State v. Blackwell

Decision Date21 January 1976
Docket NumberNo. 57447,57447
Citation238 N.W.2d 131
PartiesSTATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Lloyd Henry BLACKWELL, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

John C. Wellman, Des Moines, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Nancy J. Shimanek, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ray A. Fenton, County Atty., for appellee.

Heard before MOORE, C.J., and MASON, LeGRAND, HARRIS and McCORMICK, JJ.

MASON, Justice.

January 14, 1974, a county attorney's information was filed in the Polk district court charging Lloyd Henry Blackwell with the crime of assault with intent to commit murder as defined in section 690.6, The Code. The assault was perpetrated by Blackwell's shooting and injuring Rolland Lee Corley. He appeals from judgment based on a jury verdict convicting him of the crime charged. The facts of the assault, however, are not relevant to the issues raised in this appeal.

The incident giving rise to this appeal occurred in a hallway on the fourth floor of the Polk County Courthouse during the noon recess of the second day of trial after the State had rested. Prior to this, some 15 to 18 spectators had been present during defendant's trial in the small courtroom on that floor. These people were apparently friends and relatives of defendant and at times talked with Blackwell. The trial judge noted courtroom decorum had not been breached, although once he had to request the spectators to remove their hats, and at another point restricted their comings and goings. Both requests saw compliance.

The sheriff's office had decided for reasons of security to restrict people from conversing with defendant at the courthouse. When Deputy Chris Spidle returned defendant for the afternoon session, an alteration took place in the hallway. As the deputy and defendant passed by the courtroom spectators who were waiting in the hall, the deputy announced there would be no more 'talking or hugging'--that this type of thing was for visitor's day. The people protested but Spidle and defendant proceeded to the courtroom.

Defendant then announced he wished to smoke a cigarette so the two proceeded back to the hall. At this point some spectators asked why talking was restricted. Spidle noted the people were upset. One male approached defendant and the two began conversing, whereupon Spidle threatened to take defendant back to jail. The others then converged and there was general pushing and shoving. Someone hit a bailiff who had come to the officer's aid. Spidle then 'forcibly' handcuffed defendant and the 'melee' commenced in earnest. Mace was used on one 'very belligerent' woman. According to the testimony of another deputy, 'Blackwell and everyone was swinging. It was just a mess.'

Defense attorney Harlan Lemon stated at least two jurors were standing outside the courtroom. Lemon 'assumed' they were trying to get away from what was occurring and stated, '* * * there is no doubt in my mind but what--at least part of what happened, whatever happened, happened in the presence of some of the jury and, of course, I think the remainder of the jury was probably just inside the door, and the door was opened and closed several times.'

The foregoing facts were elicited in the courtroom by the trial court, out of the presence of the jury And defendant. The court reasoned defendant's presence 'might lead to additional disruptions.' The county attorney and defense counsel were present, neither of whom lodged objections to defendant's absence.

The trial court then summoned the jury in the presence of defense counsel and the county attorney. Defendant again was absent for the previous reasons. The purpose of this second stage was to determine whether the jury, 'individually or collectively,' had been affected by these events in their abilities to be fair and impartial.

The judge explained the noon hour events were in no way ordinary happenings during the course of a trial. The jury was further told people will seldom admit prejudice but that there were certain 'indirect' methods by which to ascertain prejudice. (This aspect seemingly referred to racial prejudice). The reason he was saying these things, the judge said, was to impress upon the jury he wanted honest answers, not what the jury persons thought the judge wanted. The importance of the inquiry was stressed.

The jury was then informed that anyone who wished to speak up should do so. And in this regard, ten jurors stated the noon hour events had not affected their ability to be fair and impartial to both sides of the case. Mrs. Terry Hoskinson stated, 'I must admit I Was quite frightened when I walked up the hallway, but that has nothing to do, as far as I am concerned, with the case in itself. I don't know at all what went on out there except that there was a lot of yelling and screaming, so it affects it no way.' The record discloses the other nine jurors made similar responses.

After both attorneys stated they did not wish to confer with the jury, the trial judge again asked if anyone had seen or heard anything affecting his ability to be fair and impartial. 'Can I assume then that you are all of a mind that you can be fair and impartial?' A juror answered, 'Yes.'

The court and counsel then retired to chambers where the court inquired if either counsel were going to move for a mistrial. The State declined to do so. However, defense counsel moved for a mistrial contending 'that it is impossible for those jurors to see any part of, or hear any part of the melee that took place out there without it affecting them somehow, so I am regretfully moving for a mistrial.' Counsel then stated, 'I suspect that it would be appropriate for me to consult with my client.'

The motion was overruled. In this regard, the trial court apparently had earlier granted such a motion, as it was stated, 'the Court reverses itself and denies the motion for mistrial.'

The court then instituted certain precautions to insure the events of that day would not be repeated. The number of spectators was limited to the number of chairs in the courtroom, and the comings and goings were to occur only at recesses. It was also provided defendant and counsel were to enter the courtroom after everyone else was present and seated. The spectators were then to remain after adjournment until defendant and counsel had left the courtroom and defendant was placed in a side room.

Trial was continued until the following morning when the court, out of the jury's presence, explained to defendant the proceedings of the day before. The following colloquy took place between the trial judge and defendant:

'Now, my purpose in advising you of this fact is that these events took place out of your presence, and I want to know first of all, do you have any questions of me? Do you understand what took place, and secondly, do you have any objection that you now want to register yourself, or through your attorney, to those proceedings taking place out of your presence?

'First of all, do you have any questions of me relative to the procedures that followed or that took place when you were not present? Do you understand those now?

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I believe now, yes.

'THE COURT: Now, do you have any objection that you want to raise personally or through your attorney to those things taking place out of your presence? Do you understand, first of all, why I felt, under the circumstances, it was best that you not be brought back to the courtroom facility at that time?

'THE DEFENDANT: No, not really.

'THE COURT: You don't understand it. Well, regardless of that, do you have any objection to raise to those things taking place out of your presence, with the understanding that your lawyer was present and did make, in my opinion, adequate record protecting you?

'THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

'THE COURT: Do you have any objections?

'THE DEFENDANT: No.

'THE COURT: Mr. Lemon, any objection you wish to make for your client?

'MR. LEMON: No, not in that regard, Your Honor.'

When the court concluded the record as to the incident, it afforded defense opportunity to make further record. At this point defense moved for directed verdict which was overruled.

Defendant did not take the witness stand but offered testimony of two witnesses in defense to the charge.

The State offered no rebuttal and defendant renewed his motion for directed verdict, motion for mistrial and motion to withdraw from consideration of the jury the crime of assault with intent to commit murder. The court overruled each motion. Copies of the proposed instructions were submitted to counsel with opportunity to make objections and take exceptions. After arguments of counsel the matter was then submitted to the jury which returned its verdict as indicated.

In instruction 19, the jury was admonished as follows:

'* * * In your jury room you should not refer to, discuss or consider any testimony that has been stricken out or anything in connection with this case except the evidence received upon the trial and the instructions of the Court. All extraneous matters, statements and suggestions should be carefully discarded by you, and, as heretofore instructed, you should base your verdict solely upon the evidence and be guided by these instructions and seek to arrive at the very truth of the matter without sympathy, bias, passion or prejudice.'

April 3, 1974, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Defendant's motion for a new trial incorporated the mistrial grounds. Attached to this motion was the affidavit of Deputy Clerk of Court Josephine Harper which stated she came in contact with at least three jurors on the third floor of the courthouse. They expressed '* * * a fear for their personal safety and sought directions as to alternate ways of reaching the courtroom * * *.'

The motion for a new trial was denied. Defendant was sentenced to a term of 30 years to be served at the Men's Reformatory in Anamosa. Defendant urges this court to 'reverse his conviction, and Dismiss the County Attorney's Information...

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