State v. Betz

• Decision Date: 04 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. SC01-319.,SC01-319.
• Citation: 815 So.2d 627
• Parties: STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Kellen Lee BETZ, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

815 So.2d 627

STATE of Florida, Petitioner, v. Kellen Lee BETZ, Respondent.

No. SC01-319.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 4, 2002.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Richard M. Fishkin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Petitioner.

James Marion Moorman, Public Defender, and Robert D. Rosen, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Respondent.

LEWIS, J.

We have for review Betz v. State, 793 So.2d 976 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in State v. Jarrett, 530 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const.

Facts and Procedural History

The pertinent facts in the instant case were recited in the opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal below:

In the early evening hours of March 9, 1998, Mr. Betz was driving a red Pontiac Fiero when two City of Clearwater officers on routine patrol observed that the Fiero's left headlight was extinguished and stopped the vehicle. Mr. Betz quickly exited the car, closing the door behind him, and awaited the police officer. While asking Mr. Betz for his driver's license, the officer smelled a "very strong odor of marijuana coming directly out" of the rolled-down window of the Fiero. He also observed grey smoke in the vehicle. From experience, the officer was familiar with the smell of burning marijuana. When he then noticed the marijuana odor emanating from Mr. Betz's shirt, the officer advised Mr. Betz that he was about to search the Fiero's trunk. Before doing so, the officer patted down Mr. Betz for weapons and contraband. He felt a long, cylindrical, hard object between four and six inches long which he could hear crinkling and rustling as he grabbed it. As the officer expected, the object, when seized, proved to be a plastic baggie containing some green plant matter that looked and smelled like marijuana. The officer placed Mr. Betz under arrest, searched the car and, ultimately, the trunk. Inside the trunk was a briefcase; inside the briefcase was a metal box; and inside the metal box was a second bag of marijuana.

793 So.2d at 977. Before trial, Betz sought to suppress both the marijuana seized from his person (12.6 grams) and his automobile's trunk (10.7 grams). See id. at 976-77. The trial court, however, denied his motion with regard to both quantities of marijuana. See id. at 976. Following this ruling, Betz entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charges. Based upon the aggregate amount of the controlled substance seized, Betz was convicted of felony possession of marijuana. See id.

Betz appealed the trial court's dispositive suppression ruling to the Second District Court of Appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress the marijuana seized from Betz's person, holding that "[o]nce the experienced officer detected the smell of cannabis emanating from the car's interior as well as from Mr. Betz's clothing, he had probable cause to search Mr. Betz and the interior of the car for contraband and weapons." Id. The court, however, reversed the trial court's decision not to suppress the marijuana seized from the automobile's trunk. See id. Based upon limitations it interpreted from United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991), the district court below held that "probable cause to believe the passenger compartment of the vehicle contained contraband did not justify a search of the trunk or of the containers within it." 793 So.2d at 978. Thus, the Second District deemed the search of the trunk illegal. Additionally, the court below discounted the precedential value of State v. Jarrett, 530 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988), as it was decided prior to Acevedo. See 793 So.2d at 978 n. 1.

In accordance with its holding regarding the suppression of the quantity of marijuana seized from the trunk of Betz's car, the district court below remanded for correction of Betz's order of probation and resentencing. See id. On the basis of the conflict between the Second District's decision here and the holding of Jarrett, the State petitioned this Court for discretionary review of the decision below. We accepted jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. See State v. Betz, 791 So.2d 1101 (Fla. 2001).

Conflict

In 1988, the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed the search of an automobile trunk under circumstances very similar to those of the instant case in State v. Jarrett, 530 So.2d 1089 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). There, the police officer searched the entire vehicle (including the trunk) based upon his having smelled the odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the auto, as well as his seizure of a bag of cannabis from the passenger compartment. See id. at 1090. The district court approved the search of the trunk, stating:

The record in the instant case establishes that Trooper Santiago had probable cause to believe that defendant's automobile contained contraband since, as he approached the automobile, he detected the odor of burnt cannabis emanating from the automobile. It necessarily follows, therefore, that based upon this probable cause Trooper Santiago was authorized to conduct a warrantless search of defendant's automobile and, under Ross, this authority to search included the authority to search the trunk of the automobile.

Id. at 1091 (citations omitted). Clearly, the Jarrett court was of the opinion that the odor of burnt marijuana alone provided police officers probable cause to search the entire automobile.

In the instant case, the Second District produced an entirely opposite result. In its decision below, the court held that the search of Betz's trunk was illegal. See Betz, 793 So.2d at 977

. This ruling was principally based upon the United States Supreme Court's Acevedo opinion-in fact, the court below explicitly held:

In that case [Acevedo] the police had probable cause to believe that a paper bag in the trunk of the defendant's automobile contained marijuana. The Court cautioned, however, that the "police did not have probable cause to believe that contraband was hidden in any other part of the automobile and a search of the entire vehicle would have been without probable cause and unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." By analogy, in this case the officer's search of Mr. Betz's trunk was invalid for lack of probable cause.

Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982). Clearly, the Second District concluded that the odor of burnt marijuana provides probable cause to search only the passenger compartment of an automobile, but does not provide a basis to extend the search to the trunk of the vehicle. In addition, the court below expressed its view in a footnote that Jarrett had been impliedly overruled by the Supreme Court's Acevedo holding. See id. at 978 n. 1.

It is eminently clear that these two holdings cannot be reconciled. On strikingly similar facts, the two district courts of appeal have produced conflicting results regarding the propriety of the search of an automobile trunk. In addition, the Betz decision rests, at least in part, upon an interpretation that Jarrett has been overruled by Acevedo. Thus, we apply this Court's conflict jurisdiction to reconcile the direct and explicit conflict here, as well as to clarify law enforcement's boundaries within the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.

United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence

As we are required to follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment,¹ it is important at the outset to analyze the limited occasions upon which the United States Supreme Court has spoken regarding the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. There are three principal cases which impact the question presented here.

In 1925, Chief Justice Taft penned the opinion of the Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). Faced with a situation in which federal prohibition agents had stopped and searched the automobile of suspected bootleggers without a warrant, the Court held:

[T]he true rule is that if the search and seizure without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.

Id. at 149, 45 S.Ct. 280. With this opinion, the Court created what has become known as the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The Court concluded that because probable cause existed, the government agents could search "behind the upholstering of the seats" for contraband. Id. at 136, 45 S.Ct. 280. As the opinion did little to elaborate upon the scope and limitations upon the exception,² the actual definition of the exception remained extraordinarily unclear.

Probably the most important decision of the United States Supreme Court for guidance in the instant action is United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). First, the Court established there the scope of the Carroll automobile exception to the warrant requirement. The Court stated, "The scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower—and no broader— than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause." Id. at 823, 102 S.Ct. 2157. Indeed, the scope of a warrantless search of a car "is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." Id. at 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157. Thus, the crux of the Ross holding was that it is the extent of the law enforcement officer's probable cause in...