State v. Bevly

• Citation: 2015 Ohio 475,142 Ohio St.3d 41,27 N.E.3d 516
• Decision Date: 11 February 2015
• Docket Number: No. 2013–0821.,2013–0821.
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BEVLY, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio

142 Ohio St.3d 41
27 N.E.3d 516
2015 Ohio 475

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,
v.
BEVLY, Appellant.

No. 2013–0821.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 11, 2014.
Decided Feb. 11, 2015.

Ron O'Brien, Franklin County Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor, Chief Counsel, Appellate Division, for appellee.

Yeura R. Venters, Franklin County Public Defender, and David L. Strait, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

LANZINGER, J.

142 Ohio St.3d 42

{¶ 1} This case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a), a subsection of the statute defining "gross sexual imposition," which subjects an offender to a mandatory prison term when evidence other than the testimony of the victim is admitted in the case corroborating the violation. We hold that the corroborating-evidence provision lacks a rational basis for distinguishing between cases on the basis of the presence or the absence of corroborating evidence and violates the due-process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We further hold that in cases in which a defendant has pled guilty, imposing a mandatory prison term pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) when corroborating evidence of the charge

142 Ohio St.3d 43

of gross sexual imposition is produced violates the defendant's right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

I. Case Background

{¶ 2} In March 2012, appellant, Damon L. Bevly, pled guilty to two counts of gross sexual imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4), a third-degree felony. At the plea hearing, the state called Detective Brian Sheline, who testified that Bevly had confessed to the offenses. The state also introduced a compact disc recording of Bevly's alleged confession. The state argued that Bevly's confession constituted corroborating evidence, and thus a mandatory prison sentence was required under R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a).

{¶ 3} Bevly argued that application of R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violated his right to a jury trial pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution¹

27 N.E.3d 518

and that the section's requirement of a mandatory prison term when corroborating evidence is introduced is unconstitutional because corroboration bears no rational relationship to the crime's severity. The state responded that the statute did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the statutory maximum for the offense was not increased and the General Assembly had a rational basis to impose a mandatory prison sentence upon the introduction of corroboration.

{¶ 4} The trial court agreed with Bevly. The court could find no rational basis for the distinction between gross-sexual-imposition cases in which there is corroborating evidence and those cases in which there is none. The court also concluded that a jury was required to make a finding regarding corroboration because introduction of this evidence enhanced the sentence from a mere possible prison term to a mandatory prison term. Bevly was sentenced to three years' imprisonment and five years of postrelease control.

{¶ 5} The state appealed, arguing that its introduction of the confession as corroborating evidence triggered a mandatory prison sentence pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a). 2013-Ohio-1352, 2013 WL 1384472, ¶ 7. The Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the judgment, holding that the General Assembly was justified in distinguishing between cases with and cases without corroborating evidence. Id. at ¶ 9, 19. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the corroboration provision of R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) was a sentencing factor that need not be found by a jury. Id. at ¶ 15.

142 Ohio St.3d 44

{¶ 6} Bevly appealed to this court, and we initially declined jurisdiction. 136 Ohio St.3d 1476, 2013-Ohio-3790, 993 N.E.2d 779. On reconsideration, we accepted Bevly's two propositions of law:

1. R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) treats cases where there is corroborating evidence differently from those where there is none. Because there is no rational basis for this distinction, the statute violates the due process protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

2. R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) violates the right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Section 16, Article I of the Ohio Constitution.

136 Ohio St.3d 1561, 2013-Ohio-4861, 996 N.E.2d 987.

II. Legal Analysis

{¶ 7} Bevly was charged with, and pled guilty to, two counts of gross sexual imposition pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(A)(4). The penalty provision is found at R.C. 2907.05(C)(2) and provides:

Gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree. Except as otherwise provided in this division, for gross sexual imposition committed in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section there is a presumption that a prison term shall be imposed for the offense. The court shall impose on an offender convicted of gross

27 N.E.3d 519

sexual imposition in violation of division (A)(4) or (B) of this section a mandatory prison term equal to one of the prison terms prescribed in section 2929.14 of the Revised Code for a felony of the third degree if either of the following applies:

(a) Evidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in the case corroborating the violation.

(Emphasis added.)

{¶ 8} R.C. 2907.05(C)(2) thus establishes that a violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(4) is a third-degree felony for which there is a presumption that a prison term be imposed. Pursuant to R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a), the court shall impose a mandatory prison term when "[e]vidence other than the testimony of the victim was admitted in the case corroborating the violation."

142 Ohio St.3d 45

A. R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) lacks a rational basis for distinguishing between cases based upon the existence or nonexistence of corroborating evidence

{¶ 9} Bevly argues that we should adopt the reasoning of the trial court and conclude that R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) is unconstitutional because there is no rational basis for distinguishing between cases in which there is corroborating evidence and those cases in which there is none. The trial court, as Bevly notes, found no other statute that enhances a penalty based upon the amount of evidence submitted in the case. The state counters that the General Assembly has broad discretion in defining crimes and fixing punishments and that the corroborating-evidence provision is rationally based upon the General Assembly's desire to ensure that evidence other than the victim's testimony exists before a court would be required to impose a prison sentence. Although the state does not identify any other statute that requires corroborating evidence before an enhanced sentence is mandated, it notes that R.C. 2907.06(B) requires the existence of corroborating evidence before a defendant can be convicted of the crime of sexual imposition.

{¶ 10} Although R.C. 2907.06(B) does contain a corroborating-evidence requirement, that requirement is fundamentally different from the one before us today because it constitutes an element of the offense. R.C. 2907.05(C)(2)(a) is unique in Ohio felony-sentencing law in that it enhances the sentence imposed on the offender based on the quantity of evidence presented to prove guilt.

{¶ 11} In the context of R.C. 2907.05, the existence of corroborating evidence is irrelevant to the stated purposes of felony sentencing set forth in R.C. 2929.11 —protecting the public from future crime and punishing the offender. Nor is it comparable to the factors that guide the court in imposing the appropriate sentence for other offenses, such as the seriousness of the offender's conduct (e.g., the victim suffered serious physical or mental injury or that injury was exacerbated because of the victim's age, the offender abused a position of trust, or the offender was motivated by prejudice) or the likelihood of recidivism (e.g., the criminal history of the accused and the lack of remorse). R.C. 2929.12. And the existence of corroborating evidence adds nothing to the court's consideration of "the need for incapacitating the offender, deterring the offender and others from future crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the victim of the offense, the public, or both." R.C. 2929.11(A).

{¶ 12} Further, the presentation of corroborating evidence differs from factors such as the use of a deadly weapon, e.g., R.C. 2903.11(A)(2), the infliction of physical

27 N.E.3d 520

harm, e.g., R.C. 2911.02, the quantity or type of drugs, e.g., R.C. 2925.11, or the value of stolen property, e.g., R.C. 2913.02, each of which increases the penalty used to elevate the degree of the offense in other statutes. It also differs from other statutory penalty enhancements, such as...