State v. Bealin

• Decision Date: 04 January 1943
• Docket Number: 15483.
• Citation: 23 S.E.2d 746,201 S.C. 490
• Parties: STATE v. BEALIN.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

23 S.E.2d 746

201 S.C. 490

STATE v. BEALIN.

No. 15483.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

January 4, 1943

C T. McDonald, of Florence, for appellant.

J Reuben Long, Sol., of Conway, and George W. Keels, of Florence, for respondent.

BONHAM Chief Justice.

Elizabeth Bealin was found dead in the home where she and her husband and their two small children resided in the Kingsburg section of Florence County, at about noon on Sunday, November 2, 1941, whereupon her husband, Monroe Bealin, the defendant, was charged with murder arising out of the death of his wife, and was tried upon that charge, to which he plead not guilty, at the January term, 1942, of the Court of General Sessions for that county.

Upon the trial, before the Honorable A. L. Gaston, Presiding Judge, and a jury, there was evidence that Elizabeth Bealin had died from hemorrhage as a result of wounds from a shotgun whose shot had penetrated her right side and chest. No one testified to having witnessed her death or the event which caused it. For the purpose of establishing its case, the State relied upon the circumstantial evidence which was adduced by various witnesses.

In addition to his general plea of not guilty, the defendant sought to prove that he was not at his residence when his wife was shot, having left his home at about half past eight o'clock that morning, and after paying a brief call at the home of another Negro man, spent the remainder of the morning at a filling station, about eight-tenths of a mile from his home, where he customarily worked in addition to farming, and, the day being Sunday, that he left the filling station shortly before noon in order to meet a previously arranged engagement with his wife to take her to church; and that when he reached his home for that purpose, he found his wife lying dead in a corner of a room in their home, and after a brief examination of her body, that he went immediately to the home of neighbors, about one hundred yards from his residence, and reported the matter, whereupon one of his neighbors, at his request, went with him to his home to look into the situation. Shortly thereafter, Bernard Currie a friend of the defendant, also came and saw the situation, and then went away for the purpose of narrating the fact to certain white men in the vicinity who likewise went to the scene, after which they were joined by a crowd of approximately one hundred spectators.

The witnesses for the State, and those for the defendant, were about evenly balanced in number, and in most of the material aspects their testimony followed two sharply conflicting lines, but witnesses for both parties testified to having seen the defendant at the filling station during the course of that morning. Neighbors testified to having heard the sound of a shot coming from the direction of the home of Elizabeth Bealin and Monroe Bealin at some time between eleven o'clock that morning and noon, but it was not shown that the latter was present at the time the shot was heard. The State, among other things, sought to establish its charge of murder by offering in evidence certain work-day clothing, but respecting which the testimony was divided as to when the defendant had last worn them. The State offered testimony tending to show that Monroe Bealin was wearing the overalls and other work clothes when he was seen at the filling station on that Sunday morning, and that shortly after the death of his wife, those same articles of clothing were found, bloodstained, near the defendant's home. Witnesses for the defendant who had seen him at the filling station during the course of the morning, and also shortly after his wife had been found dead, testified that on both occasions he had been dressed in his Sunday clothes which were described by the witnesses in terms sufficient to distinguish them from the overalls and work clothes which were found near the home.

When the taking of the testimony had been completed and the jury had been excused, counsel for the defendant renewed an earlier motion, which was likewise refused by the Court, for a directed verdict, following which, in the course of a colloquy between the Court and counsel for both parties, the following discussion was held between the Court and counsel for the defendant:

" The Court: *** Mr. McDonald, do you think I ought to submit to the jury anything about manslaughter?

"Mr. McDonald: Your Honor, I leave that to the Court. We take the position that he is not guilty of anything.

"The Court: The reason I asked you, I don't want to submit anything to the jury that is not supported by the evidence. *** I am not inclined to submit the issue of manslaughter to the jury.

"Mr. McDonald: Of course, our position is that he would not be guilty of anything whatever.

"The Court: *** Unless there is a request along that line, I am not going to charge manslaughter to the jury ***."

No specific requests to charge were made by counsel for either party, and upon the return of the jury, the charge was delivered by the trial Judge, following which the jury, after deliberation, returned a verdict of guilty with a recommendation for mercy, following which a motion for a new trial was made by counsel for the defendant, and refused by the Court, the grounds of the refused motion forming the basis for the nine exceptions now before this Court.

The seventh exception, which we shall consider first, is: "That his Honor erred in failing to charge the jury on manslaughter, the error being that there was testimony in the case from which the jury could have inferred that if the killing were done by defendant, that the same was done in sudden heat and passion."

The brief paragraph which constitutes the "Statement" in the voluminous typewritten transcript of record in the case contains no evidentiary matters, and the very brief paragraph in each of the typewritten briefs of counsel for both sides likewise confine themselves solely to the merest mention of the fact that motions for a directed verdict, and for a new trial, were made and refused. The facts and evidence in the case can be found only by an examination of the testimony of the two dozen witnesses, as reported in the typewritten transcript of record.

In our discussion of the question of manslaughter, and of the subsequent question of alibi, in their relation to this case, we are not, of course, considering the weight and sufficiency of the evidence which, under the instructions it had received, the jury had for its consideration. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the testimony on both sides were naturally questions which the jury should, and did, pass upon. Our allusions to the testimony in its relation to the exceptions pertaining to manslaughter and alibi are solely for the purpose of determining whether, under that testimony, the trial Judge should have instructed the jury more fully than he did as to whether, under that testimony, it could properly consider the offense of manslaughter and the defense of alibi. In view of the disposition which we shall make of this appeal, we shall, in this opinion, make as slight references to the testimony as is compatible with a statement of the reasons upon which we base our decision.

While there is no testimony in the record that any person saw the defendant commit the crime of manslaughter (or murder either, for that matter) we cannot agree with the position of the trial Judge that the evidence did not support submitting to the jury the question of manslaughter.

We find in the testimony considerable evidence that the defendant and his wife were on good terms prior to her death, and that any motive for the crime of murder was not only not positively shown by the State, but was negatived in part by at least one of the State's own witnesses. Bernard Currie, a witness for the State, testified that on the afternoon immediately prior to the morning on which Elizabeth Bealin met her death, he had taken his own wife and family, and the defendant and his wife and family, in the witness' automobile, on a shopping expedition to Johnsonville, where both men bought supplies for their families. He testified that Monroe Bealin made a considerable amount of purchases. The witness saw the defendant bring a number of bundles, some of which the witness knew to contain groceries and cloth and put them in the automobile, whereupon the witness drove the defendant and his family home in that automobile, and at the same time brought the goods which had been purchased, arriving at home at about six-thirty o'clock that afternoon. The witness stated that the supplies which Monroe Bealin purchased were a considerable amount and "a pretty good supply." This witness for the State testified further that on the return trip, the defendant requested him to take the defendant and his wife to church on the following morning, but that no final decision was then made since the witness had already planned to take a crowd on that occasion. He testified further that while he was dressing on Sunday morning, the defendant came to his home and inquired whether the witness would be able to carry out the plan, and that the defendant went away upon being told by the witness that he would do so.

The defendant later confirmed the testimony of the State's witness in the foregoing respect, and in reply to the question: "About how much did you spend for groceries and clothing over there (in Johnsonville) that Saturday evening?" answered: "Right around $12.00 or a little better."

Malachi Bealin, a half-brother of the defendant, testified that he saw and talked with the defendant at the filling station on the Sunday morning in question, and that Monroe Bealin gave him and another brother three bottled drinks and some candy...