State v. Bennett
| Decision Date | 30 July 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 7158,7158 |
| Citation | 362 A.2d 184,116 N.H. 433 |
| Parties | STATE of New Hampshire v. Joseph BENNETT. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Warren B. Rudman, Atty. Gen., and David W. Hess Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
T. Casey Moher, Dover, by brief and orally, for defendant.
The defendant is charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. RSA 262-A:62 (Supp.1975; Laws 1973, 528:321.) The defendant moved to dismiss the charge. After a hearing the District Court (Calderwood, J.) denied the motion and reserved and transferred the defendant's exceptions with the following agreed statement:
'The facts were that a State Police officer was parked off Route #108 in Madbury, a few hundred feet from the City Line of Dover.
'The defendant driving out of an entrance in Dover was observed to drive out in front of an approaching vehicle going in the same direction and allegedly the defendant did not yield the right of way to said approaching vehicle, all of which occurred within the City of Dover.
'The State Police officer drove out of the Town of Madbury into the City of Dover and stopped the defendant's vehicle, out of which apprehension evolved the complaint for driving while under the influence. The State Police officer had not been requested by any official to act in the City of Dover.
'The agreed issues are:
'1. Was the violation observed by the State Police officer a 'crime' as this term is used in RSA 106-B:15.
The second issue is the credibility of the officer's testimony that he saw the defendant fail to yield the right of way in violation of RSA 262-A:30 and :2 (Supp.1975). Nothing in the agreed statement suggests that the testimony is inherently improbable. The agreed facts warranted a finding and ruling that the officer had probable cause to stop the defendant.
The first and third issues require interpretation of PSA 106-B:15 which provides: 'A (state) pplice employee shall not act within the limits of a town having a population of more than three thousand or of any city, except when he witnesses a crime or is in pursuit of a law violator or suspected violator, or when in search of a person wanted for a crime committed outside its limits, or when in search of a witness of such crime or when requested to act by an official of another law enforcement agency, as provided under section 11, or when ordered by the governor.' (Emphasis supplied.) Compare Iowa Code § 80.9 (1975); 23 Louisiana Rev.Stat.Ann. 40:1387 (1965); 8A Md.Ann.Code Art. 88B, § 4(b) (1969).
On the first issue the defendant notes that failure to yield the right of way is a violation. RSA 262-A:30 and :2 (Supp.1975). Under the criminal code, '(a) violation does not constitute a crime . . .' RSA 625:9 II(b). The defendant argues that the officer had no authority to act because he had not witnessed a 'crime'. This argument is answered by State v. Miller, 115 N.H. 662, 348 A.2d 345 (1975), which held in similar circumstances that the technical definitions of the criminal code would not be imported into other statutes where there was no evidence that the legislature intended to change the other statute. There is no indication that the legislature intended to restrict the jurisdiction of the state police when it created the distinction between violations and crimes in the criminal code. The legislature has not amended RSA 106-B:12 (Supp.1975), which directs the state police to enforce the highway traffic laws and regulations.
Therefore, the defendant's failure to yield the right of way constituted a crime within the meaning of RSA 106-B:15, and the officer had authority to act.
Under RSA 106-B:15 a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Slayton
...in order to promote harmony among the various police authorities and insure the efficient use of the State police. See State v. Bennett, 116 N.H. ---, 362 A.2d 184 (1976). The officer, in his approach to the defendant, was intent only on rendering aid to an apparently disabled motorist. Suc......
-
Welch v. Director, New Hampshire Div. of Motor Vehicles
...and to provide for the efficient deployment of the State police. The second is to enforce the criminal law." State v. Bennett, 116 N.H. 433, 435, 362 A.2d 184, 186 (1976). The importance of the second objective has justified a liberal interpretation of the statute. Cf. State v. Kolocotronis......
-
State v. Doe, 7514
...not a 'crime', no such distinction exists outside the Code.' Id. at 664, 348 A.2d at 347. In discussing Miller in State v. Bennett, 116 N.H. --, --, 362 A.2d 184, 185 (1976), we stated that 'the technical definitions of the Criminal Code would not be imported into other statutes where there......
-
State v. Kolocotronis, 7104
...designed to minimize friction between law enforcement agencies and provide for the efficient use of the State police. State v. Bennett, 116 N.H. --, 362 A.2d 184 (1976). Notwithstanding the officer's personal judgment, it is evident from the agreed statement of facts that his pursuit was in......