State v. Bell, 835SC195

• Decision Date: 06 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 835SC195,835SC195
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Melvin BELL.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 464

309 S.E.2d 464

65 N.C.App. 234

STATE of North Carolina v. Melvin BELL.

No. 835SC195.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Dec. 6, 1983.

Atty. Gen., Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen., James C. Gulick and Sp. Deputy Atty. Gen., John R.B. Matthis, Raleigh, for the State.

Appellate Defender, Adam Stein by Asst. Appellate Defender, James H. Gold, Raleigh, for defendant.

WELLS, Judge.

In his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to dismiss the murder charge. We agree.

"Upon the defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit in a criminal action, the question for the court is whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and of the defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense.... In making this determination, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State and the State is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from it....

"The test of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the motion for judgment of nonsuit is the same whether the evidence is circumstantial, direct or both.... There is substantial evidence of each element of the offense charged, ... and of the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of it if, but only if, interpreting the evidence in accordance with the foregoing rule, the jury could draw a reasonable inference of each such fact from the evidence.... If, on the other hand, the evidence so considered, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, raises no more than a suspicion or a conjecture, either that the offense charged in the indictment, or a lesser offense included therein, has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the evidence is not sufficient and the motion for judgment of nonsuit should be allowed." [Citations omitted]. State v. Vestal, 278 N.C. 561, 180 S.E.2d 755 (1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874, 94 S.Ct. 157, 38 L.Ed.2d 114 (1973), see also State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 261 S.E.2d 114 (1980); State v. Smith, 40 N.C.App. 72, 252 S.E.2d 535 (1979).

The rule, thus stated, proves more difficult in application than in formulation. Nearly a century ago, our courts recognized that the question "... whether there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury ... is often [an] embarrassing one to the courts and probably gives them as much trouble as any question that comes before them...." State v. Gragg, 122 N.C. 1082, 30 S.E. 306 (1898). Twentieth century courts have made little progress toward resolving the problem and cases decided since Gragg lack consistent analyses and results. The difficulty of applying the standard consistently to the varying facts of each case increases where evidence of the defendant's guilt is purely circumstantial. This is so because determining the significance of circumstantial evidence requires the trier of fact to infer the presence of a disputed fact from an offered fact, a logical step not required in evaluating direct evidence.

Perhaps it is this additional step which explains the confusion in decisions concerning sufficiency of the evidence. The lack of consistency in the case law begs for the construction of some test or guideline around which both defense and prosecution attorneys could build their cases. Our analysis of the cases and the problem before us, however, convinces us that such a standard, while desirable, would not be sufficiently flexible and is certainly not supported by precedent.

The first area of confusion in decided cases concerns the quantum of proof that the state must present in order to survive a defendant's motion to dismiss. Earlier cases required that the state must present evidence inconsistent with any hypothesis other than guilt. State v. Harvey, 228 N.C. 62, 44 S.E.2d 472 (1947). This language was overruled, at least formally, in State v. Stephens, 244 N.C. 380, 93 S.E.2d 431 (1956). In that case the court held that the state need only present substantial evidence of all material elements of the offense to overcome a motion to dismiss. "To hold that the court must grant a motion to dismiss unless, in the opinion of the court, the evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence would in effect constitute the presiding judge the trier of facts." Id. While the rule appears sound and well-reasoned, it is unclear whether introduction of the new standard has made a significant difference in the outcome of cases. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 294 N.C. 299, 240 S.E.2d 449 (1978), in which the court noted that the facts presented by the state "excited suspicion in the just mind that he is guilty, but such view is far from excluding the rational conclusion that some other unknown person may be the guilty party...." citing State v. Goodson, 107 N.C. 798, 12 S.E. 329 (1890).

In addition to the inconsistent language concerning the level of proof required of each material element of the crime, the cases fail to specify how much evidence the state must produce that the defendant is the perpetrator of the crime. The modern "test" states only that there must be substantial proof of each element of the crime and that the defendant committed the act. There appears to be no logical reason to require less than "substantial" proof that defendant is the perpetrator, however, despite the lack of authority on the subject.

The difficulty in labelling the required level of proof that defendant committed the crime touches only the surface of the problem presented upon a motion to dismiss. The real problem lies in applying the test to the individual facts of a case, particularly where the proof is circumstantial. One method courts use to assist analysis is to classify evidence of guilt into several rather broad categories. Although the language is by no means consistent, courts often speak in terms of proof of motive, opportunity, capability and identity, all of which are merely different ways to show that a particular person committed a particular crime. In most cases these factors are not essential elements of the crime, but instead are circumstances which are relevant to identify an accused as the perpetrator of a crime. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 230 N.C. 205, 52 S.E.2d 908 (1950); State v. O'Neal, 187 N.C. 22, 120 S.E. 817 (1924); Brandis, North Carolina Evidence § 83 (2d rev. ed. 1982). While the cases do not generally indicate what weight is to be given evidence of these various factors, a few rough rules do appear. It is clear, for instance, that evidence of either motive or opportunity alone is insufficient to carry a case to the jury. State v. White, 293 N.C. 91, 235 S.E.2d 55 (1977) (the victim lived in a mobile home adjacent to the motel where defendant lived; defendant, a black man, frequently visited the victim; a black man was seen running away from the mobile home on the evening of the killing; there was blood on the carpet of defendant's motel room, and a knife similar to the murder weapon was found in defendant's room); State v. Cutler, 271 N.C. 379, 156 S.E.2d 679 (1967) (defendant was seen driving to the victim's house twice on the day of the killing and that his truck was parked in the victim's yard; defendant, who had been drinking heavily, returned home on the day of the killing with a deep head wound; and a search of defendant's room revealed a bloody pocket knife with chest hairs similar to the victim's stuck on the blade); see also State v. Hendrick, 232 N.C. 447, 61 S.E.2d 349 (1950); 4 N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 106.2.

When the question is whether evidence of both motive and opportunity will be sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, the answer is much less clear. The answer appears to rest more upon the strength of the evidence of motive and opportunity, as well as other available evidence, rather than an easily quantifiable "bright line" test. For instance, in State v. Furr, 292 N.C. 711, 235 S.E.2d 193, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 924, 98 S.Ct. 402, 54 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), defendant threatened ex-wife repeatedly, tried to hire others to kill her, possessed a garage door opener to her home and lived within...