State v. Blair & Certain Intoxicating Liquors

• Decision Date: 13 October 1887
• Parties: STATE v. BLAIR AND CERTAIN INTOXICATING LIQUORS.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

72 Iowa 591

34 N.W. 432

STATE

v.BLAIR AND CERTAIN INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 13, 1887.

Appeal from district court, Keokuk county; D. RYAN, Judge.

M. L. May filed an information, under oath, before a justice of the peace, in which he charged that certain intoxicating liquors were kept in a certain building, which was described in the information, and that said liquors were owned by the defendant, John T. Blair, and were kept by him with intent to sell the same in violation of law. The justice thereupon issued a search-warrant, upon which the liquors were seized. The notice of the seizure required by the statute was served on defendant, who appeared before the justice, and filed an answer, in which he alleged that he was the owner of the liquors, and that he held a permit from the board of supervisors for the sale of intoxicating liquors, and that he kept the liquors for sale only for the purposes enumerated in the permit, and denied that he kept the same for sale in violation of law. The trial before the justice resulted in an order for the destruction of the liquors. From that order defendant appealed to the district court, where the case was tried before a jury, who found that the liquors were kept by defendant for the purpose of being sold in violation of the laws of the state, and the court entered an order for their destruction.Mackey & Fonda and J. P. Talley, for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

REED, J.

1. After the verdict was returned, the defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment; one ground of which was that the information did not allege that May, the informant, was a resident of the county. The proceeding was instituted under section 1544 of the Code, which is as follows: “If any credible resident of any county shall, before a justice of the peace of the same county, make written information, supported by his oath or affirmation, that he has reason to believe, and does believe, that any intoxicating liquor, described as particularly as may be in said information, is in said county, in any place, described as particularly as may be in said information, owned or kept by any person named or described in said information as particularly as may be, and is intended by him to be sold in violation of the provisions of this chapter, said justice shall, upon finding probable cause for such information, issue his warrant of search. * * *” It will be observed that the facts which are required to be shown by the information, are expressly enumerated in the section. But it contains no express provision which requires that the fact that the informant is a resident of the county is to be shown by the information. It is true that, to give the justice jurisdiction to issue the warrant, the information must be made and verified by a resident of the county. He is required, therefore, before issuing the warrant, to institute an inquiry as to the residence of the informant. But the fact of his residence may be shown by proof independent of the information, or, if the fact should be within his personal knowledge, we see no reason why he might not act upon that knowledge. There is nothing either in the provisions of the statute, or in the nature of the case, which requires that the fact should be shown by the information. The question is similar in principle to that determined in State v. Thompson, 44 Iowa, 399.

2. It was shown upon the trial that defendant held a permit from the board of supervisors to sell intoxicating liquors for mechanical, culinary, and sacramental purposes. One ground of the motion in arrest was that the information did not charge that defendant had sold intoxicating liquors in violation of law. It is provided by section 1536 that, when intoxicating liquors shall be seized under a search-warrant, it shall be no bar to the confiscation and destruction of the same that the party claiming them has a permit, if the court or jury trying the facts shall be satisfied from the proof that he has sold such liquors in violation or evasion of law. The ground, however, upon which the liquors may be seized and destroyed, is defined by section 1544, and it is that they were intended to be sold in violation of law. The effect of the provision of section 1536 is simply to make the fact that the party has...