State v. Bell
| Decision Date | 17 November 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 3,3 |
| Citation | 720 A.2d 311,351 Md. 709 |
| Parties | STATE of Maryland v. Wilbur BELL. |
| Court | Maryland Court of Appeals |
Mary Ann Ince, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.
Daniel H. Weiss, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on brief), Baltimore, for Respondent.
Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, CHASANOW, RAKER, WILNER and CATHELL, JJ.
Wilbur Bell, respondent, was convicted in a court trial before the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of second degree rape, assault and battery, attempted rape, and assault with intent to rape. He was sentenced to twenty years imprisonment on the rape conviction, with ten years suspended. The trial court merged the remaining counts for sentencing purposes. Respondent appealed his convictions to the Court of Special Appeals.
As relevant to this opinion, that court vacated his convictions and remanded the case to the circuit court, holding that respondent had been insufficiently advised of his right to a jury trial because the trial court failed to advise him specifically of the unanimity requirement that all twelve jurors must agree in order to render a verdict of guilt.1 The State petitioned this Court, presenting one issue for our consideration:
Did the Court of Special Appeals incorrectly hold that Maryland Rule 4-246(b) requires an examination of a defendant on the record and in open court regarding jury unanimity as a prerequisite for a knowing and voluntary waiver of a jury trial?
We granted a writ of certiorari to answer this important question. We shall reverse the Court of Special Appeals and direct it to affirm the trial court's judgment.
On September 2, 1994, respondent was arrested pursuant to a warrant for the above-charged offenses. The record indicates that on November 14, 1994, he filed a demand for a jury trial. When the case ultimately was called for trial, the following exchange occurred:
The Defendant: I'm thirty-four.
Mr. Hale: You can read and write the English language, right?
The Defendant: Yes.
Mr. Hale: You know what you are charged with, second degree rape, a very serious charge that can get you thirty years in jail?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: You and I talked about whether you should have a jury trial or judge trial, haven't we?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: And we came to the conclusion that we would like Judge Hotten to decide the case rather than a jury?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: Have I forced you to do that?
The Defendant: No, sir.
Mr. Hale: Are you giving up your right to a jury trial freely and voluntarily?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
Mr. Hale: Has anyone promised you anything?
The Defendant: No, sir.
Mr. Hale: Or offered you any inducement?
The Defendant: No, sir.
Mr. Hale: Are you in good health mentally and physically?
The Defendant: No.
The Court: Have you taken any alcohol, medication or drugs?
The Defendant: No, ma'am.
The Court: Do you understand if you were to have a jury trial, which would consist of twelve people, or whether you choose to have this member of the bench hear the case, the State would still have the burden to prove the charges against you beyond a reasonable doubt?
The Defendant: Yes, sir [sic].
The Court: Have you been satisfied with the services of your attorney up to the present time?
The Defendant: Yes, ma'am.
The Court: Is there anything that's been said or anything that's been going on so far that you don't understand or have a question about?
The Defendant: No, ma'am.
The Court: At this time, knowing that you give up the right to a jury trial and that you are under the influence of no alcohol, medication or drugs, and that you are making this decision freely and voluntarily, is it your intention to give up or waive your right to a jury trial?
The Defendant: Yes.
The Court: Okay.
We said in Countess v. State, 286 Md. 444, 455, 408 A.2d 1302, 1307-08 (1979):
The requirement of § d [of then Rule 735] that the defendant must "knowingly and voluntarily" waive the right to a jury trial goes no further than the mandates for a waiver of that right under the constitutions. If the waiver is determined by the court to have been an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, it meets the test of Rule 735d. For the court to ascertain whether it was a "known right" which was waived, § d prescribes that the defendant have "full knowledge of his right to a jury trial." The defendant-petitioners urge that "[t]he term `full knowledge' certainly implies understanding of the most salient features of trial by jury, including, at a minimum, the composition of the jury, the jury selection process, and the unanimity requirement." This goes far beyond what is necessary for a waiver of a jury trial to be constitutionally effective; the Supreme Court has certainly not enunciated such a test. We do not believe that Rule 735 calls for knowledge of all the matters which the defendant-petitioners suggest are essential to a valid election of a court trial. Such detailed information regarding a jury is not indicated. What the Rule contemplates is that the defendant have a basic understanding of the nature of a jury trial. We think that this understanding is generally satisfied when the defendant entitled to a jury trial knows that he has the right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury; that whether trial is by a jury or by the court, his guilt must be found to be beyond a reasonable doubt; that in a jury trial all 12 jurors must agree that he is so guilty but in a court trial the judge may so find. These are the matters which the defendant acknowledges he is aware of in the written form of election set out in § b of the Rule in designating his election of court trial or jury trial, and normally they should suffice. We saw no need to go further when we adopted the Rule, and we see no need to add other matters now. Ordinarily if the court duly determines that the defendant understands those aspects of a jury trial, he has, under the Rule, "full knowledge of his right to a jury trial." [Emphasis added.]
The rule in effect at the time of our decision in Countess, Maryland Rule 735(d), provided:
If the defendant elects to be tried by the court, the trial of the case on its merits before the court may not proceed until the court determines, after inquiry of the defendant on the record, that the defendant has made his election for a court trial with full knowledge of his right to a jury trial and that he has knowingly and voluntarily waived the right. If the court determines otherwise, it shall give the defendant another election pursuant to this Rule. [Emphasis added.]
Additionally, subsection (b) of that rule provided a form criminal defendants were required to sign to elect a court or jury trial. That form specified, inter alia, that the defendant knew he had "a right to be tried by a jury of 12 persons or by the court without a jury," and that in a jury trial, "all 12 jurors must find that [the defendant is] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Relative to this waiver procedure, we noted in Countess, 286 Md. at 453, 408 A.2d at 1307, that "[t]here are three aspects to this procedure: (1) the election; (2) the inquiry; and (3) the knowledge necessary for an effective waiver of a trial by jury."
After our decision in Countess, this Court revised Rule 735 on November 13, 1981 (effective January 1, 1982), deleting the "full knowledge" requirement. Additionally, revised Rule 735 no longer required a written waiver or fixed litany of advice. 8 Md. Reg. 1928, 1929-30 (1981); see also State v. Hall, 321 Md. 178, 182, 582 A.2d 507, 509 (1990)
; Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 132 n. 7, 134, 522 A.2d 950, 954 n. 7, 955 (1987) (). The rule, as modified to its present form as Maryland Rule 4-246, provides in subsection (b):
(b) Procedure for acceptance of waiver. A defendant may waive the right to a trial by jury at any time before the commencement of trial. The court may not accept the waiver until it determines, after an examination of the defendant on the record in open court conducted by the court, the State's Attorney, the attorney for the defendant, or any combination thereof, that the waiver is made knowingly and voluntarily. [Emphasis added.]
As is evident from the emphasized portions of the respective rules, the requirement of "full knowledge" contained in the former Rule 735, as it existed at the time of Countess, has been deleted and a trial court now may accept a waiver if it is satisfied that the waiver is made "knowingly and voluntarily."2 The current rule no longer requires the trial court to establish that a defendant has "full knowledge" of the right to a jury trial. We therefore must address what different standard, if any, was created when the rule was modified to delete the "full knowledge" requirement in effect at the time of Countess.
We have not addressed, since the rule was modified in 1981, whether a defendant can "knowingly" waive his or her right to a jury trial without a specific reference to the unanimity requirement during the in-court advice given to a defendant about whether to elect a court or jury trial.3 We begin...
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