State v. Black River Phosphate Co.

Decision Date19 July 1893
Citation13 So. 640,32 Fla. 82
PartiesSTATE v. BLACK RIVER PHOSPHATE CO.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Clay county; W. B. Young, Judge.

Bill by the state of Florida against the Black River Phosphate Company. Defendant had decree, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

The act of June 7, 1887, referred to in the opinions, grants to H. S Greeno and others, and such other persons as may associate with them, the right to dig and remove, for 25 years, from the beds of the navigable waters within the jurisdiction of the state, the phosphate rocks and phosphatic deposits 'Provided, that the persons named and other associates shall not in any way interfere with the free navigation of the navigable streams and waters of the state, or the private rights of any citizen or citizens residing upon or owning the lands upon the banks of' such navigable rivers and waters. The grant is made on the express condition that the grantees shall pay $1 per ton for every ton of such phosphate dug and removed. It requires the execution of a bond of specified penalty and condition for making true returns of the quantity of phosphate mined and removed, and for making payment annually for the same; and also that their books shall be open for inspection by the comptroller or his duly-appointed agent, and provides that nothing in the act shall be so construed as to grant to the persons named exclusive rights. The statute also enacts: 'That any other persons who may incorporate under the laws of the state of Florida shall have the same rights, privileges, and franchises granted to said persons by this act, upon their complying with the requirements provided for in this act.'

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. The act of December 27, 1856, entitled 'An act to benefit commerce,' and commonly known as 'The Riparian Act of 1856,' (sections 454, 455, Rev. St.,) does not vest in riparian owners an unqualified fee in the lands below high-water mark, and out to the edge of the channel in navigable streams, bays of the sea, or harbors of this state. So long as such submerged lands remained unimproved by the construction of wharves, or unreclaimed by filling in from the shore, and converting the water into land, the riparian owner, though the legal title is in him, has, in so far as the statute is concerned, no greater right to the beneficial use of such submerged lands and the waters above them than any other citizen, except for the purpose of protecting from invasion the right to improve which the statute gives him. The statute does not give to the riparian owner the right to take phosphates from the beds of navigable streams, bays of the sea, or harbors, below high-water mark, and out to the edge of the channel, for the purposes of sale. The acts of June 7, 1887, (chapter 3826,) and June 9, 1891, (chapter 4043,) relating to the phosphate interests of the state in its navigable waters, permit the taking of such phosphates and prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may be taken; and these statutes apply to riparian owners falling within the provisions of the act of December 27, 1856. Mabry J., dissenting.

2. The act of June 9, 1891, (chapter 4043,) which gives to the board of phosphate commissioners control of the phosphate interests of the state, and authorizes it to institute suits and legal proceedings in the name of the state to protect such interests, does not abate an action previously instituted by the attorney general in the name of the state.

3. A supplemental bill, which presents a continuation of the same trespassing, does not introduce a new subject-matter of litigation.

COUNSEL W. B. Lamar and A. W. Cockrell & Son, for the State.

Cooper & Cooper, for appellee.

OPINION

RANEY O. J.

The appellee, the Black River Phosphate Company, a body corporate under our laws, has been taking phosphate from the bed of Black creek, or, as it is also called, Black river. The company claims to be the owner of lands extending to the water of that stream, which is both tidal and navigable in fact, and founds its claim of title to or right of property in such phosphate, as against the state, upon such riparian ownership and the act of December 27, 1856, entitled 'An act to benefit commerce,' and commonly known as 'The Riparian Act of 1856,' (sections 454, 455, Rev. St.) The first section of this statute, after reciting: 'Whereas it is for the benefit of commerce, that wharves be built and warehouses erected for facilitating the landing and storage of goods; and whereas, the state being the proprietor, of all submerged lands and water privileges, within its boundaries, which prevents the riparian owners from improving their water lots: therefore,' enacts 'that the state of Florida for the considerations above mentioned, divest themselves of all right, title, and interest to all lands covered by water lying in front of any tract of land, owned by a citizen of the United States or by the United States, for public purposes, lying upon any navigable stream, or bay of the sea, or harbor, as far as to the edge of the channel, and hereby vest the full title to the same in and unto the riparian proprietors, giving them full right and privilege to build wharves into streams or waters of the bay or harbor as far as may be necessary to effect the purposes described, and to fill up, from the shore, bank or beach, as far as may be desired, not obstructing the channel, but leaving full space for the requirements of commerce; and upon the lands so filled in to erect warehouses, or other buildings, and also the right to prevent encroachments of any other person upon all such submerged land in the direction of their lines continued to the channel, by bill in chancery or at law and to have and maintain action of trespass in any court of competent jurisdiction in the state for any interference with such property, also, confirming to the riparian proprietors all improvements which may have heretofore been made upon submerged lands for the purposes within mentioned.' The second, or remaining, section enacts 'that nothing, in this act contained shall be so construed, as to release the title of the state of Florida, or any of its grantees, to any of the swamp or overflowed lands, within the limits of the same, but the grant, herein contained shall be limited to those persons and body corporate, owning lands actually, bounded by, and extending to low-water mark, on such navigable streams bays and harbors.'

The cases in which the act has come before this court for consideration are Geiger v. Filor, 8 Fla. 325; Alden v. Pinney, 12 Fla. 348; Rivas v. Solary, 18 Fla. 122; Sullivan v. Moreno, 19 Fla. 200; Ruge v. Apalachicola Oyster Canning & Fish Co., 25 Fla. 656, 6 South. Rep. 489.

In Geiger v. Filor (decided in 1859) the court, having stated that by the laws of Spain and England the sovereign of neither country could have alienated the land covered by the water, then observes that the question is not raised 'as to the power of the state to alienate, but whether the state has actually transferred to complainants or to the proprietor from whom they derive title;' and afterwards, remarking that the avowed object of the law is to give to the riparian owners 'the right and interest of the state in and to the land covered by water as far as the edge of the channel, and to owners who were prevented by the state's title from improving lots so situated between them and the water,' it says that, if the complainants are such owners in contemplation of law, their case is made out; but it finds that 'they, as assignees of the reserved fee of the original proprietors or dedicators of the streets, are not riparian owners within the meaning of the statute. * * * There are no water lots at the ends of the streets held by them, and they are not the riparian proprietors prevented from improving any lots there claimed by them. * * * Neither the complainants nor the original proprietor of the lots derived title to the land between high and low water mark at the end of the streets from this law, and their claim on this ground is unsustainable.' We also understand the view of the court to have been that, as between the city and riparian owners of lots which also about on a street, the city would be entitled to the benefits of the act as to land opposite the end of the street, as long as the street continued to exist as such, and such lot owners afterwards; and, further, that the city was authorized by statute, apart from the riparian act, to construct and maintain wharves at the foot of its streets.

In Alden v. Pinney (decided in 1869) it was found that a street intervened between the land of complainants and high-water mark, and consequently that the complainants were not riparian proprietors, and that any full discussion of the effect of the statute was improper. It is, however, observed in connection with the subject of the equitable jurisdiction invoked that riparian proprietors, too, under the act of 1856, 'have a title coupled with a trust for the benefit of the public;' and it is said in another connection that wherever the title to this soil--that from the street to the channel--is, whether in the city or the heirs of Pintado or in the state, it cannot under existing laws, be used in any event to obstruct navigation or commerce. If the grantees of the state hold it, it is coupled with this trust; and if it is put to such use, or such use is threatened, there are circumstances under which complainants can properly seek a court of law or equity to redress injuries. If this ice house, or any other structure which defendants intend to construct, will be an obstruction to navigation, a hindrance to commerce, or impede or transgress the rights of the public in this...

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2 books & journal articles
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