State v. Bertrand

• Decision Date: 27 October 2020
• Docket Number: No. ED 108007,ED 108007
• Citation: 636 S.W.3d 181
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Renee N. BERTRAND, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

636 S.W.3d 181

STATE of Missouri, Respondent,

v.Renee N. BERTRAND, Appellant.

No. ED 108007

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, DIVISION ONE.

Filed: October 27, 2020

FOR APPELLANT: Renee A. Murphy, 601 N. Washington St., Farmington, MO 63640, James C. Egan, 1000 West Nifong Blvd., Building 7, Ste. 100, Columbia, MO 65203.

FOR RESPONDENT: Courtney G. Goodwin, St. Francois County Prosecuting Attys. Office, 1 North Washington St., Ste. 101, Farmington, MO 63640.

ROBERT M. CLAYTON III, Judge

Renee N. Bertrand ("Defendant") appeals the judgment, following a jury trial, (1) convicting her of one count of fourth-degree assault of a law enforcement officer (Count I) and one count of first-degree trespass (Count III);¹ and (2) imposing a total of $981.50 in court costs upon Defendant, including $760.48 in "Jury Fees."² The trial court sentenced Defendant to one year in the St. Francois County Jail on Count I and to six months in the St. Francois County Jail on Count III, with the sentences to run consecutively; however, the court suspended execution of the sentences and placed Defendant on probation for two years.

On appeal, Defendant argues, (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for first-degree trespass; (2) the trial court's imposition of $760.48 in "Jury Fees" upon Defendant as court costs is erroneous because there is no statutory authority permitting such fees to be taxed as court costs; and (3) the trial court's imposition of the entire amount of court costs on Defendant ($981.50) is erroneous under section 550.030 RSMo 2016³ because Defendant is unable to pay the costs in that she is an indigent person represented by a public defender.

For the reasons set forth in detail below, we hold the following. Because we find there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found Defendant guilty of her first-degree trespass conviction (Count III) she challenges on appeal, and because Defendant does not challenge her conviction for fourth-degree assault of a law enforcement officer (Count I), we affirm the portion of the judgment convicting Defendant of Counts I and III. Additionally, because Defendant does not challenge her sentences for Counts I and III, we affirm the portion of the judgment sentencing Defendant on those counts.

However, because the record on appeal does not specifically indicate what the $760.48 in "Jury Fees" imposed upon Defendant as court costs encompasses, and because the trial court only had express statutory authority to impose "all fees due" persons selected to serve on the jury panel (including alternate empaneled jurors) for daily pay (at the rate of six dollars per day) and mileage (at the rate of seven cents per mile) as taxable court costs, we reverse and remand the trial court's decision to impose $760.48 in "Jury Fees" upon Defendant as court costs for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Finally, the issue of whether Defendant is unable to pay court costs was never adjudicated by the trial court, and therefore, the issue is not ripe for appellate review; however, this issue may be addressed on remand pursuant to a motion filed by Defendant and after a hearing at which evidence regarding Defendant's inability to pay is adduced.

I. BACKGROUND

In this case, the State's substitute information charged Defendant with fourth-degree assault of a law enforcement officer (Count I), resisting arrest (Count II), and first-degree trespass (Count III) for incidents that allegedly occurred on October 23, 2017 at the municipal division of the Circuit Court of St. Francois County located in Park Hills, Missouri ("municipal division"). A jury trial took place in the Circuit Court of St. Francois County ("trial court" or "court") with respect to Defendant's charges on April 24, 2019. Defendant was represented by a special public defender throughout the underlying proceedings before the trial court.

A. Relevant Evidence Presented at Trial

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the following evidence was presented at Defendant's trial. On the night of October 23, 2017, Defendant and other persons were in the courtroom audience during municipal division proceedings before the Honorable James Joyce. Four law enforcement officers were also present in the courtroom: Lieutenant Doug Bowles acting as bailiff, Officer Steven Poole, Officer Abbey Sullivan, and Officer Zachary Hedrick.

During the municipal division proceedings, Defendant got into a "verbal altercation" with another person who was in the front of the courtroom. Defendant was "very aggressive," was "confrontational," and was told several times to quiet down by both the bailiff and the judge. However, "[e]ach time [Defendant] was told to do something, the situation escalated." At some point, Defendant began to use profanity, and when Defendant was told to stop swearing, she stood up and used more profanity in a louder tone.

Eventually, the bailiff asked Defendant to leave the courtroom. The judge also told Defendant "you need to leave" and told officers to remove her from the courtroom. At some point thereafter, Defendant stood up and took steps towards the back of the courtroom while continuing to argue, scream, and use profanity. Defendant then stopped near the back door of the courtroom where Officers Poole and Hedrick were standing.

At this point in time, Officers Poole and Hedrick both told Defendant she was trespassing and instructed her to leave. Defendant yelled she was not going to leave and the officers could not make her leave. Because it was evident to Officer Poole that "[Defendant] wasn't [ ] agreeing to leave the courtroom," the officer "placed a hand on [Defendant's] wrist and her upper arm" to convey to her she needed to leave. When Officer Poole touched Defendant, she aggressively and loudly told the officer not to touch her. Officer Poole then gave Defendant additional verbal commands to leave the courtroom. However, instead of leaving, Defendant tensed up, took a wide stance, and became immoveable.

Another officer in the courtroom, Officer Sullivan, subsequently approached Defendant and gave her commands to leave the courtroom. Defendant then punched Officer Sullivan near her collarbone. Thereafter, all of the officers in the courtroom took Defendant to the ground, and Defendant was eventually handcuffed, placed under arrest, and escorted out of the building.

B. Relevant Procedural Posture

At the close of the State's evidence and at the close of all of the evidence, Defendant filed motions for judgment of acquittal. The trial court denied the motions.

Subsequently, the jury found Defendant guilty of fourth-degree assault of a law enforcement officer (Count I) and of first-degree trespass (Count III), and the jury found Defendant not guilty of resisting arrest (Count II). Defendant then filed a motion for judgment of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict of the jury, or in the alternative, a motion for a new trial, alleging the trial court erred in denying her motions for judgment of acquittal with respect to Counts I and III ("Defendant's post-trial motion"). The trial court denied Defendant's post-trial motion.

Defendant waived jury sentencing, and the trial court held a sentencing hearing on June 28, 2019. At the hearing, the trial court orally pronounced it was sentencing Defendant to one year in the St. Francois County Jail on Count I and to six months in the St. Francois County Jail on Count III, with the sentences to run consecutively; however, the court suspended execution of the sentences and placed Defendant on probation for two years.

The trial court also stated at the June 28 hearing that it was going to impose court costs upon Defendant. Defense counsel then requested the trial court to waive the court costs because "this is a public defender case, [ ] [Defendant] is indigent[,] [and] [s]he cannot pay the court costs." The trial court denied defense counsel's request, stating, "I am not willing to waive the costs at this time." The Case Party Fee Report that is a part of the record in this appeal provides the court costs imposed on Defendant totaled $981.50, including $760.48 in "Jury Fees."

The trial court subsequently entered a judgment in accordance with the jury's verdicts convicting Defendant on Counts I and III and entering a written sentence consistent with the court's oral pronouncement. The trial court then entered an order granting Defendant leave to file an appeal in forma pauperis. Defendant appeals.⁴

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant raises three points on appeal arguing, (1) there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction for first-degree trespass; (2) the trial court's imposition of $760.48 in "Jury Fees" upon Defendant as court costs is erroneous because there is no statutory authority permitting such fees to be taxed as court costs; and (3) the trial court's imposition of the entire amount of court costs on Defendant ($981.50) is erroneous under section 550.030 because Defendant is unable to pay the costs in that she is an indigent person represented by a public defender.

A. Defendant's Sufficiency-of-the-Evidence Claim

In Defendant's first point on appeal, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for first-degree trespass.

1. Standard of Review

Appellate review of a claim that there was insufficient evidence to support a criminal conviction is limited to a determination of "whether the [S]tate has introduced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Hosier , 454 S.W.3d 883, 898 (Mo. banc 2015). In making that determination, great deference is given to the trier of fact, and an appellate court will not weigh the evidence anew. State v. Nash , 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011). Additionally, all evidence and inferences favorable to the State are accepted as true, and all contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded. Id.

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