State v. Blair

Decision Date24 April 2018
Docket NumberNo. 50037-0-II,50037-0-II
Citation415 P.3d 1232
CourtWashington Court of Appeals
Parties STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Mason BLAIR, Appellant.

Christopher Gibson, Nielsen Broman & Koch PLLC, 1908 E Madison St., Seattle, WA, 98122-2842 for Appellant.

Joseph James Anthony Jackson, Thurston County Prosecutor's Office, 2000 Lakeridge Dr. Sw Bldg. 2, Olympia, WA, 98502-6045 for Respondent.

PUBLISHED OPINION

Melnick, J.

¶ 1 The State charged Mason Blair in juvenile court with rape in the second degree of another juvenile, EF. Blair and EF both testified at trial. The defense attempted to cross-examine EF if, prior to accusing Blair of rape, she knew Blair had a criminal history of sexual crimes. The trial court allowed limited cross-examination on this topic. On appeal, Blair argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense and to confront witnesses by limiting cross-examination.1 We affirm.

FACTS
I. THE INCIDENT

¶ 2 On April 30, 2016, Blair and his female cousin KA each invited a friend to join them for a sleepover at their grandmother's house. Blair brought his male friend BS; KA brought her female friend EF. EF had a boyfriend, who was not present. The four teens spent the evening together. Around midnight, the two girls went to bed in KA's room and the two boys went to bed in Blair's room.

¶ 3 Later in the night, the boys entered KA's room and told EF to leave so that KA and BS could spend time together. At this point EF's and Blair's versions of what happened diverged.

A. EF's Testimony

¶ 4 Per EF, she went to Blair's room and laid on the bed. Blair entered, sat next to EF, attempted to kiss her, and asked EF to have sex with him. EF refused, saying "No. I have a boyfriend." 1 Report of Proceedings (RP) at 134.

¶ 5 EF testified that Blair then held her down on the bed, removed her leggings, and raped her. Blair ignored her repeated requests that he "stop" and "get off [of her]." 1 RP at 28; 1 RP at 134-36. Eventually, EF pushed Blair off with her knee and left the room. EF and KA left the house shortly thereafter. EF went to the hospital, where she received a sexual assault examination.

B. Blair's Testimony

¶ 6 Blair claims that while lying next to EF on the bed, he and EF "shared a mutual kiss" that lasted until Blair attempted to remove EF's pants. 2 RP at 192. EF stopped him, removed the pants herself, and laid back on the bed. They then had intercourse. Blair stated that EF soon became nervous Blair's grandmother would come in. She insisted they stop, and they did. Blair initially denied that EF ever told him "no" or "stop." 2 RP at 193. In a later statement, Blair acknowledged that after intercourse began EF told him to "stop" and "get off" because she was afraid they would be caught. 2 RP at 197, 215. Blair told EF to "just let it happen." 2 RP at 215.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 7 The State charged Blair with rape in the second degree by forcible compulsion. The matter proceeded to trial.

¶ 8 Prior to the events giving rise to this case, Blair had two adjudications for sexual crimes, one count of indecent liberties and one count of attempted rape of a child in the first degree. At the time of the sleepover, Blair was serving a Special Sex Offender Disposition Alternative (SSODA) sentence for these convictions. The court did not admit any direct evidence of prior convictions at trial. However, trial testimony established that Blair was on probation, that he had at least one prior offense that was sexual in nature, and that EF knew why Blair was on probation.

¶ 9 During EF's cross-examination, Blair attempted to elicit testimony that EF knew about his criminal history prior to accusing him of rape. The following exchange occurred:

[Defense]: Okay. And while you were there you learned that [Blair] was on probation, correct?
[EF]: Yes.
[Defense]: And you learned that [Blair] had a history of sexual offenses?
[Prosecutor]: Objection. Again, beyond the scope of direct.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Defense]: Did you learn what [Blair] was on probation for?
[EF]: Yes.
[Prosecutor]: Objection. Beyond the scope of the direct.
[Defense]: She specifically answered that question, and it was not objected to.
THE COURT: I'll allow the last answer to stand.
[Defense]: Thank you.
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection to any further inquiry in this area.
[Defense]: Okay.

1 RP at 145-46.

¶ 10 In closing argument, the prosecutor argued that EF's testimony was more credible than Blair's, and that the State had proved every element of rape in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt. Blair primarily argued that the State had failed to prove forcible compulsion beyond a reasonable doubt. Blair also argued actual innocence, suggesting that EF falsely accused Blair of rape to avoid being caught cheating on her boyfriend and because she believed Blair's criminal history made her accusation more believable.

¶ 11 The trial court adjudicated Blair guilty of rape in the second degree. It entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. Acknowledging that the ruling turned largely on credibility, the trial court found EF's version of events more credible. The trial court did not consider Blair's criminal history. Blair appeals.

ANALYSIS

¶ 12 Blair contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to present a defense and to confront witnesses by limiting his cross-examination of EF. We disagree.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 13 The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal defendant "to be confronted with the witnesses against him." U.S. CONST. amends. VI. and XIV. Similarly, article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution guarantees the right of a defendant to "meet the witnesses against him face to face." Alleged violations of constitutional rights are generally reviewed de novo. State v. Tyler , 138 Wash. App. 120, 126, 155 P.3d 1002 (2007).

¶ 14 Additionally, criminal defendants have a constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV ; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3, 22 ; Chambers v. Mississippi , 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed. 2d 297 (1973). However, this right and the right to confrontation are not absolute. State v. Arredondo , 188 Wash.2d 244, 266, 394 P.3d 348 (2017). It does not extend to irrelevant or inadmissible evidence. State v. Wade , 186 Wash. App. 749, 763-64, 346 P.3d 838 (2015). "The accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence."

Taylor v. Illinois , 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed. 2d 798 (1988). The defendant's right to present a defense is subject to "established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence." Chambers , 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038 ; State v. Cayetano-Jaimes , 190 Wash. App. 286, 296, 359 P.3d 919 (2015).

¶ 15 We review the right of confrontation involving a limitation on the scope of cross-examination for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lee , 188 Wash.2d 473, 486, 396 P.3d 316 (2017). The "scope of such cross examination [remains] within the discretion of the trial court." State v. Russell , 125 Wash.2d 24, 92, 882 P.2d 747 (1994). Therefore, when a trial court allows cross-examination but exercises its discretion to limit the scope of questioning, courts have instead applied the more deferential abuse of discretion standard. Arredondo , 188 Wash.2d at 265-66, 394 P.3d 348.

¶ 16 In State v. Darden , the court clarified, "Although the dispositive issue before us concerns the confrontation clause, ultimately we are asked to review the trial court's ruling on the admissibility of [evidence], which is reviewed for abuse of discretion." 145 Wash.2d 612, 619, 41 P.3d 1189 (2002). Similarly, a trial court's limitation of the scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed unless it is the result of manifest abuse of discretion. Darden , 145 Wash.2d at 619, 41 P.3d 1189 ; State v. Campbell , 103 Wash.2d 1, 20, 691 P.2d 929 (1984). As to the right to a fair trial, "[a]llegations that a ruling violated the defendant's right to a fair trial does not change the standard of review." State v. Dye , 178 Wash.2d 541, 548, 309 P.3d 1192 (2013).

¶ 17 A manifest abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's exercise of discretion is "manifestly unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons." State v. Powell , 126 Wash.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d 615 (1995). Even when an appellate court disagrees with the trial court, we will not reverse unless the court abused its discretion. Dye , 178 Wash.2d at 548, 309 P.3d 1192 ; In Re Marriage of Littlefield , 133 Wash.2d 39, 46-47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997).

¶ 18 The legal principles from the above-cited cases can be summarized as follows. We first look to see if the trial court abused its discretion in excluding evidence or limiting cross-examination. If there is no abuse of discretion, the inquiry ends because there is no error. If the trial court does abuse its discretion, then we take the next step and review de novo the claim that a constitutional right has been violated. We do not, however, review the court's evidentiary ruling de novo. Only the claimed violation of a constitutional right is reviewed de novo.

¶ 19 As we discuss below, in our case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling. Therefore, it is distinguishable from Darden , Jones , and Lee .2

¶ 20 In Darden , the trial court abused its discretion by excluding evidence. The State conceded the error which is why the court had to further analyze whether or not the defendant's constitutional claim had merit. 145 Wash.2d at 618, 41 P.3d 1189. In our case, unlike in Darden , the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary ruling.

¶ 21 In State v. Jones , 168 Wash.2d 713, 721-22, 230 P.3d 576 (2010), the trial court abused its discretion by...

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