State v. Bieniek, No. A04-272 (MN 9/21/2004)
| Decision Date | 21 September 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. A04-272.,A04-272. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Barbara J. Bieniek, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Ramsey County, File No. K7-03-2228.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, and
Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Jennifer M. Spalding, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Michael F. Cromett, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge; Kalitowski, Judge; and Hudson, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Barbara Bieniek challenges her conviction of controlled-substance crime in the fifth degree, claiming that the district court erred by not suppressing the evidence of illegally obtained heroin. Appellant contends that, after being legally stopped for a traffic violation, Sergeant Paul Paulos did not have a reasonable basis to expand the traffic stop by handcuffing appellant and placing her in the back of his squad car. Because we conclude that Paulos did have a reasonable basis to expand the traffic stop and place appellant in the squad car, we affirm.
On June 22, 2003, Sergeant Paul Paulos was on patrol near the Dorothy Day Center when he saw a well-dressed woman, appellant Barbara Bieniek, approaching Cleveland Circle, an area that he stated is known for narcotics dealing. He observed appellant meet with Pedro Chatterlays, a known narcotics dealer. The two spoke, walked around the corner, and got into a car. Paulos followed the vehicle because he thought Chatterlays would likely be in possession of a weapon or drugs. After following the vehicle, he observed the driver fail to come to a complete stop at the corner of St. Joseph and Seventh Street. About two blocks later, Paulos pulled the car over. As he was making the stop, Paulos called for back up to "roll by." He approached the car and asked appellant, the driver, to step out of the car. Chatterlays remained in the back seat, and there was a passenger in the front seat. Paulos felt it was necessary to separate the vehicle's occupants because Chatterlays was known to often be in possession of weapons and because Paulos was working alone.
Once appellant stepped out of the car, Paulos told her that she had violated a traffic law and was with a known drug dealer. Paulos asked appellant if she had any narcotics or if Chatterlays had asked her to hold anything for him. Appellant stated that she did not have any narcotics. But Paulos testified that as he spoke to appellant, especially when he began questioning her about whether she had any drugs or whether Chatterlays gave her any drugs, he noticed she was shaking and that she kept trying to get into her pockets. Paulos stated that he became concerned for his safety because he was aware of past violence committed by Chatterlays. Further, Paulos testified that, while he did not observe appellant to have any threatening objects, he was concerned that she might be in possession of a weapon because she wanted to get into her pockets and was making jerky movements. Paulos stated that, because of this concern, he handcuffed appellant and put her in the back seat of his squad car. Paulos did not conduct a pat-down search of appellant before putting her in the back seat of his vehicle, but he stated that he was planning to search appellant when his back-up arrived. Paulos's back-up drove by as Paulos was heading back to the car to speak with the other passengers. Paulos spoke with the other passengers in the vehicle. Paulos never discovered weapons or drugs on the other passengers, but Chatterlays had a twenty-dollar bill rolled up in his hand and was in possession of more than $200 in cash.
After about ten to fifteen minutes, Paulos observed appellant in the squad car making a motion he described as "going into the small of her back." Paulos stated that appellant was leaning forward and he could see her trying to conceal something into the small of her back and could see a piece of a baggie.
Paulos and the back-up officer removed appellant from the squad car and asked her what she was putting in her back. She wrestled with them and screamed. Paulos recovered a small bindle of powder from appellant's back. Appellant identified the powder as heroin.
Appellant was charged with controlled-substance crime in the fifth degree. Appellant moved to suppress the evidence of the heroin, and a suppression hearing was held on August 21, 2003. On September 15, 2003, the district court denied the motion to suppress and appellant was found guilty after a bench trial on stipulated facts. On appeal, appellant challenges the district court's ruling refusing to suppress the evidence, claiming that Paulos exceeded the legally permissible scope and duration of the traffic stop.
When reviewing pretrial orders on motions to suppress evidence, an appellate court may independently review the facts and determine as a matter of law whether the district court erred in not suppressing the evidence. State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 98 (Minn. 1999). "The correct approach in a case where the facts are not significantly in dispute is to simply analyze the testimony of the officers and determine if . . . the officers were justified under the cases in doing what they did." State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 58 n.1 (Minn. 1988).
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution govern investigative stops. State v. Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 360-63 (Minn. 2004); State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997). An investigatory traffic stop is lawful if the police officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person stopped is engaged in criminal activity. State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 (1968)). The officer must have objective support for his suspicion. State v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 824, 825-26 (Minn. 1989). If an officer observes a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, the officer generally has an objective basis for stopping the vehicle. George, 557 N.W.2d at 578. If an officer makes a lawful stop, any evidence that comes to his attention, even if the evidence is of a crime different from the crime for which the initial stop was made, is admissible at trial. State v. Vivier, 453 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn. App. 1990).
Both parties agree that Paulos had the authority to stop appellant. But appellant argues that after removing appellant from the vehicle, Paulos did not have the authority to expand the stop by handcuffing appellant and placing her in the back of his vehicle. Appellant first argues that Paulos's actions converted the stop into an unlawful arrest without probable cause. Further, appellant contends that, even if the stop was not converted into an arrest, handcuffing appellant and placing her in the back of his squad car was beyond the scope and necessary duration of the investigatory stop.
Appellant was not unlawfully arrested without probable cause. In State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886, 891 n.4 (Minn. 1998), the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that an officer does not need probable cause before requesting that a person wait in...
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