State v. Beerbower, 77238
Decision Date | 18 April 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 77238,77238 |
Parties | STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Gary D. BEERBOWER, Appellee. |
Court | Kansas Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. A judgment of acquittal is a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged. A trial court's characterization of its own conduct may not always control whether it has rendered a judgment of acquittal or a dismissal.
2. Under the facts of the present case, where the record establishes that the trial court resolved absolutely no factual matters prior to ordering a dismissal, a judgment of acquittal was not granted in the first case.
3. The "without the consent of the defendant" portion of K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) involves situations where a defendant did not request the dismissal of the case or explicitly give consent to the dismissal through his or her actions.
4. Under the clear wording of K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c), a defendant is not in jeopardy in a case tried to the court until the court begins to hear evidence. The statutory language "begun to hear evidence" in a trial to the court means at least some evidence must have been introduced or a witness sworn. If the facts show this condition has been satisfied, jeopardy statutorily attaches. If it has not, jeopardy has not attached, and a second prosecution following dismissal of the first case may properly continue.
5. Under the facts of this case, the trial court had not begun to hear evidence in the first case, so a subsequent prosecution was not barred on double jeopardy grounds by the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c) or the Kansas or United States Constitutions.
Cline I. Boone, Assistant County Attorney, argued the cause, and John L. Swarts, III, County Attorney, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, were on the brief, for appellant.
Charles Gentry, of Short, Gentry & Bishop, P.A., Fort Scott, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.
This is an appeal by the State, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1), from the dismissal on double jeopardy grounds of charges of driving under the influence and while suspended against Gary D. Beerbower. The dismissed charges had been refiled after an earlier case was dismissed by the court at trial when the State's primary witness did not appear.
Factual background
In December 1995, a complaint was filed against Beerbower for DUI and driving while suspended. The case was set for trial in February 1996, but continued until March 25, 1996, when the record shows the following colloquy occurred:
The next day, Beerbower moved for a judgment of acquittal. This motion does not appear to have been ruled upon. A month later, the State filed a new complaint alleging the same counts that were previously charged. Beerbower moved to dismiss on grounds of double jeopardy.
The issue was briefed by both parties, with Beerbower claiming: Beerbower also asserted the prior dismissal should be characterized as a judgment of acquittal because the State presented no evidence when called upon to do so.
The trial court dismissed the second case and, citing K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c), ruled:
The court did not classify the prior dismissal as a judgment of acquittal, as requested by Beerbower, and did not rely upon K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(a).
A transcript of the dismissal of the first case was not available to the court at the time of its decision in the second case, which was based upon the court's and the parties' recollection of the prior proceedings.
The State's appeal is claimed to be "[f]rom an order dismissing a complaint," as allowed by K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1). The State argues that Beerbower was never placed in jeopardy, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c), because the court had not begun to hear evidence.
Beerbower asserts that jeopardy attached when the State failed to present its case when called upon to do so and that he did not consent to the dismissal. Beerbower further contends that the K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(a) prohibition on a second prosecution does not require the defendant to have been placed in jeopardy and that the first case was concluded after a finding that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction, effectively barring a second prosecution.
Standard of review
Although the trial court in this case appears to have based its decision on an inexact recollection of the previous proceedings, the facts shown by the transcript before us are uncontroverted. When facts are uncontroverted, a trial court decision that double jeopardy applies is subject to de novo review on appeal. State v. Harlin, 260 Kan. 881, 883, 925 P.2d 1149 (1996).
Arguments and authorities
In announcing its decision, the trial court ruled the second prosecution was barred under K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(c), but it also declared that allowing the second prosecution to continue would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Regarding this constitutional protection, we noted in State v. Freeman, 236 Kan. 274, 280-81, 689 P.2d 885 (1984):
The Freeman court then set forth the two Kansas statutory provisions which relate to the constitutional double jeopardy protection when it stated:
236 Kan. at 281, 689 P.2d 885.
The trial court in our case primarily based its decision to dismiss the second prosecution on the provisions of K.S.A. 21-3108. The applicable portions of the statute at issue read:
"(1) A prosecution is barred if the defendant was formerly prosecuted for the same crime, based upon the same facts, if such former prosecution:
(a) Resulted in either a conviction or an acquittal or in a determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction; or
....
(c) Was terminated without the consent of the defendant after the defendant had been placed in jeopardy.... A defendant is in jeopardy when he or she is put on trial in a court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment, information or complaint sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and in the case of trial by jury, when the jury has been...
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