State v. le Blanc

• Decision Date: 13 July 1916
• Citation: 98 A. 119
• Parties: STATE v. LE BLANC (two cases).
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

98 A. 119

STATE

v. LE BLANC (two cases).

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

July 13, 1916.

Exceptions from Supreme Judicial Court, Lincoln County, at Law.

Laurie D. Le Blanc was convicted of obstructing a fish warden in the discharge of his official duties and of refusing while outside the waters of the state to return to state waters when ordered so to do, in violation of Pub. Laws 1915, c. 235, and he appeals to the Supreme Judicial Court of Lincoln County. Case taken to the law court on agreed statement of facts. Judgment for respondent.

Argued before SAVAGE, C. J., and CORNISH, KING, BIRD, HALEY, HANSON, and PHILBROOK, JJ.

James B. Perkins, Co. Atty., of Boothbay Harbor, for the State. C. R. Tupper, of Boothbay Harbor, for respondent.

CORNISH, J. Two complaints and warrants under section 11 of chapter 235 of the Public Laws of 1915 were brought in the Lincoln municipal court. Demurrers were filed and overruled and the respondent adjudged guilty in each case. Appeals were taken to the supreme judicial court for Lincoln county, and thence were brought to this court on an agreed statement of facts.

From this statement it appears that the respondent was the master of the E. McNichol, a vessel owned in Boston, Mass., and enrolled under the custom laws of the United States, and was sailing under a license to carry on the coasting trade, issued at the custom house in Boston. He was engaged in buying lobsters along the Atlantic Coast and transporting them to Boston in his vessel. On the morning of October 13, 1915, he left McFarland's Cove, Johns Bay, Bristol, with a cargo of lobsters bound for Boston. He slowed down near White Islands and took lobsters from two boats. While the vessel was under way and at a point two miles east of White Islands, and shortly after the lobsters were taken from the two boats, a fish warden came alongside and "ordered the smack to stop for the purpose of allowing the warden to go on board to inspect the lobsters. The respondent being in charge refused to stop the smack. The warden followed the smack in his power boat until they were outside the waters under the jurisdiction of the state of Maine, and then ordered the respondent to return with the vessel to the waters of the state of Maine. This the respondent refused to do, but continued on his course to Boston." The respondent held a license from the commissioner of sea and shore fisheries to purchase lobsters in this state and to transport them out of the state, and had furnished the bond required by said act.

Upon this state of facts two warrants were issued. In the first, the respondent is charged with obstructing a warden in the discharge of his official duties by refusing to stop the vessel to allow the warden to come on board for the purpose of inspection; and, in the second, he is charged with refusing, while outside the waters of this state, to return to waters under the jurisdiction of the state when ordered so to do. Neither complaint can be sustained, because in neither do the allegations constitute a cognizable offense.

1. Let us consider the first complaint, the alleged obstruction of an officer by refusal to stop and permit search. It might well be doubted whether the alleged act of the respondent in simply continuing on his course could be deemed the obstruction of an officer, as that term is used in law. To "obstruct" ordinarily implies opposition or resistance by direct action, and forcible or threatened means. State v. Welch, 37 Wis. 196; State v. Knudson, 27 S. D. 400, 131 N. W. 400; Vince v. State, 113 Ga. 1070, 39 S. B. 435; Moses v. State, 6 Ga. App. 251, 64 S. E. 699.

But passing this point without decision, the fatal defect is that section eleven of the act in question creates no such offense as is here charged. That section does not make the refusal to stop a vessel for purpose of search a criminal offense. The first part of the section reads as follows:

"No lobsters shall be transported beyond the limits of this state, whether of legal length or otherwise, except by common carriers, as provided in this act, unless by persons licensed to transport lobsters outside the limits of the state under the following conditions."

This respondent was duly licensed. There was no violation of this provision on his part. The section continues by prescribing the method of procuring and issuing the license, its terms and conditions. Among these conditions is this:

"It (that is, the license) shall further provide that such smack, vessel or other conveyance shall, at all times, be subject to inspection and search by the commissioner of sea and shore fisheries, or his wardens or deputy wardens, with warrant or without, in which inspection and search they shall in no way be obstructed."

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