State v. Benton

• Citation: 865 S.E.2d 919,435 S.C. 250
• Decision Date: 13 October 2021
• Docket Number: Appellate Case No. 2017-002553,Opinion No. 5868
• Parties: The STATE, Respondent, v. Tommy Lee BENTON, Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina

435 S.C. 250

865 S.E.2d 919

The STATE, Respondent,

v.Tommy Lee BENTON, Appellant.

Appellate Case No. 2017-002553

Opinion No. 5868

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard October 14, 2020

Filed October 13, 2021

Robert Walker Humphrey, II, of Willoughby & Hoefer, PA, of Charleston, and Chief Appellate Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, both for Appellant.

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Assistant Attorney General Tommy Evans Jr., all of Columbia, and Solicitor Jimmy A. Richardson, II, of Conway, all for Respondent.

MCDONALD, J.:

Tommy Lee Benton appeals his convictions for murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree arson, and third-degree arson, arguing the circuit court erred in (1) trying his case after previously granting a mistrial on the same charges and (2) admitting into evidence certain crime scene photographs, text messages, and Facebook messages. We affirm Benton's convictions.

Facts and Procedural History

Charles Bryant Smith owned a mobile home park, rental properties, and commercial properties in Horry County. Many tenants paid in cash, and Smith paid his employees in cash. According to Smith's son, Smith distrusted banks, so he carried large sums of cash and only deposited enough money in his accounts to pay bills. Garland Rose and his mother, Lorraine Rose, worked for Smith; Smith was also Lorraine's landlord. Garland informed Benton and Mitchell Cheatham that Smith often had large amounts of cash, and the three devised a plan to rob him.

Cheatham testified at Benton's trial regarding the various burglaries the group committed in their efforts to steal from Smith. On April 18, 2014, Cheatham met Benton at Garland's house before the first burglary. Benton borrowed Heather Faircloth's¹ black Ford Focus and drove the group to Smith's Aynor home. Benton and Garland then broke into Smith's home and stole approximately $27,000 in cash. Cheatham claimed he remained in the car while Benton and Garland burgled the house.

On the afternoon of April 25, 2014, Cheatham, Benton, and Justin Travis met Douglas Thomas at a local Walmart, then went to Cheatham's hotel room to discuss robbing Smith again—this time, at his store.² Benton believed Smith kept about $100,000 in cash in a safe at the store, and the group planned to lie in wait and rob Smith when he arrived at the store that night. For this effort, Benton, Thomas, and Travis used a stolen truck, while Cheatham remained nearby in Heather's car. In the early morning hours of April 26, the three broke into Smith's store. When Smith did not arrive as expected, they set the store on fire.

Two days later, Benton, Thomas, and Cheatham met at a hotel to discuss yet another effort to rob Smith. In the wee hours of April 29, 2014, Benton drove them in Heather's car to pick up the stolen truck. The group left the car on a dirt road and took the truck to Smith's mobile home, where they beat and handcuffed him. They ransacked and robbed the home, set it on fire, and left Smith handcuffed inside to die.

When firemen arrived at the scene and found a handcuffed body inside the burnt trailer, they alerted the Horry County Police Department. Investigator Jill Domogauer received the dispatch around 4:45 a.m. and went to process the scene. While sifting through the debris, Domogauer found handcuffs, a rope, several exploded casings, and metal debris in close proximity to the area from which the body had been removed. She also found a safe containing $120,000 in cash.

On April 21, 2016, the Horry County grand jury indicted Benton for Smith's murder. On October 26, 2016, the grand jury indicted Benton for two counts of first-degree burglary, first-degree arson, and third-degree arson.

The case initially went to trial on July 17, 2017, and the jury was sworn the following day. During his opening statement, Benton's counsel began to discuss Benton's alibi for the night of the murder, noting he was with his mother at the home of his great-grandmother. The State immediately objected, and the circuit court held a bench conference off the record. The circuit court subsequently excused the jury to address the objection on the record. The State argued Benton had failed to provide written notice of his intention to offer an alibi defense as required by Rule 5 of the South Carolina Rules of Criminal Procedure, noting the State first learned of some of the proposed alibi witnesses during Benton's opening statement. Benton conceded he did not give the State written notice of his intent to raise an alibi defense, but stated he did not believe notice was an issue because the State had already been talking with at least one of Benton's witnesses regarding Benton's whereabouts on the night of the murder.

Following a discussion on the record and a conference in chambers, the circuit court declared a mistrial as a matter of manifest necessity and ordered Benton to serve the State with written notice of his intent to offer an alibi defense. The circuit court reasoned that excluding the alibi witnesses' testimony as contemplated by Rule 5 would deprive Benton of his right to present a defense, but allowing the trial to continue without excluding the witnesses would deprive the State of a full and complete opportunity to challenge the alibi testimony. Thus, a mistrial was the only reasonable option.

At Benton's request, the circuit court again addressed the matter at a hearing the following day. Benton stated, "I wanted to make a further request of the Court in connection [with] the interpretation of [ Rule 5 ] and express my views on it."

Benton explained he received a standard disclosure request from the State requesting written notification of any alibi defense, however, Benton argued the State's request was insufficient because Rule 5 required the State to set forth the time, date, and place or any alleged offense and the indictments did not contain the times of the alleged offenses. Benton clarified, "And so all I'm asking is that we follow—that I get that full compliance as I am interpreting the rule before I have to comply with the remainder of the rule." The State responded, and the circuit court detailed the items provided by the State during reciprocal discovery, noting the various times, dates, and locations set forth therein. The circuit court then found the State "has more than sufficiently complied with any requirement set forth in Rule 5(e)(1). The defendant has more than sufficient information as to time, date, and place regarding these allegations, charges, and indictments that have been brought against him in this particular matter." The circuit court concluded,

Based upon that, the request for further information from the state as to time, date and place in this matter, under Rule 5(e) is denied. Again, I reaffirm what the Court said yesterday and also that I am requiring strict compliance with the—with the rule, as I indicated yesterday, both from the defense and the state in this matter.

The case went back to trial on December 4, 2017. Pretrial, Benton moved to dismiss the indictments, asserting double jeopardy prevented him from standing trial for the indicted offenses because there was no justification for the prior mistrial. Again, Benton argued Rule 5 did not require him to give the State written notice of his alibi defense because the State failed to include the times of the alleged offenses in its Rule 5 request for written notification. The circuit court reaffirmed its prior rulings and denied Benton's motion to dismiss.

Benton presented four alibi witnesses at trial: his mother, his stepfather, his great-grandmother, and his uncle's former girlfriend. The jury convicted Benton of murder, first-degree arson, third-degree arson, and two counts of first-degree burglary. The circuit court sentenced Benton to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for murder, life imprisonment for first-degree burglary, thirty years' imprisonment for first-degree arson, and fifteen years' imprisonment for third-degree arson.

Law and Analysis

I. Double Jeopardy

Benton argues double jeopardy barred his December trial on the murder, burglary, and arson charges because the circuit court erred in finding manifest necessity existed for the mistrial. Essentially, Benton contends his own Rule 5(e) obligation to notify the State of his intent to raise an alibi defense was not triggered because the State's written alibi request did not comply with Rule 5. He further asserts the circuit court erred in failing to consider available alternatives before declaring a mistrial. We disagree.

The Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States Constitution and the South Carolina Constitution protect citizens from repetitive conclusive prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. U.S. Const. amend. V ("[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ...."); S.C. Const. art. I, § 12 ("No person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty ...."). "Under the law of double jeopardy, a defendant may not be prosecuted for the same offense after an acquittal, a conviction, or an improvidently granted mistrial." State v. Parker , 391 S.C. 606, 612, 707 S.E.2d 799, 801 (2011) (quoting State v. Coleman , 365 S.C. 258, 263, 616 S.E.2d 444, 446 (Ct. App. 2005) ). "Hence, a properly granted mistrial poses no double jeopardy bar to a subsequent prosecution." Id. at 612, 707 S.E.2d at 802.

The decision to grant or deny a mistrial falls within the sound discretion of the trial court, however, a "mistrial should be granted only if there is a manifest necessity or the ends of public justice are served. The trial court should first exhaust other methods to cure possible prejudice before declaring a mistrial." State v. Brown , 389 S.C. 84, 94, 697 S.E.2d 622, 627–28 (Ct. App. 2010) (citation omitted)....