State v. Benally

• Decision Date: 20 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. S-1-SC-37613,S-1-SC-37613
• Court: New Mexico Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner, v. Milo BENALLY, Defendant-Respondent.

493 P.3d 366

STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Petitioner,

v.Milo BENALLY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. S-1-SC-37613

Supreme Court of New Mexico.

Filing Date: May 20, 2021

Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General, Walter M. Hart, III, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner

Bennett J. Baur, Chief Public Defender, Nina Lalevic, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent

VIGIL, Justice.

{1} We granted certiorari to review whether Defendant Milo Benally's two convictions for "[p]ossession of deadly weapon or explosive by prisoner," NMSA 1978, § 30-22-16 (1986), violated his double jeopardy rights under the United States and New Mexico Constitutions. State v. Benally , 2019-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 23-24, 448 P.3d 592. More specifically, we are asked to consider "whether the [L]egislature intended" to punish Defendant for his "entire course of conduct" in possessing two deadly weapons while incarcerated, or "whether the [L]egislature intended" to punish Defendant separately "for each discrete act" or weapon possessed. Swafford v. State , 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 8, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223. This case thus presents a question about the intended unit of prosecution under Section 30-22-16.

{2} The Court of Appeals held that Section 30-22-16 was ambiguous as to its intended unit of prosecution and that Defendant's conduct was not sufficiently distinct to support multiple punishments. Benally, 2019-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 13-23, 448 P.3d 592. We affirm the Court of Appeals and, like that court, id. ¶ 24, remand to the district court to vacate one of Defendant's convictions. Nevertheless, we write to reemphasize the relevant inquiry of our two-step framework for reviewing questions of double jeopardy in which a defendant has received multiple punishments for violation of the same statute, such as in the case presented here. See Herron v. State , 1991-NMSC-012, ¶ 12, 111 N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624.

{3} We begin by reviewing the background and procedural posture of this appeal. Next, we set forth our standard of review and explain our two-step approach to analyzing cases presenting issues of double jeopardy in unit of prosecution convictions. We then analyze Defendant's two convictions for possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner under Section 30-22-16 using this two-step framework. In the end, we affirm the Court of Appeals and remand to the district court to vacate one of Defendant's convictions as violative of his double jeopardy rights.

I. BACKGROUND

{4} The underlying facts of this case were well detailed by the Court of Appeals, and we incorporate that description here. Benally , 2019-NMCA-048, ¶¶ 2-5, 448 P.3d 592. We recite only those facts we deem helpful to our analysis.

{5} Following a "shakedown" search of Defendant's dormitory-style pod, prison staff found "two makeshift weapons" in Defendant's bunk. Id . ¶¶ 2-4. The first weapon was "a shaving razor with a playing card folded around it to form a handle." Id . ¶ 3. This "razor weapon" was found in the support bar of the bunk above Defendant's bed. Id. The second weapon was "a sharpened piece of the end of a plastic mop handle," which was found hidden inside Defendant's mattress. Id . Also inside the mattress was a locking ring from the same mop. In a nearby shower stall, prison staff found "orange plastic shavings that matched the end of a mop handle ... and similar residue ground into the concrete lip of the shower pan." Id . ¶ 3. Finally, in a utility closet used to store cleaning supplies, prison staff found "that an end to one of the plastic mop handles had been removed." Id.

{6} Defendant later made incriminating statements during an interview with prison officials, expressing anger towards another inmate and insinuating that he knew prison staff had found weapons in the dormitory. Id. ¶ 4. However, Defendant did not fully admit to possessing the weapons, id. , and later testified that he had never seen the razor weapon, mop weapon, or mop locking ring prior to trial.

{7} The jury convicted Defendant of two counts of possession of a deadly weapon by a prisoner, contrary to Section 30-22-16. Benally , 2019-NMCA-048, ¶ 5, 448 P.3d 592. Defendant received a nine-year sentence for each conviction, NMSA 1978, § 31-18-15(A)(7) (2007, amended 2019), and each sentence was enhanced by eight years because Defendant was a three-time habitual offender under NMSA 1978, § 31-18-17(C) (2003). In total, Defendant was sentenced to thirty-four years.

{8} Defendant sought reversal of his convictions on two grounds before the Court of Appeals. Benally , 2019-NMCA-048, ¶ 1, 448 P.3d 592. First, he asserted that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence because the State failed to show that Defendant possessed the two weapons. Id. ¶ 6. The Court of Appeals disagreed and found the evidence sufficient for the jury to infer Defendant's constructive possession. Id . ¶¶ 9-10, 12. We denied Defendant's petition for certiorari on the sufficiency of the evidence issue, and that issue is not before this Court.

{9} Second, and pertinent to our review, Defendant argued that his convictions violated his right under principles of double jeopardy to be free from multiple punishments for the same conduct under the same criminal statute. Id. ¶ 13. The Court of Appeals agreed and vacated one of Defendant's convictions as violative of his double jeopardy rights. Id. ¶ 23. The State appealed, challenging the Court of Appeals' conclusion that there were not "sufficient indicia of distinctness to support Defendant's separate convictions under Section 30-22-16," id. , and arguing that "the Legislature intended ... to permit a separate charge [and resultant punishment] for each deadly weapon found in possession of a prisoner." We granted certiorari only as to this double jeopardy issue.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{10} "The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, and Article II, Section 15 of the New Mexico Constitution each protect defendants against multiple punishments for the same offense." State v. Alvarez-Lopez , 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 38, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699. However, "[i]n the multiple punishment context, the Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the [L]egislature intended." Swafford, 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 7, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223 (brackets omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The issue, though constitutional, becomes "primarily one of legislative intent," because "[m]ultiple punishments run afoul of the double jeopardy clause only where the Legislature has not authorized multiple punishments." State v. Ellenberger , 1981-NMSC-056, ¶ 17, 96 N.M. 287, 629 P.2d 1216.

{11} We have identified two types of multiple punishment cases: "cases in which a defendant has been charged with multiple violations of a single statute based on a single course of conduct, known as unit of prosecution cases; and cases in which a defendant is charged with violations of multiple statutes for the same conduct, known as double-description cases." State v. DeGraff, 2006-NMSC-011, ¶ 25, 139 N.M. 211, 131 P.3d 61 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "While the analysis for each type of case focuses on whether the Legislature intended multiple punishments, the particular canons of construction we apply in ascertaining the Legislature's intent depend on the specific type of multiple punishment case in front of us." Alvarez-Lopez , 2004-NMSC-030, ¶ 38, 136 N.M. 309, 98 P.3d 699 (citation omitted). This is a unit of prosecution case where "the relevant inquiry ... is whether the [L]egislature intended punishment for the entire course of conduct or for each discrete act." Swafford , 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 8, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223. We review this question de novo. State v. Olsson , 2014-NMSC-012, ¶ 14, 324 P.3d 1230.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Two-Step Analytical Framework for Unit of Prosecution Cases

{12} We have previously articulated a two-step framework for analyzing questions about the intended unit of prosecution of a criminal statute. Herron , 1991-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 6, 15, 111 N.M. 357, 805 P.2d 624. Throughout both steps of our unit of prosecution analysis, our focus remains on whether a defendant has received more punishments than the number of punishments that the Legislature intended to authorize under the facts and circumstances of the case. See Swafford , 1991-NMSC-043, ¶ 7, 112 N.M. 3, 810 P.2d 1223.

{13} Under the first step of our framework, we "must analyze the statute to determine whether the Legislature has defined the unit of prosecution and, if the statute spells out the unit of prosecution, then the court follows that language and the inquiry is complete." Olsson , 2014-NMSC-012, ¶ 18, 324 P.3d 1230. The purpose of this first step is to ascertain the legislative intent as to the unit of prosecution or, in other words, to determine what conduct the Legislature "has defined [as] a statutory offense" or "[w]hether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct offenses under the statute." Sanabria v. United States , 437 U.S. 54, 69-70, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978). Our prior caselaw makes clear that we should consider all markers of legislative intent in construing the unit of prosecution defined by a criminal statute, including the wording, structure, legislative history, legislative purpose, and quantum of punishment prescribed under the statutory scheme. State v. Swick , 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 33, 279 P.3d 747 ; State v. Gallegos , 2011-NMSC-027, ¶¶ 32-33, 149 N.M. 704, 254 P.3d 655 ; Olsson , 2014-NMSC-012, ¶¶ 23-30, 324 P.3d 1230 ; DeGraff , 2006-NMSC-011, ¶¶ 32-34, 139 N.M. 211, 131 P.3d 61. We note, however, that some of our unit of prosecution precedents may have not explicitly discussed all potentially relevant canons of statutory construction. See, e.g. , State v. Bernal , 2006-NMSC-050, ¶ 14, 140 N.M. 644, 146...