State v. Bennett

Decision Date16 November 1940
Docket Number28111.
Citation6 Wn.2d 208,107 P.2d 344
PartiesSTATE v. BENNETT.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Thomas F. Bennett was convicted of inducing a belief that he was engaged in practice of chiropractic at a time when he was not a licensed practitioner, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Pierce County; F. G Remann, judge.

George G. Rinier, of Indianapolis, Ind., and J. W. Selden, of Tacoma, for appellant.

Thor C Tollefson, Hugo Metzler, Jr., and Horace G. Geer, all of Tacoma, for respondent.

STEINERT Justice.

Upon a trial by jury, defendant, Thomas F. Bennett, was found guilty of the crime of inducing a belief that he was engaged in the practice of chiropractic at a time when he was not a licensed practitioner. From a judgment of conviction, he now appeals.

Appellant contends that the court erred (1) in refusing to dismiss the case, or to direct a verdict in his favor, because of insufficiency of the state's evidence; (2) in denying his motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment, on the ground that the state had failed to prove the crime charged (3) in denying similar motions, on the ground that venue had not been established; and (4) in giving a certain instruction.

The first two assignments of error are argued, and will be considered, together.

Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10099 makes it unlawful for any person to practice chiropractic in this state unless he shall have obtained a license from the state board of chiropractic examiners. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10101 requires that every applicant for a license shall pass an examination given by the board. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10109 reads, in part, as follows: 'Any person who shall practice or attempt to practice chiropractic, * * * or who shall use the title chiropractic, D. C. Ph. C., or any word or title to induce belief that he is engaged in the practice of chiropractic without first complying with the provisions of this act, * * * shall be guilty of a misdemeanor * * *.'

Appellant was accused of having violated Rem.Rev.Stat. § 10109, in that, without first obtaining the necessary license, he used the title 'chiropractic, D.C.Ph.C.,' upon business cards, in the telephone directory, and upon his office window at 5214 South Tacoma Way, thereby inducing the belief that he was engaged in the practice of chiropractic.

It is undisputed that at the time alleged in the information, and for at least a year prior thereto, appellant did not have the required license.

The evidence in the case, which was adduced solely through the testimony of two inspectors from the state department of licenses, may be summarized as follows: At the time involved in this action, appellant's office was located on the ground floor of a building facing and bordering a street in the business section of South Tacoma. On the front window of the office was a sign bearing an inscription, in letters large enough to be seen from the street, which read: 'Thomas F. Bennett, Palmer Graduate, X-Ray, Chiropractic.'

On Monday morning, March 4, 1940, the two inspectors visited and interviewed appellant at his office. On entering the reception room of the office, they observed a tray containing appellant's professional cards. Upon the central portion of the cards, two of which appear as exhibits in the case, were printed the words 'Thomas F. Bennett, Palmer Graduate, Chiropractor,' and upon the four corners of the cards appeared information relative to appellant's telephone number, address, office hours, etc. While the inspectors were waiting in the reception room, appellant emerged from the private portion of his office accompanied by a lady to whom he remarked at the time, 'I will see you Wednesday.'

The city telephone directory in general use at that time contained, in its classified advertisement section, an item reading: 'Bennett, Thos. F., X-Ray, Neurocalometer Service, Palmer Graduate, 5214 South Tacoma Way, Telephone, Garland 1329.'

Mr. William Lasher, the inspector who conducted the interview with appellant, testified: 'I asked him if he was practicing, and if the wording on the window was still the same and the words in the telephone book and the advertising, and he said it was the same as it had been right along. * * * He [appellant] said he had no license; that he felt it was not necessary; that it was not fair to them to have to pass that examination and that he had never gotten a license.'

The other inspector, Mr. Eli L. Duncan, testified: 'Mr. Lasher asked him [appellant] if he was still advertising in the telephone book and practicing the same as he had been, and he told Mr. Lasher he was. Then Mr. Lasher talked to him about his license and he [appellant] said he did not feel like that he needed a license and that in fact he would not accept one if given to him because it would not make him so that he could treat his patients any better. * * * Well, he [appellant] said he did not feel it would make him capable of performing the work any better or that it would add to his certificate from his school, and said, 'That is the only thing that really matters to me.''

Upon cross-examination, it appeared that, in connection with the same matter, one of the inspectors had called on appellant about a year prior to the instant visit.

At the conclusion of the state's evidence, and without the offer of any evidence by appellant, the case was submitted to the jury upon instructions given by the court.

We are of the view that, upon the evidence, the jury not only could have believed that appellant was engaged in the practice of chiropractic without having a license so to do, but also was clearly warranted in finding, as it did, that appellant had 'induced a belief' on the part of the general public that he was engaged in that profession.

It is true, as appellant points out, that the inspectors did not see the appellant actually performing any manual operation upon a patient, and that no witness testified that he, or she, had been induced to believe that appellant was engaged in the practice of chiropractic.

However it was not essential that the...

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5 cases
  • Crouch v. Wyckoff
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • November 22, 1940
  • State v. Rasmussen
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • July 31, 1942
    ...regarding the insertion in the telephone book. However, circumstantial evidence was admissible to prove that fact. State v. Bennett, 6 Wash.2d 208, 107 P.2d 344. facts in this case are similar to those in State v. Low, 192 Wash. 631, 74 P.2d 458, and State v. Bennett, supra. In the first ca......
  • State v. Palmer
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • October 22, 1969
    ...case, as any other, may be proved by circumstantial evidence which has the same probative effect as direct testimony. State v. Bennett, 6 Wash.2d 208, 107 P.2d 344 (1940). The review given to circumstantial evidence was defined in State v. Dugger, 75 Wash.Dec.2d 702, 704, 453 P.2d 655, 656 ......
  • Young v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
    • June 13, 1962
    ...may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and reasonable inferences have the same probative effect as direct testimony.' (State v. Bennett, 6 Wash.2d 208, 107 P.2d 344.) Furthermore, there was competent evidence upon which the jury could have convicted the plaintiff, aside from any evidence......
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