. P1-2022-2596A

Superior Court of Rhode Island, Providence

August 24, 2023

For Plaintiff: David Bonzagni, Esq.

For Defendant: Michael J. Pisaturo, Esq.

DECISION

CRUISE, J.

Before this Court for decision is David Beal's (Beal) appeal of a Superior Court Magistrate's (the Magistrate) Order dated March 10, 2023, that denied Beal's motion to compel responses to his motion for a bill of particulars (the Order). Jurisdiction is pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 8-2-11.1(d).

I Facts and Travel

On July 6, 2022, Beal was indicted by a Grand Jury on eight counts of criminal charges that alleged (1) in July, August, and November 2019, Beal conspired and engaged in, or attempted to engage in, the act of money laundering in violation of G.L 1956 §§ 11-9.1-15(a)(1), 11-9.1-15(a)(2), 11-9.1-15(a)(3), 11-9.1-15(a)(4), or 11-1-6; (2) in December of 2019, Beal conspired to commit the act of money laundering in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in violation of G.L. 1956 § 11-1-7; and (3) in March of 2019, Beal filed a false or fraudulent tax return in violation of G.L. 1956 § 44-30-94. (Indictment No: P1/22-2596 (Indictment) 1-4.) On August 10, 2022, Beal filed a Motion for Bill of Particulars (the Motion) that requested the State to provide him with "the alleged specific conduct . . . that the State intends to prove and when . . . these events specifically occur[ed]."^[1] The State filed its objection to Beal's Motion on August 25, 2022, which argued that (1) a bill of particulars is not intended to provide a defendant with the evidentiary facts in the prosecutor's case and (2) the State's Answer to Beal's motion for discovery, filed on August 25, 2022, satisfies the notice a Bill of Particulars would require. (State's Objection to Defendant's Motion for Bill of Particulars.) On January 30, 2023, a hearing was held on the Motion (the Hearing).

At the Hearing, Beal joined in on the arguments advanced by codefendant, Jehane MacDonald (MacDonald), who argued that the State is advancing four alternative theories in the Indictment to charge both defendants with money laundering and, as such, it is impossible for defense counsel to know what facts the State is alleging to support each of the four theories. (Hr'g Tr. (Tr.) at 1:7-15, 2:18-23, Jan. 30, 2023.) Additionally, MacDonald argued that neither the discovery provided, nor the Indictment, indicate the specific unlawful activity or conduct underlying the money laundering and conspiracy charges, which is an element of the crime that the State must prove at trial. Id. at 3:6-21. Furthermore, MacDonald argued that there is no indication as to the year, or the activity, that both defendants engaged in that would constitute filing a false tax return under the statute. Id. at 4:1-13. Finally, Beal argued that a Bill of Particulars is necessary because he needs to know what unlawful conduct the State is alleging Beal engaged in that the State contends is captured on the casino surveillance videos. Id. at 5:8-19.

In response, the State argued that each count of the Indictment includes the date and location of the charged offenses, and eight of the ten offenses were captured on the surveillance videos which were made available to defense counsel in its answer to Beal's motion for discovery. Id. at 6:24-7:5. The State contended that, based on our Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Isom, 251 A.3d 1 (R.I. 2021), its discovery response had satisfied the information that would be provided to Beal in a Bill of Particulars. Id. at 7:6-24.

After hearing the parties' arguments, the Magistrate denied the Motion. Id. at 8:15-18. The Order reflecting the Magistrate's denial was entered on March 10, 2023. (Docket.) On March 23, 2023, Beal timely appealed the Magistrate's denial to this Court pursuant to Rule 2.9(e) of the Superior Court Rules of Practice. Id.; see also R.P. 2.9(e) ("[t]he notice of appeal required shall be filed within twenty (20) days of the date of the entry of the . . . order . . . appealed from"). No memoranda in support of the parties' respective positions was filed nor was argument heard on the instant appeal.

II Standard of Review

A Superior Court Justice's review of a decision of a magistrate is governed by § 8-2-11.1(d) which provides, in pertinent part:

"A party aggrieved by an order entered by the . . . magistrate shall be entitled to a review of the order by a justice of the superior court. Unless otherwise provided in the rules of procedure of the court, the review shall be on the record and appellate in nature. The court shall, by rules of procedure, establish procedures for review of orders entered by the . . . magistrate." Section 8-2-11.1(d).

Rule 2.9 of the Superior Court Rules of Practice presently governs the review standard and provides, in pertinent part:

"(h) Review. The Superior Court justice shall make a de novo determination of those portions to which the appeal is directed and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the judgment, order, or decree of the magistrate. The justice, however, need not formally conduct a new hearing and may consider the record developed before the magistrate, making his or her own determination based on that record whether there is competent evidence upon which the magistrate's judgment, order, or decree rests. The justice may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter with instructions." R.P. 2.9(h).

The record on appeal includes "[t]he original papers and exhibits filed with the Superior Court, the transcript of the proceedings, and the docket entries[.]" R.P. 2.9(f). If the record indicates that competent evidence supports the magistrate's findings, the Court "shall not substitute [its] view of the evidence for [the magistrate's] even though a contrary conclusion could have been reached." State v. Dennis, 29 A.3d 445, 450 (R.I. 2011) (citing Tim Hennigan Co. v. Anthony A. Nunes, Inc., 437 A.2d 1355, 1357 (R.I. 1981)).

III Analysis

An indictment provides a defendant with sufficient notice of the charged offense(s) if the offense is charged either "'(1) [b]y using the name given to the offense in terms of either the common law or by statute; or (2) [b]y stating the definition of the offense in terms of substantially the same meaning.'" State v Jimenez, 276 A.3d 1258, 1270 (R.I. 2022) (quoting G.L. 1956 § 12-12-1.4); see also State v. Saluter, 715 A.2d 1250, 1253 (R.I. 1998) ("an indictment may track the words of the statute criminalizing the act being charged"). A defendant confronted with an ambiguous indictment can seek a bill of particulars. See State v. Hunt, 137 A.3d 689, 693 (R.I. 2016); see also Super. R. Crim. P. 7(f).

Rule 7(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure dictates the procedure for obtaining a Bill of Particulars, which states, in pertinent part:

"Upon motion of a defendant the court shall direct the filing of a bill of particulars. A motion for a bill of particulars may be made within thirty (30) days after arraignment or at such later time as the court may permit. A bill of particulars may be amended at any time subject to such conditions as justice requires." Super. R. Crim. P. 7(f).

Furthermore, our Supreme Court has held that "'the function of a bill of particulars is to apprise a defendant of the evidentiary details establishing the facts of the offense when such facts have not been included in the indictment or information.'" State v. Footman, 196 A.3d 758, 763 (R.I. 2018) (quoting State v. LaChapelle, 638 A.2d 525, 527 (R.I. 1994)). The primary purpose of a bill of particulars "'is to avoid prejudicial surprise at trial.'" State v. Gregson, 113 A.3d 393, 397 (R.I. 2015) (quoting LaChapelle, 638 A.2d at 527). Moreover, "'the granting of a bill of particulars in any civil or criminal proceeding is within the discretion of the justice who hears the motion and his discretion will not be disturbed unless it appears that there has been an abuse of discretion.'" Gregson, 113 A.3d at 397 (quoting Union Mortgage Co. v. Rocheleau, 51 R.I. 345, 348, 154 A. 658, 660 (1931)).

In the present case, the Indictment alleges eight counts of criminal charges against Beal which include the dates and locations for each charge of (1) money laundering in violation of §§ 11-9.1-15(a)(1)-(4); (2) conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation of §§ 11-1-6 and 11-1-7; and (3) filing a false tax return in violation of § 44-30-94. (Indictment 1-4.) For the money laundering charges, the State is advancing multiple theories under § 11-9.1-15(a) upon which it intends to prove its case against Beal. See id. Our Supreme Court has explained that when crafting an indictment "[t]he preferable manner is to charge a single offense as one count, setting forth multiple theories that may be alleged[,]" which is precisely the course of action the State took with respect to the money laundering charges. State v. Matthews, 88 A.3d 375, 381 (R.I. 2014); see also Super. R. Crim. P. 7(c) ("[i]t may be alleged in a single count that the means by which the defendant committed the offense are unknown or that [he or she] committed it by one or more specified means"). Rhode Island law is clear that the State is not prohibited from advancing multiple theories it intends to prove for a single count of an indictment; nor is the State required to narrow its prosecution to a single theory. See Matthews, 88 A.3d at 381 (citing United States v. Roy, 408 F.3d 484, 492 n.4 (8th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, after reviewing the Indictment, the Court finds that the Indictment adequately informs Beal of each criminal charge that he must defend against at trial.

Furthermore the posture of the present appeal is similar to that of Isom. In Isom, the...