State v. Beeson
| Decision Date | 15 May 1912 |
| Citation | 136 N.W. 317,155 Iowa 355 |
| Parties | STATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. GENOUR BEESON, Appellant |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Linn District Court.--HON. MILO P. SMITH, Judge.
THE defendant was indicted for the murder of his wife, and, being convicted of manslaughter, appeals.
Reversed.
Tom H Milner for appellant.
George Cosson, Attorney General, and John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
The defendant and family, consisting of his wife and three young children aged from six months to five years, lived in a farm house near Mt. Vernon in Linn county. He was himself employed as a laborer upon a neighboring farm. One Mendenhall and wife, parents of Mrs. Beeson, resided a mile and a half distant. Under the terms of his employment defendant lodged at his own home but took his meals at the house of his employer, one Neal, some sixty rods distant. On September 29, 1910, Neal and his family went from home in the morning and remained away most of the day, leaving the defendant at work on the farm. For at least a portion of the day he was engaged in hauling gravel and repairing fences. Several weeks prior to this time he had borrowed a double-barreled shotgun from Neal and had been in the habit of taking it out into the field where he worked and was heard to fire it at times before and after his working hours; but it is not shown whether he had it in the field on the day of the alleged murder. Some time in the afternoon the oldest child appeared at the home of the Mendenhalls, his grandparents. He explained the errand on which he had come and to his statement in this respect further reference is hereinafter made. About an hour later, the defendant, driving rapidly with team and wagon and bringing his two younger children, came to the Mendenhalls and in an excited manner exclaimed that his wife "had left him;" that she "was dead in the house." Mrs. Mendenhall at once charged him with murder of his wife, but he denied it, saying she had no reason to make such an accusation. The party, together with a neighbor or two, immediately drove to defendant's home, and, entering the house, found the wife lying dead on the floor. The shotgun was laid across an overturned chair to which it was fastened with muzzle pointing in the direction of the body. A string tied at one end of the trigger passed back over a chair rung and forward again to the body, where it was wrapped about the hand of the deceased. The charge from the gun had entered the head of the deceased just under and a little back of the left ear. The wound was "clean cut" and about the size of a silver half-dollar. The situation rendered it clearly apparent that the woman had committed suicide, or that she had been slain by another person who arranged these details to create a false impression or inference of suicide and thereby conceal his crime. There was more or less evidence as to the details of the situation revealed at the defendant's home and of alleged contradictions and inconsistencies of conduct on the defendant's part tending, to some extent at least, to discredit the theory of suicide and support the theory of a felonious killing; but of the weight and credibility of such testimony we express no opinion. Without going into further details at this point, it may be said that the fact that the death of the deceased was produced by this gunshot wound is shown beyond reasonable dispute, and that the vital questions upon the trial were whether that wound had been feloniously inflicted by another person, and, if so, whether the evidence establishes the defendant's guilty agency therein. This presents a sufficient statement of the record to indicate the materiality and bearing of the several assignments of error which are advanced by the defendant in support of his appeal.
I. Mrs. Mendenhall, mother of the deceased, having testified that her five year old grandson appeared at her home some time after noon on the day of his mother's death and remained there until defendant appeared an hour later, as we have already related, was asked by the prosecutor (referring to the child), "What did he say?" and over the objection of the defendant she was allowed to answer that the boy said he had come for his mother's pocketbook, which she had left there the day before, and that his father had sent him for it. She further testified, over appropriate objections, that deceased during her married life had said to witness (not in defendant's presence) that defendant had struck her on at least two occasions; had called her names; that she suspected him of "running with other women;" that on one or more occasions he had gone away leaving her without food; that she had been driven to seek charity; that he was intemperate, and when drinking would abuse her. Similar testimony was also given by other witnesses over the objection of the defendant. Another witness testified to visiting deceased at one time when her husband had left her and found her in a state of destitution. The matters and things of which these witnesses testified were for the most part not of recent occurrence, but took place at different times while the defendant and wife were living in the state of Minnesota and thereafter in Cedar Rapids, and before they moved to the farmhouse where the woman met her death. Upon the admission of this testimony error is assigned.
Concerning the testimony of the young child's statements to his grandmother, we think it should have been excluded; but, were this the only exception in the record, we should hesitate to hold that prejudicial error was shown, for it appears that the defendant's motion to strike this evidence was taken under advisement, and the record discloses no ruling nor any demand therefor.
The propriety of the court's ruling admitting proof of statements made by the wife in conversation with others, and not in the presence of the defendant, charging him with specific acts of personal violence, abuse, and neglect, presents a graver question. In support of the ruling, counsel for the state cite us to the authorities holding that upon a charge of this nature, and especially where a husband is accused of killing his wife, it is competent to show previous and repeated threats and acts of violence and abuse on his part toward the deceased as tending to show malice and motive and a state of mind and purpose which may naturally develop a murderous intent. We may concede that the precedents cited do announce this rule, and that within proper limitations the rule stated is eminently sound; but it does not cover the objection raised by the appellant. The rule relied upon by the state does no more than declare that such facts may be proved; but it announces no new or exceptional rule as to the admissibility of evidence by which such proof may be made. What the court below held, and what the state asks us to approve, is that such abuse and ill treatment need not necessarily be shown by the testimony of witnesses having any knowledge thereof, but by mere hearsay--the statements of witnesses who claim to have heard the deceased in her lifetime and not in the presence of her husband make such charges against him. We are cited to no authority that goes to this extent.
To be admissible as evidence against the accused, the statements must be so immediately connected with the alleged crime as to be a part of the res gestae. None of the testimony now under consideration is of that character. The incompetency of hearsay testimony is such an elementary proposition in the law of evidence that citation of authorities is uncalled for. It is true this is a rule to which there are several well-defined real or apparent exceptions; but none of them is broad enough to include a case like the one now under consideration. Its inadmissibility arises from its essential nature. Its very name or definition presupposes some better testimony which ought to be produced. Except as it may fall within the res gestae rule, such evidence is intrinsically weak and fails to satisfy the impartial mind. It affords a cover to fraud and gives to an unsworn statement of one person of matters which are repeated by another, whose bias or failure to understand or whose imperfection of memory may vitally affect its real meaning and import, the same dignity and quality which we give to testimony taken under oath in a solemn judicial proceeding. This is inconsistent with the fundamental principles upon which justice is administered by the courts. Queen v. Hepburn, 7 Cranch 290 (3 L.Ed 348). To a man on trial for his life or liberty it is a legal right of the very highest value that he shall be tried according to the established law of the land and upon competent evidence. When these landmarks are ignored, the most sacred privileges and immunities of citizenship are potentially exposed to destruction. That this evidence was extremely prejudicial to defendant is too clear for argument. This will be more particularly apparent when we say that no witness was produced who undertakes to say that he or she ever heard the defendant threaten the deceased...
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