State v. Black
| Decision Date | 19 February 2015 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 2013–0552,2013–0805.,s. 2013–0552 |
| Citation | 30 N.E.3d 918,142 Ohio St.3d 332,2015 Ohio 513 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BLACK, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Ramona J. Rogers, Ashland County Prosecuting Attorney, and Andrew N. Bush and Emily M. Bates, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellant.
Poplar & Mason, L.L.C., and Daniel D. Mason, Sheffield Village, for appellee.
{¶ 1} In this appeal, we resolve a conflict between the Fifth District Court of Appeals and the Eighth District Court of Appeals over whether the term "penal or correctional institution of a party state," as used in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, codified in R.C. 2963.30, includes a county jail.
{¶ 2} We hold that the term "penal or correctional institution of a party state," as it is used in R.C. 2963.30, includes a county jail as well as a state prison or correctional facility. Because our holding adopts the analysis of the Fifth District, we affirm.
{¶ 3} The Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD") is a compact among 48 states, the District of Columbia, and the United States that establishes procedures for one jurisdiction to obtain temporary custody of a prisoner incarcerated in another jurisdiction for the purpose of bringing the prisoner to trial. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 435, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981), fn 1. Ohio adopted the IAD in 1969 and codified its provisions in R.C. 2963.30. Am.S.B. No. 356 ("S.B. 356"), 133 Ohio Laws, Part I, 1067.
{¶ 4} The IAD arose from a report issued in 1948 that addressed difficulties that prisoners and state authorities faced regarding the use of detainers. United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349–350, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) ; see also Meadows, Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the Rights it Created, 18 Akron L.Rev. 691 (1985). The Council for State Governments drafted the legislation in 1956 and included the draft with its Suggested State Legislation Programs for 1957. Id. ; Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985). In 1970, Congress enacted the IAD into law on behalf of the United States and the District of Columbia. Mauro at 353, 98 S.Ct. 1834. For the states, the IAD is a congressionally sanctioned interstate compact under the Compact Clause, Article I, Section 10, of the United States Constitution. Carchman at 719, 105 S.Ct. 3401.
{¶ 5} The term "detainer" is not defined in the IAD. When the legislation was presented to Congress, however, a "detainer" was defined as " ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner is serving a sentence, advising [that he is wanted to face] pending criminal charges in another jurisdiction.’ " (Bracketed material added.) Meadows, 18 Akron L.Rev. at 695, fn. 37, quoting S.Rep. No. 91–1356, at 2 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4864, 4865.
{¶ 6} The drafters of the IAD recognized that detainers, which could be issued informally but never acted on by prosecutors, had certain detrimental effects on prisoners because they posed a threat of further prosecution and could lead to additional sanctions, higher security classification, loss of privileges, or ineligibility for rehabilitative programs and parole. See Meadows, 18 Akron L.Rev. at 691–692. Thus, the legislation recognized that "charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, information or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trials of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions" cause uncertainties that "obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation." R.C. 2963.30, Article I.
{¶ 7} To address these uncertainties, the purpose of the IAD is twofold. Meadows, 18 Akron L.Rev. at 695. First, the IAD expressly states that its purpose is "to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints." R.C. 2963.30, Article I. Second, the IAD is intended to provide cooperative procedures to facilitate interstate transfers. Id . Taken together, the objective of the IAD is "to implement a defendant's right to a speedy trial and to avoid excessive interference with a prisoner's rehabilitation in the state prison system." United States v. Palmer, 574 F.2d 164, 167 (3d Cir.1978).
{¶ 8} The IAD outlines two procedures by which a prisoner against whom a detainer has been lodged may be transferred to the temporary custody of another state for disposition of charges pending there. "One of these procedures may be invoked by the prisoner; the other by the prosecuting attorney of the receiving State." Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 444, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641.
{¶ 9} Under the prisoner-initiated procedure outlined in the statute, the "warden, commissioner of corrections or other officials having custody of the prisoner" must promptly inform the prisoner of any detainer as well as the prisoner's rights in making a request for final disposition. R.C. 2963.30, Article III(c). The prisoner may then provide a written notice for final disposition to the warden, commissioner of corrections, or other official having custody of him, who must forward it to the "appropriate prosecuting official and court" in the receiving state, that is, the state where the detainer is pending. Id ., Article II(c) and III(b). The receiving state must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days of receiving the prisoner's request for disposition, or the charges will be dismissed with prejudice for good cause shown. Id., Article III(a) and (d). A prisoner invoking the IAD also waives any objection to extradition. Id ., Article III(e). Because a prisoner's request under the statute operates as a request for final disposition of any untried indictments on which a detainer from the receiving state is based, the authorities with custody of the prisoner must notify all the prosecuting officers and courts in the receiving state of any request for final disposition by the prisoner. Id ., Article III(d).
{¶ 10} Under the prosecutor-initiated procedure outlined in the statute, the receiving state has 120 days after the prisoner's arrival in the state to bring the prisoner to trial. Id ., Article IV(c). To initiate the procedure, the prosecuting official in the receiving state must make a written request for temporary custody to the "appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated," id ., Article IV(a), also known as the "sending state," id ., Article II(b). The governor of the sending state may disapprove the request sua sponte or upon the motion of the prisoner. Id ., Article IV(a). After the sending state receives a request, the authorities with custody over the prisoner must provide the receiving state with a certificate providing certain details regarding the prisoner's incarceration, including the time remaining to be served and any time for parole eligibility. Id ., Article IV(b). They must also provide notice of the request for custody to all other prosecuting authorities and courts from the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the prisoner. Id ., Article IV(b).
{¶ 11} Under either procedure, if a trial is not held in the receiving state "prior to the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment," the charges are to be dismissed with prejudice. Id ., Article III(d) and IV(e). This provision is referred to as the "antishuttling provision" of the IAD. United States v. Taylor, 173 F.3d 538, 540 (6th Cir.1999).
{¶ 12} Resolution of this appeal requires our interpretation of the language in Article III of the IAD, which states that the statute applies to a defendant who has begun a term of imprisonment "in a penal or correctional institution of a party state." R.C. 2963.30, Article III(a). More specifically, we resolve the parties' dispute over whether "a penal or correctional institution of a party state" includes a county jail.
{¶ 13} On August 2, 2010, appellee James Black was indicted in Ashland County on charges of theft and breaking and entering. A warrant was issued for his arrest. At the time, Black was being held in a county jail in Maryland awaiting sentencing and was notified of the pending charges in Ashland County as well as of separate charges that had been filed in Richland and Franklin counties.
{¶ 14} In February 2011, Black began to serve a one-year sentence in the Cecil County Detention Center in Elkton, Maryland. Prior to beginning his sentence, Black attempted to use the prisoner-initiated procedures under the IAD to notify Ashland County of his incarceration in Maryland and his availability for disposition of the charges pending in Ashland County. But the Ashland County prosecutor notified him that his request was premature because he had not begun his term of imprisonment.
{¶ 15} In March 2011, with the assistance of the jail administrator in the Cecil County Detention Center, Black again initiated IAD requests for final disposition of his charges in Ashland, Richland, and Franklin Counties. In April 2011, the Richland County prosecutor's office responded to Black's request and prepared to transfer Black from Maryland to resolve charges of receiving stolen property, forgery, and tampering with evidence in that county.
{¶ 16} On May 27, 2011, Black was transported from Maryland to Richland County, Ohio, for disposition of the charges pending there. On July 8, 2011, while awaiting final disposition of the Richland County charges, Black was transferred to Ashland County for arraignment.
{¶ 17} Black pleaded not guilty, and the Ashland County Common Pleas Court scheduled trial for October 11, 2011, with no objection from Black or his counsel. The judge initially ordered that Black be held in the Ashland County jail until trial, but the court modified the order to temporarily return Black to ...
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