State v. Bentley
| Decision Date | 10 December 1943 |
| Docket Number | No. 33523.,No. 33446.,No. 33499.,No. 33522.,33499.,33522.,33523.,33446. |
| Citation | 12 N.W.2d 347,216 Minn. 146 |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. PETERSON, Attorney General., v. BENTLEY et al. (BIG STONE CANNING CO. et al., Interveners). STATE ex rel. BURNQUIST, Attorney General, v. DISTRICT COURT, BIG STONE COUNTY, SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DIST. et al. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Condemnation proceedings by the State, by Harry H. Peterson, its Attorney General, against John W. Bentley and others, wherein Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company and Medbery Brothers and the Big Stone Canning Company filed their petitions in intervention by which they sought to bring their respective tracts of land into the proceedings. From an order bringing tract of the interveners Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company and Medbery Brothers into the proceedings and judgment awarding damages to such interveners, and from order overruling demurrer to the intervening petition of the Big Stone Canning Company, the State, by Harry H. Peterson, its Attorney General, appealed. A writ of prohibition was issued out of Supreme Court on a petition by the State, on the relation of J. A. A. Burnquist, Attorney General, against the District Court, Big Stone County, Sixteenth Judicial District, and others, restraining further proceedings in the District Court until the further order of the Supreme Court.
Order and judgment appealed from affirmed. Writ discharged.
J. A. A. Burnquist, Atty. Gen., Chester S. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Sam W. Campbell, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for relator and appellant.
Victor E. Anderson and Carl J. Eastvold, both of St. Paul, E. V. Cliff, of Ortonville, and Edwin C. Kraus and Geo. T. Havel, both of LeCenter, for respondents.
In June 1935, the state, by its attorney general, initiated proceedings in the district court of Big Stone county for the condemnation of certain lands in that county proposed to be taken in connection with the construction of a work relief project known as "F. A. 1 — Big Stone-Whetstone Project." The proceedings were instituted pursuant to Mason St.1927, c. 41, as amended, and L.1935, c. 51, under the authority and direction of the state executive council. An order granting the state's petition and appointing appraisers to ascertain and report the amount of damages to the several owners by reason of the taking was filed September 18, 1935. Work on the project was commenced in the fall of 1935 and completed in the spring of 1937, but a certificate of completion, with approval thereof, has not been filed as required by Minn. St.1941, § 117.20(4), Mason St.1927, § 6557-1(d). All of the lands condemned by the state are located at the southerly end of Big Stone Lake. The lake extends about 25 miles to the north and west of the lands so taken and forms the border between Minnesota and South Dakota at that place.
The controversies here involved have to do with tracts of land not included in the original petition. One of these tracts consists of 1,251 acres located at the head and northerly end of Big Stone Lake and is owned jointly by the Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company and Medbery Brothers. It is referred to in the briefs and will hereinafter be referred to as the Medbery land. About one-half of this tract is located in Minnesota and one-half in South Dakota. The other tract consists of 335 acres and is owned by the Big Stone Canning Company. It is located about two miles south of the outlet and the southerly end of the lake in Big Stone county, this state.
In January 1938 the owners of the Medbery lands served on the attorney general a petition in intervention by which they sought to bring their Minnesota land into the condemnation proceedings. They alleged in their petition that in the construction and maintenance of the project and because of the diversion of waters from the Whetstone River into the reservoir of Big Stone Lake and the impounding of such waters in the lake their lands were flooded and their crops destroyed to such an extent as to constitute a taking of such lands. By stipulation of the parties the hearing on the petition was indefinitely continued. The stipulation, which was approved by the court, provided that the matter might be brought on for hearing "at any time upon 10 days' written notice by either party." It was brought on for hearing by petitioners on August 29, 1942, at which time they amended their petition to include damages for the years 1937 to 1942, inclusive.
At this hearing the state appeared specially and moved the court to deny jurisdiction to the petitioners. This motion was "overruled," and on October 7, 1942, an order was filed granting petitioners' application to bring their lands into the proceedings and appointing appraisers to ascertain and report the damages thereto. A subsequent motion by the state to vacate this order was denied on October 30, 1942. The commissioners found the damages to petitioners' Minnesota lands to be $22,240, and the state appealed from the award to the district court of Big Stone county. It also appealed to this court (Case No. 33499) from the order of October 7 bringing petitioners' lands into the proceedings and from the order of October 30 refusing to vacate that order.
On January 23, 1943, the state again moved that the order of October 7, 1942, be vacated and that it be granted permission to file a proposed answer, which motions were denied by the trial court on the ground that, the state having appealed from the order it sought by this motion to vacate, the court was without jurisdiction to entertain the motion. The appeal in Case No. 33523 is from the order denying that motion.
On August 17, 1942, the owners of the Medbery lands served on the attorney general a petition to bring their South Dakota land into the proceedings. This petition was noticed for hearing and heard on August 29, 1942, at which time the state appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court. The objection was overruled, and on October 7, 1942, an order was filed granting the petition and appointing appraisers to ascertain and assess the damages. A motion by the state to vacate this order was denied on October 30, 1942.
A writ of prohibition issued out of this court on the state's petition on November 14, 1942, restraining further proceedings in the district court until the further order of this court. This case, No. 33466, is here on the petition, writ, and return thereto.
A petition in intervention by the Big Stone Canning Company to bring its land into the proceedings was served on the attorney general and noticed for hearing on October 12, 1942. The state appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court. It also demurred to the petition upon the grounds:
The court overruled the demurrer, with a certificate that the questions presented were "important and doubtful." This appeal (Case No. 33522) is from that order.
The four cases were consolidated for hearing in this court.
The determinative questions presented by the various appeals are: Did the district court have jurisdiction to entertain the respective petitions in intervention; and, if so, did the petitions state facts which warranted the court in ordering into the proceedings the lands described therein, to the end that such lands might be condemned and damages awarded to the owners thereof? These questions clearly appear in Case No. 33499, involving the Medbery Minnesota land, and will be discussed in connection with the appeal in that case. What is there said will apply to the other appeals insofar as applicable. The other points raised in Cases Nos. 33446, 33522, and 33523 will be treated separately.
1. "Jurisdiction is authority to hear and determine a cause." 2 Dunnell, Dig. & Supp. § 2345, and cases cited. It depends upon the right of the court to hear the matter in controversy and declare the law. State ex rel. Kinsella v. Eberhart, 116 Minn. 313, 133 N.W. 857, 39 L.R.A., N.S., 788, Ann.Cas.1913B, 785; State ex rel. Decker v. Montague, 195 Minn. 278, 262 N.W. 684. The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal in condemnation proceedings depends wholly upon the statute authorizing it; and only after it has decided preliminary jurisdictional questions in its favor may the court exercise jurisdiction. Otter Tail County v. Nelson, 187 Minn. 277, 245 N.W. 427; George D. Harter Bank v. Muskingum W. C. Dist., 53 Ohio App. 325, 4 N.E.2d 996; Comesky v. Village of Suffern, 179 N.Y. 393, 72 N.E. 320; 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, p. 1193, § 232. However, once the jurisdiction in condemnation proceedings attaches, it is retained until a termination of the proceedings. State, by Benson, v. Stanley, 188 Minn. 390, 247 N.W. 509; State, by Peterson, v. Werder, 200 Minn. 148, 273 N.W. 714; City of St. Louis v. Weber, 140 Mo. 515, 41 S.W. 965.
No final certificate having been filed as required by Minn.St.1941, § 117.20(4), Mason St.1927, § 6557-1(d), the court had jurisdiction of the condemnation proceedings when the petition in intervention was presented, and still has. Had a certificate been filed prior to the presentation of the petition, a different situation would have existed. State, by Youngquist, v. Hall, 195 Minn. 79, 261 N.W. 874.
2. It is the contention of the state that in the exercise of the right of eminent domain the affirmative determination of what lands are necessary for any given purpose is purely a legislative question to be exercised by the agency designated by the legislature free from...
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