State v. Bishop, No. K1/2008-0087A (R.I. Super 2/12/2009)
| Decision Date | 12 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. K1/2008-0087A,K1/2008-0087A |
| Parties | STATE OF RHODE ISLAND v. ALFRED BISHOP |
| Court | Rhode Island Superior Court |
Defendant Alfred Bishop ("Bishop") has filed a motion to suppress statements which he made while in the custody of the Warwick Police Department on July 3, 2007. Essentially, Defendant Bishop claims that because he was not provided with the Miranda1 warnings prior to the police interrogation, the statements he made to the police are inadmissible. More specifically, he argues that because he was never advised of his rights under Miranda, his statements were not voluntarily made in the constitutional sense. After carefully considering the evidence presented at hearing, oral arguments, and the written submissions of the parties, the motion is ripe for decision.
Defendant Bishop has been charged with first degree murder and a number of other criminal offenses stemming from a home invasion at the residence of Ceasar2 and Claire Medeiros during the early morning hours of June 28, 2008.
Officers of the Warwick Police Department responded to a 911 emergency call at the Medeiros home. Upon arrival, the officers found Gabriel Medeiros, Ceasar's brother, dead on the floor of the kitchen as a result of a gun shot wound. Ceasar also suffered a gun shot wound after he had attempted to ward off an intruder in his home. Claire was also injured slightly. The Medeiroses were rushed to Rhode Island Hospital for emergency medical attention. After interviewing the Medeiroses in the emergency room, Detectives of the Warwick Police Department began an intensive investigation, led by Detective Sergeant Robert Bentson, to identify the suspect in the murder and other related offenses.
Within a few days of the incident, Defendant Alfred Bishop became a person of interest in the homicide investigation. Learning that the police were interested in talking with him, Bishop telephoned Sergeant Bentson and was told that Bentson wanted to meet with him. Bishop replied that because he had injuries to his head3 from a work related accident, he was unable to meet with the Detective. By tracing a telephone call, the police determined that it was likely that Bishop was at the residence located at 109 Birch Street, Warwick. At about 5:00 a.m. on July 3, 2007, the police went to that location, observed Bishop through a window, and entered the house for the purpose of affecting his arrest on a parole violation warrant. Bishop was handcuffed and taken immediately to Warwick Police headquarters.
The police led Bishop to the Detective Division where he requested to call Attorney Paul DiMaio prior to being interviewed by the police. The police allowed the defendant to telephone DiMaio in private. That call was not unexpected by DiMaio, as Detective Bentson had previously advised him that a parole violation warrant had been issued for Bishop, and that the Warwick Police Department wished to talk to Bishop about an ongoing investigation.
At approximately 7:30 in the morning, Attorney DiMaio arrived at the Warwick Police headquarters and was allowed to speak with his client in private. The attorney-client meeting terminated after about 20 minutes when Attorney DiMaio left the room in which he Bishop had met, indicating that their discussions had been concluded. At this point, Detective Bentson, together with Detectives Sassi and DeGregorio, entered the room. The police then began to interview Bishop in the presence of Attorney DiMaio. The interview, the contents of which the State proposes to offer as evidence at trial, was recorded on a VHS video recording system. The fruits of that recording have since been transferred to a digital computer disc.4
The parties agree that Attorney DiMaio was present through the entirety of the interview. At one point, Attorney DiMaio asked to speak with his client in private. Honoring the request, the Warwick Police left the interview room after shutting off the recorder. In this way, Bishop was able to again speak privately with his attorney. The interview then resumed until it was finally concluded at Attorney DiMaio's request. During some portions of the interview, Attorney DiMaio also asked questions of the defendant. At other times he spoke for the defendant in response to police inquiry.
It is undisputed that the police did not advise Bishop of the so-called Miranda warnings. This was because the police believed Miranda warnings were not required due to the fact that his attorney was present throughout the interview proceedings.
Bishop asserts that his statements made in response to police questioning while he was in custody at the Warwick Police Station are not admissible as evidence at his trial. Specifically, he contends that the failure of police to advise him of his Miranda5 rights and secure his waiver of those rights prior to interrogation render such statements inadmissible. Further, he claims that these omissions on the part of the police resulted in a violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.
"Both the United States and the Rhode Island Constitutions forbid the use of a defendant's involuntary confession." State v. Monteiro, 924 A.2d 784, 790 (R.I. 2007) (citing State v. Humphrey, 715 A.2d 1265, 1274 (R.I.1998)). "[B]efore a confession can be used at trial, the state must establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his or her right against self-incrimination and that the statement was voluntary." Id. The most common way the police demonstrate that an accused is aware of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is proof that Miranda warnings were given to the accused either orally, in writing, or both.6
In 1966, following a long line of cases which require law enforcement officers to honor a criminal suspect's rights under the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona. As will be discussed below, the high court has never held that providing the Court-created warnings to a suspect in custody was absolute. Rather, the Court held:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. . . . As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statements he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (emphasis added).
The question squarely presented herein is whether the presence of retained counsel at the time of Bishop's interrogation satisfied the constitutional requirement of procedural safeguards of his Fifth Amendment guarantees.
A central guarantee is that no confession or statement shall be held admissible unless it is truly a product of free choice. A confession must be voluntary in the Constitutional sense. See State v. Forbes, 900 A.2d 1114, 1118 (R. I. 2006). ("`The sole issue in * * * a [suppression] hearing is whether a confession was coerced.' ") (citing Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 485 n.12 (1972)). A principal reason for the requirement of the Court-crafted warnings announced in Miranda was the Supreme Court's conclusion that confessions are commonly obtained while the suspect is held incommunicado in a police-dominated atmosphere.7 Of great concern to the Miranda Court was the sad fact that law enforcement personnel had historically used violence or improper psychological pressure to extract confessions from criminal suspects. The bulk of the interrogations are conducted while the suspect is isolated and in the secrecy of police stations. The interrogation techniques of the police, who historically took advantage of interview conditions, constituted a substantial basis for the Miranda decision. As observed by the Court, the "interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. And, "given this background, we concern ourselves primarily with this interrogation atmosphere and the evils it can bring." Id. at 456. Thus, in Miranda a litany of warnings was formulated as "a protective device to dispel the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation." Id. at 465. However, the Court stated clearly and without reservation, Id. at 466.
With this caveat and the purpose of the Miranda decision in mind, this Court now turns to the substantial case authority which has discussed the admissibility of such statements.8 As will be discussed, every court which has ruled on the issue, with one exception,9 has followed the holding10 of Miranda.
Shortly after the Miranda decision was handed down, the Eighth Circuit addressed this issue in Frohmann v. United States. 380 F.2d 832 (1967). In Frohmann, the defendant was under investigation for failure to file tax returns. The defendant challenged the admission of statements he made during a conference at the Internal Revenue Service attended by defendant, his lawyer, and two agents because he was not advised of all of the rights prescribed in Miranda.11 The Eighth Circuit recognized that the defendant was not in "custody" for the...
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