State v. Blazak, 1976--2

• Decision Date: 06 December 1973
• Docket Number: No. 1976--2,1976--2
• Citation: 516 P.2d 575,110 Ariz. 202
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Mitchell Thomas BLAZAK, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 575

516 P.2d 575

110 Ariz. 202

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Mitchell Thomas BLAZAK, Appellant.

No. 1976--2.

Supreme Court of Arizona, In Division.

Dec. 6, 1973.

Gary K. Nelson, Atty. Gen., Phoenix, by John S. O'Dowd, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tucson, James P. F. Egbert, Third Year Law Student, for appellee.

O'Dowd, Fahringer & Diamos, by Clay G. Diamos, Tucson, for appellant.

STRUCKMEYER, Justice.

Defendant, Mitchell Thomas Blazak, was convicted of robbery, a violation of A.R.S. § 13--641, and assault to commit murder, a violation of A.R.S. § 13--248, in the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, and appeals.

The facts necessary for the determination of the appeal show that on June 14, 1967, after defendant had been arrested and arraigned in the Superior Court, a Rule 250 hearing was held, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., in which it was determined he was so mentally incapacitated as to be unable to assist in his defense. He was, accordingly, committed to the Arizona State Hospital for treatment.

On April 24, 1968, after defendant's release from the State Hospital, seemingly a written motion was filed by his then counsel waiving a further hearing as to defendant's competency, and on July 9, 1968, he entered guilty pleas to the commission of the offenses with which he was charged. Defendant was tried to the court without a jury solely on the issue of his sanity as it existed at the time the crimes were committed.

The trial judge, in the belief that A.R.S. § 13--1621.01 placed the burden of establishing proof of insanity upon the defendant, found him sane. We reversed. State v. Blazak, 105 Ariz. 216, 462 P.2d 84 (1969). In reversing, we held that under the provisions of the statute A.R.S. § 13--1621, after the defendant's return from a commitment to the State Hospital it was mandatory for the court to hold a hearing to determine his capacity to stand trial and that it was error for the court to permit a waiver of the hearing.

On remand to the lower court, a date was set for the defendant's re-trial on the question of his sanity at the time of commission of the offenses, and in preparation therefor the Superior Court ordered a hearing to determine if he was presently able to understand the charges against him and to assist counsel in his defense. Because defendant's present counsel moved to have the pleas of guilty to the commission of the offenses withdrawn, the court further ordered that the hearing also be held to determine the defendant's capacity to understand the nature of the charges and assist in his defense prior to the entrance of pleas of guilty.

On March 30, 1970, the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was able to understand the nature of the charges against him and able to assist counsel in his defense. It further found that beyond a reasonable doubt on April 24, 1968, the defendant was also able to understand the nature of the charges against him and to assist counsel in his defense. The court then denied the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and ordered a jury trial limited solely to the issue of defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the offenses. On June 16, the jury found the defendant sane, and the defendant was duly thereafter sentenced. From that sentence and the judgment of conviction, Blazak has perfected this second appeal.

He presents two questions for our determination.

The first is whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit him to withdraw his pleas of guilty, thereby confining the trial to the single issue of defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the offenses. It is defendant's position that the trial court's determination that he was sane when he entered his pleas of guilty was error. Defendant relies on the statute A.R.S. § 13--1621 et seq., which makes a second hearing to determine a defendant's ability to assist in his defense mandatory after his return from the State Hospital. He argues that the proceedings after his return to the Superior Court and before such a determination is made, such as the pleas of guilty, are invalid. The essence of defendant's argument, as we understand it, is that the failure to make the determination required by law necessarily voids all subsequent proceedings. But we do not think so.

We think this case is controlled by our decision in State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1967). There, after Bradley's return from the State Hospital, the trial judge denied a motion by defendant's counsel for a second hearing to determine defendant's ability to assist in his defense. While we found that the weight of authority holds that it is not always necessary to have a second hearing, we also held:

'The prior adjudication of mental incompetency gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of continued incompetency.' State v. Bradley, Supra, at 487, 433 P.2d at 278.

We concluded that if the circumstances before the court raise substantial doubts of competency, a hearing should be held and a determination thereof made.

It is to be noted that State v. Bradley was a case prior to the passage by the Legislature of § 13--1621. But we do not believe that the mandatory nature of the legislative language requiring a second hearing necessarily compels the conclusion that the omission of such a hearing constitutes prejudicial error. Concededly, on direct attack by appeal subsequent proceedings will be held invalid and set aside. But the failure to hold a second...