State v. Billman
| Decision Date | 23 September 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. DA 06-0753.,DA 06-0753. |
| Citation | 346 Mont. 118,2008 MT 326,194 P.3d 58 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Bernard Richard BILLMAN, Defendant and Appellee. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
¶ 1 The State of Montana appeals from the District Court's order granting Bernard Richard Billman's motion to dismiss for violation of his right to speedy trial in the Thirteenth Judicial District, Yellowstone County. We affirm.
¶ 2 We restate the issue as follows:
¶ 3 Did the District Court err when it granted Billman's motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial right?
¶ 4 On January 27, 2006, Bernard Richard Billman (Billman) was arrested and jailed for driving under the influence of alcohol, a felony; driving while his driving privileges were suspended or revoked, a misdemeanor; and operating a motor vehicle without proof of liability insurance, a misdemeanor. The District Court set Billman's bond at $7,000 and set Billman's trial for June 19, 2006.
¶ 5 The District Court signed an order on June 29, 2006, continuing Billman's trial date to August 21, 2006, based on conflicts in the court's docket. On August 25, 2006, the State moved to reset the trial for a date after October 1, 2006, because the State's primary witness, the arresting officer, was unavailable due to training. The District Court then set a trial date for October 30, 2006, but later changed the date to November 1, 2006, due to docket control.
¶ 6 On October 30, 2006, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and Billman appeared in court for a hearing on pretrial motions. Defense counsel orally moved to dismiss the case based on a violation of Billman's speedy trial right. The District Court set a hearing on the motion for November 1, 2006, and rescheduled the trial date for December 4, 2006.
¶ 7 On November 1, 2006, the District Court orally granted Billman's speedy trial motion and released Billman from incarceration. The State subsequently appealed. While the State's appeal was pending, we established a new framework for evaluating speedy trial claims in State v. Ariegwe, 2007 MT 204, 338 Mont. 442, 167 P.3d 815. In light of the Ariegwe decision, we remanded this case to the District Court to enter findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to the Ariegwe analysis. The District Court conducted a speedy trial analysis and again granted Billman's motion to dismiss for violation of his right to speedy trial. The State appeals.
¶ 8 Whether a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial presents a question of constitutional law. Ariegwe, ¶ 119. We review de novo a district court's legal conclusions to determine whether the court correctly interpreted and applied the law. Ariegwe, ¶ 119. We will not disturb the factual findings underlying a speedy trial ruling unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Ariegwe, ¶ 119. A finding is clearly erroneous if it is not supported by substantial credible evidence, if the district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence, or if our review of the record convinces us that the district court committed a mistake. Ariegwe, ¶ 119.
¶ 9 Did the District Court err when it granted Billman's motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial right?
¶ 10 The State maintains that the District Court erred in granting Billman's motion to dismiss under speedy trial grounds. The State acknowledges that the underlying facts are "straightforward and mostly undisputed," but argues that the District Court failed to engage in the balancing process that Ariegwe and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) require.
¶ 11 The United States Constitution and the Montana Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI; Mont. Const. art. II, § 24. Our test to determine whether an accused has been denied the right to speedy trial rests on the Montana Constitution. Ariegwe, ¶ 35. We consider four factors when presented with a speedy trial claim: the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the accused's responses to the delay, and prejudice to the accused. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 106-111. We then balance the four speedy trial factors to determine whether the accused has been denied the speedy trial right. Ariegwe, ¶ 112. Each factor's significance varies based on the particular case's unique facts and circumstances. Ariegwe, ¶ 105.
¶ 12 A. The speedy trial factors
¶ 13 The State argues that the District Court incorrectly analyzed the first speedy trial factor. The State maintains that the short delay between the speedy trial triggering date and the trial date did not weigh in favor of Billman's speedy trial motion.
¶ 14 A court addressing a speedy trial claim must first determine whether 200 days have elapsed between the accusation and the trial date. Ariegwe, ¶ 41. If this 200-day threshold passes, a presumption of prejudice arises that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused. Ariegwe, ¶ 56. A court must then consider the delay extending beyond the 200-day trigger date. Ariegwe, ¶ 62. As the pretrial delay increases, the presumption increases that the delay has prejudiced the accused and the State's burden to justify the delay under the second speedy trial factor increases. Ariegwe, ¶ 62.
¶ 15 The District Court determined that the delay exceeded 200 days and that the first factor thus weighed in favor of granting Billman's speedy trial motion. The court relied on two calculations to determine the amount of delay: (1) the interval between the triggering date and the date that the court granted Billman's motion to dismiss, which the District Court calculated to be seventy-seven days, and, alternatively, (2) the interval between the accusation and the date of the court's second order dismissing Billman's case, which the District Court calculated to be 711 days. Regarding the court's second calculation, any delay associated with the State's initial appeal bears no relevance to Billman's speedy trial claim. Following the court's order, no criminal charges were pending against Billman, nor was he subjected to actual restrictions on his liberty, and thus, the speedy trial guarantee no longer applied. U.S. v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1502, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); U.S. v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302, 310-11, 106 S.Ct. 648, 653-54, 88 L.Ed.2d 640 (1986).
¶ 16 Though the District Court correctly determined that further speedy trial analysis had been triggered, the court failed to examine the intensifying effect of the delay beyond the triggering date. To examine the intensifying effect, a court must first determine the proper speedy trial timeframe; courts generally consider the interval between accusation and the scheduled trial date or the date on which an accused pleads guilty, whichever date reflects the case's disposition. Ariegwe, ¶ 43; State v. Ellenburg, 2000 MT 232, ¶ 16, 301 Mont. 289, ¶ 16, 8 P.3d 801, ¶ 16. In this case, the District Court's order granting Billman's speedy trial motion disposed of the case, and thus, the date that the court ruled on Billman's speedy trial motion reflects the case's disposition.
¶ 17 We acknowledge our statement in Ariegwe that, "the interval between accusation and trial runs not to the date on which the accused's speedy trial motion is considered by the court but, rather, to the scheduled trial date" or the date on which an accused pleads guilty, whichever date represents the case's disposition. Ariegwe, ¶ 43 (citations omitted). This statement remains true when a court denies a speedy trial motion because the denial does not dispose of the case. See State v. Kipp, 1999 MT 197, ¶ 9, 295 Mont. 399, ¶ 9, 984 P.2d 733, ¶ 9. When a court grants a speedy trial motion, however, that date becomes the date of the case's disposition. Thus, the date that a district court grants a motion to dismiss based on speedy trial properly becomes the end date of the speedy trial interval. In this case, the District Court correctly used the date of Billman's arrest to start the speedy trial clock and the date of its dismissal order as the end date. Officers arrested Billman on January 27, 2006, and the District Court granted Billman's motion to dismiss on November 1, 2006. The length of the delay in this case amounts to 278 days, seventy-eight days beyond the speedy trial trigger.
¶ 18 We presume that the accused has experienced some prejudice once the 200-day threshold passes. Ariegwe, ¶ 56. That prejudice intensifies as the delay extends beyond the 200-day trigger date, and the State's burden to justify the delay increases. Ariegwe, ¶ 62. In Ariegwe, the delay amounted to 208 days beyond the trigger date. Thus, we required the State to "provide particularly compelling justifications for the delay" under the second speedy trial factor and to "make a highly persuasive showing" that the delay did not prejudice Ariegwe under the fourth speedy trial factor. Ariegwe, ¶ 123. We also recognized that the quantum of proof expected from Ariegwe under the fourth factor correspondingly decreased. Ariegwe, ¶ 123. The delay in this case amounts to less than that in Ariegwe; however, 278 days of delay presents a considerable amount of delay, and we conclude that the State's justifications for the delay must be compelling and that it must make a persuasive showing that the delay did not prejudice Billman. Further, the quantum of proof required from Billman under the fourth factor...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Morrisey
...... Ariegwe, ¶¶ 106-112; State v. Billman, 2008 MT 326, ¶ 11, 346 Mont. 118, 194 P.3d 58. . ¶ 52 Whether a defendant has been denied the right to a speedy trial presents a question of constitutional law. Billman, ¶ 8. This Court reviews de novo a district court's legal conclusions to determine whether the court ......
-
State v. Rose
......Bruce, 1998 MT 186, 290 Mont. 148, 965 P.2d 866, to reach its decision. In other cases that were on appeal when a district court entered its decision before Ariegwe, we remanded for the district court to reconsider its orders applying the Ariegwe factors. See State v. Billman, 2008 MT 326, 346 Mont. 118, 194 P.3d 58; State v. Smith, 2008 MT 7, 341 Mont. 82, 176 P.3d 258; State v. Madplume, 2008 MT 37, 341 Mont. 321, 176 P.3d 1071; State v. Howard, 2008 MT 173, 343 Mont. 378, 184 P.3d 344. However, as this case was previously remanded for a hearing on Rose's claim ......
-
State v. Macgregor
...... State v. Steigelman, 2013 MT 153, ¶ 15, 370 Mont. 352, 302 P.3d 396; State v. Billman, 2008 MT 326, ¶ 31, 346 Mont. 118, 194 P.3d 58. MacGregor was arrested on April 15, 2010, and at a hearing on November 15, 2010, the trial was scheduled for February 7, 2011. MacGregor was incarcerated for 214 days, at which time he was told that he would be incarcerated for 84 more days before ......
-
State of Mont. v. COUTURE
......We then balance these factors with any other relevant circumstances to determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated. Ariegwe, ¶¶ 106-112; State v. Billman, 2008 MT 326, ¶ 11, 346 Mont. 118, 194 P.3d 58. ¶ 47 We apply two standards when reviewing a district court's ruling on a speedy trial motion. First, we review the factual findings underlying the court's ruling to determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous. Ariegwe, ......