State v. Blalock

• Decision Date: 05 August 1970
• Docket Number: No. 7010SC235,7010SC235
• Citation: 9 N.C.App. 94,175 S.E.2d 716
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. James Jackson BLALOCK and Meril Lane Andrews.

Page 716

175 S.E.2d 716

9 N.C.App. 94

STATE of North Carolina v. James Jackson BLALOCK and Meril Lane Andrews.

No. 7010SC235.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Aug. 5, 1970.

Certiorari Denied Aug. 28, 1970.

Robert Morgan, Atty. Gen., Eugene A. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Howard P. Satisky, Staff Atty., Raleigh, for the State.

Hatch, Little, Bunn, Jones & Liggett, by E. Richard Jones, Jr., and William P. Few, Raleigh, for defendants-appellants.

HEDRICK, Judge.

By assignments of error numbers 1, 3, 4, 7 and 14, the defendants contend that the trial judge, during the course of the trial, made remarks and asked questions of some of the witnesses which amounted to an expression of an opinion by the judge in violation of G.S. § 1--180. In North Carolina it is improper for a trial judge to question a witness for the purpose of impeaching his testimony. State v. Perry, 231 N.C. 467, 57 S.E.2d 774 (1950). However, it is a well settled rule in this State that a trial judge may ask questions of a witness in order to obtain a proper understanding and clarification of the witness' testimony. State v. Strickland, 254 N.C. 658, 119 S.E.2d 781 (1961); State v. Humbles, 241 N.C. 47, 84 S.E.2d 264 (1954); State v. Stevens, 244 N.C. 40, 92 S.E.2d 409 (1956); State v. Furley, 245 N.C. 219, 95 S.E.2d 448. This rule is a necessary one in our system of criminal law since there are times during the course of a trial, and especially in a trial involving facts as complicated as in the present case, when the judge finds it necessary to ask the witness competent questions to aid in clarifying the witness' testimony. State v. Hoyle, 3 N.C.App. 109, 164 S.E.2d 83 (1968); State v. Perry, Supra.

We have examined the testimony of these witnesses and after considering the questions propounded by the judge, in light of all the attendant facts and circumstances, we believe that the questions asked by the judge were for the purpose of clarification and were not expressions of opinion, and did not tend to impeach the testimony of the witnesses. These assignments of error are overruled.

The defendants contend that the court erred in threatening to issue bench warrants for the arrest of any witnesses who testified that they participated in the crime of aiding and abetting prostitution. The record shows the facts to be as follows: Roger Watson, testifying for the defense, stated that everyone at the house that night, including himself twice, had intercourse with Pat Hinton. Following this testimony, Judge Carr excused the jury and called the solicitor's attention to the provisions of G.S. § 14--203 and G.S. § 14--204 relating to prostitution. He stated that he felt the witness had violated this statute but that he had grave doubts about the Corpus delicti. When reminded by one of the defendant's attorneys that the witnesses were present, Judge Carr stated that he wanted them to know what the law was and what the consequences of their actions could be under the law. After the jury returned, the record shows that Donnie Marshburn and Donald Jones took the witness stand and testified that each of the men present on the night in question took turns going into the bedroom of Pat Hinton where they had intercourse with her.

The record is clear that the remarks by Judge Carr had no adverse effect on the two witnesses that testified after he had informed them of the possible consequences of their testimony. This assignment of error is overruled.

The defendants argue that the court committed prejudicial error in allowing the solicitor on cross-examination to ask one of the defendant's witnesses whether he would be willing to take a lie detector test as to his testimony. The record discloses that the solicitor asked the witness Jones the following question: 'Will you take a lie detector test regarding your testimony today.' No objection appears in the record as to this question or the answer. Later, the witness was asked the same question and an objection was made by the attorney for the defendant Blalock who afterwards stated that he had no objection to the question being asked once more; whereupon, the question was asked the third time without any objection and the witness answered. Subsequently, an attorney for the defendant Andrews stated to the court that this is highly improper and asked the court to instruct the jury on the admissibility of lie detector tests in North Carolina. Later, when the question was asked for the fourth time, counsel for one of the defendants objected.

It is the general rule that unless an objection is made at the proper time, it is waived. Stansbury, N.C.Evidence, 2d Ed., Sec. 27, page 49. In case of a specific question, objection should...