State v. Bleau, 93-301-C
| Decision Date | 28 October 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 93-301-C,93-301-C |
| Citation | 649 A.2d 215 |
| Parties | STATE v. Carlton J. BLEAU. A. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This case comes before us on appeal by the defendant, Carlton J. Bleau (Bleau), from his conviction of leaving the scene of an accident in violation of G.L.1956 (1982 Reenactment) § 31-26-1. Bleau raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) the trial justice erred in not allowing him to make an opening statement following the state's opening statement, (2) the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial, and (3) the trial justice erred in denying his motion to pass after two jurors saw him in handcuffs during a court recess. We reject Bleau's arguments and affirm the Superior Court judgment of conviction. The facts of the case are as follows.
On the evening of January 10, 1988, Rebecca Dunn (Rebecca) was working alone at the Store 24 (the store) located on Broad Street in Central Falls. Her shift began at seven o'clock in the evening and ended at approximately two-thirty the following morning, on January 11, 1988.
After closing the store, Rebecca began walking to her boyfriend's house to leave a note on his automobile before she walked home. Rebecca crossed Broad Street and then continued down toward Clay Street. As she walked down the left side of the street, a man driving alone in a beige Nissan pick-up truck approached her and asked her if she wanted a ride; Rebecca declined. During this encounter Rebecca spoke to the driver for less than one minute. Rebecca described the man as having gray hair and wearing glasses; he also wore a cap and "some kind of * * * post jacket" which had a signature on one side. Rebecca next observed the truck drive to the end of the street and turn left. The man in the truck then came back down Clay Street behind Rebecca, glanced at her, and slowly drove by her.
Rebecca then walked down Clay Street, turned right at High Street, and proceeded onto Jackson Street. When she was on Jackson Street, she saw the man in the truck on High Street. She hid behind a parked car for between five to ten minutes. She testified that she was scared.
Rebecca next proceeded to walk to her boyfriend's house. She left a note on the windshield of his car but did not knock on the door to his house because it was so late.
Rebecca then traveled down the left side of Jackson Street. She testified that she was walking in the street and not on the sidewalk. As she looked over her right shoulder, she saw the man in the truck drive by, turning the wheel to the truck in her direction. The truck was traveling approximately ten miles per hour. Rebecca testified that the left side of the truck hit her right hip, causing her to fall to the ground. The man in the truck did not stop, and Rebecca saw him make a left turn onto Roosevelt Street after pausing at a stop sign.
Rebecca could see the truck's license plate from her position on the ground, and she testified that the license plate number was Massachusetts 417375.
Rebecca then ran to her house located on Cross Street in Central Falls and the police were called. Thereafter, Patrolman Robert Teft (Patrolman Teft) arrived. Patrolman Teft transported her to Pawtucket Memorial Hospital where she was examined.
On January 15, 1988, Rebecca met with a detective at the Pawtucket police station and reviewed a group of five or six photographs. Rebecca recognized and identified Bleau from a photograph she selected from the group.
Subsequently, Rebecca saw Bleau in person at the Pawtucket police station and identified him as the man driving the truck. She also made an in-court identification of Bleau.
Robert Smith (Smith) testified that in January of 1988 Bleau was living in an apartment located downstairs in his house. Smith further testified that in 1988 he owned a beige Nissan pick-up truck bearing Massachusetts registration 417375. Bleau had both access to the truck and his own key. Smith was not driving the truck on January 11, 1988.
Bleau first contends that the trial justice erred in not allowing him to make an opening statement immediately following the state's opening statement, which omission denied him a basic right. Bleau avers that Rule 26.2 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure does not give a trial judge discretion to deny a criminal defendant an opportunity to make an opening statement. The state avers that the trial justice correctly limited the scope and extent of defense counsel's opening statement to evidence that would be presented in its case in chief. The state further asserts that even if the trial justice did commit error in this respect, Bleau did not suffer sufficient prejudice to warrant the reversal of his conviction.
Rule 26.2 provides in essence that before any evidence is offered at trial, the prosecutor may make an opening statement. Thereafter, if the defense wishes to make an opening statement, it may do so after the prosecution's opening statement or before the beginning of presentation of evidence in support of the defense. Here, defense counsel indicated that he wished to make an opening statement immediately after the prosecutor's opening statement. However, defense counsel was uncertain whether he would present any evidence to the jury in his case in chief. Defense counsel indicated that in his statement the jury would be told to pay attention to inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimony. The trial justice denied defense counsel's request to make an opening statement immediately after the prosecutor's on the basis of his description of the statement.
In State v. Brynes, 433 A.2d 658, 664 (R.I.1981), we rejected a similar argument to that being pursued by the defense. We stated that "[t]he proper function of an opening statement is to apprise the jury with reasonable succinctness what the issues are in the case that is about to be heard and what evidence the prosecution and the defense expect to produce at trial in support of their respective positions." Id. An opening statement is not an appropriate vehicle by which to "attempt to impeach or otherwise argue the merits of evidence that the opposing side has or will present." Id. (quoting State v. Griffith, 97 Idaho 52, 56, 539 P.2d 604, 608 (1975)). Here, as in Brynes, the trial justice did not order a complete ban on the defense counsel's opening statement but limited its scope to what would be presented in the defense's case in chief. We find no error in the reasoning supporting the trial justice's ruling.
Bleau next argues that the trial justice erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and motion for a new trial. It is Bleau's contention that Rebecca's testimony was insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict. Specifically, Bleau argues that the facts do not support the finding that Bleau had knowledge that the truck hit Rebecca. In the absence of knowledge, Bleau avers, there cannot be a conviction of leaving the scene of an accident pursuant to § 31-26-1. The state contends that there was sufficient evidence supporting the finding that Bleau committed the crime of leaving the scene of an accident.
In ruling on a motion for a judgment for acquittal, a trial justice "must view the evidence in the...
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