State v. Bledsoe

Decision Date26 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. W2004-01585-SC-R11-CD.,W2004-01585-SC-R11-CD.
Citation226 S.W.3d 349
PartiesSTATE of Tennessee v. Tevias BLEDSOE.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General & Reporter; Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General; David H. Findley, Asst. Attorney General; William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General; Steve Jones and Amy Weirich, Asst. District Attorneys General; for the appellant, State of Tennessee.

William C. Anderson, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Tevias Bledsoe.

OPINION

CORNELIA A. CLARK, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which WILLIAM M. BARKER, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER and GARY R. WADE, JJ., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, Sp.J., joined.

The Defendant, Tevias Bledsoe, was charged with premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a felony, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, all in connection with the shooting death of Nathan Maroney. Apparently accepting the Defendant's theory that the shooting was accidental, the jury acquitted him of all charges except felonious possession of a handgun. On direct appeal, the Defendant challenged for the first time the trial court's jury instructions, claiming that the court should have charged the jury on the defense of duress. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the defense of duress was plain error and granted the Defendant a new trial. The State sought, and we granted, permission to appeal. We hold that the Defendant is not entitled to a new trial on the basis of plain error. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the shooting death of Nathan Maroney during an early morning encounter with the Defendant, Tevias Bledsoe, in Memphis, Tennessee, on September 9, 2001. The facts included in the record for our determination of the issue before us include the testimonies of the Defendant and an eyewitness.

Alonzo Holt testified that he was sitting on his car in his driveway during the early morning hours when he heard two people arguing. He walked toward the noise to investigate. Near a high school, he saw a beige SUV next to which two men were standing and arguing. Holt stopped about forty yards away. Although it was between two and three o'clock in the morning, a street light made the arguing men visible. Holt heard one of the men tell the other one to give him something. The man who made the demand had a gun pointed at the other man and "was talking about killing him." Holt did not recognize the man holding the gun.

Holt yelled at the man holding the gun, "If you shoot that guy, man, that camera is going to see you," referring to a security camera at the school. Holt testified that he hoped this announcement would avert a shooting. Upon hearing Holt's warning, the man being threatened said, "Man, I don't know why he want to do this, I thought we were friends." Holt testified that both men looked over at him and he began backing up. He turned to leave and then turned back to see what was happening. Holt testified that he saw the two men struggling with one another and "then [he] heard a gunshot and the guy went down." Describing the struggle, Holt stated that "[t]he victim grabbed at the shooter, you know, as if they were wrestling for the gun." According to Holt, "[t]he gun went off one time."

Holt stated that, after the victim went down, the shooter went through the victim's pockets, then went to the vehicle and began looking for something inside the SUV, returned to the victim, then returned to the vehicle. At that point, Holt returned home and hid. He saw the shooter get in the SUV and then leave "at a high rate of speed." Holt called the police. Holt was unable to identify the shooter either to the police or at trial.

The Defendant also testified. He explained that he and the victim, Nathan Maroney, had spent the evening together partying. Maroney provided their transportation with his SUV. On their way home, they stopped and the Defendant purchased some marijuana for Maroney. The Defendant got back in the SUV and began removing some of the marijuana for himself, a portion that he described as a bonus from the seller for bringing the seller a new customer. According to the Defendant, Maroney viewed the Defendant's action as a theft and pulled a gun on the Defendant. Maroney continued driving the SUV "real slow." The Defendant saw three persons in the vicinity and decided that Maroney would not shoot him in front of witnesses, so the Defendant jumped out of the SUV.

The Defendant testified that Maroney slammed on the brakes, put the SUV into park, and got out of the vehicle with the gun. According to the Defendant,

The truck was still running, the lights was on, and [Maroney] was standing in the back of the truck, and he was telling me to come here. And I was like, no— well, he was actually telling me to get back in the truck. And I was like, "Man, look, I ain't getting back in that truck. I'm straight from here; I'll walk. Just let me get my clothes out your trunk, and I'll walk. My momma stay right around the corner, and I take it from here."

The Defendant stated that he and Maroney were not yelling at each other "at this point."

The Defendant testified that Maroney then "walked up on" him with the gun and "stretched his arm out." The Defendant stated that, at that point, he "slapped the gun out [of Maroney's] hand." The two men then began fighting. The Defendant explained that he grabbed the gun, which had slid a short distance away. Specifically, the Defendant testified,

I grabbed the gun. Somehow I get control. Because when-like I'm right here. The gun maybe slid to like where that garbage can is right there. One of these jurors can see it right there. It slid over there to where I am to where the garbage can at. . . . And we, you know, fighting all the way over here, and I ended up getting it.1

The Defendant hit Maroney in the head with the gun in an attempt to "scare him away." Maroney kept telling the Defendant to give him the gun. The Defendant cocked the gun, pointed it at Maroney, and heard a voice call out, "Hey, man, you'[a]ll stop that; it's a camera in front of that school." The Defendant testified that this announcement caught his "undivided attention" and when he looked toward the voice, Maroney "grabbed the gun." As the Defendant struggled to keep the gun, it discharged.

According to the Defendant, Maroney then "kind of kneeled down" and fell back. Maroney's eyes remained open. The Defendant became afraid that Maroney had been shot, but he did not see any blood. The Defendant stated that he searched Maroney to see if there was a gunshot wound, but did not see one.2 The Defendant panicked, jumped in Maroney's SUV, and drove off. About a block away, the Defendant threw the gun out the window. He continued on a short distance to his girlfriend's house, where he parked the SUV and spent the night. The Defendant insisted that he did not reach into Maroney's pockets, did not take anything from him, and did not touch him other than to determine whether he had been shot.

After his arrest, the Defendant was charged with premeditated murder, murder in the perpetration of a felony, especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a handgun by a convicted felon. The Defendant contended at trial that the shooting was accidental. Defense counsel told the trial court specifically that he was not asking that the jury be instructed on self-defense.3 Defense counsel also did not request a charge on duress. The jury acquitted the Defendant of all charges other than unlawful possession of a handgun by a felon. In his motion for new trial, the Defendant challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence. On direct appeal, the Defendant acknowledged his failure to raise previously any issue regarding the jury instructions but asked the Court of Criminal Appeals to recognize as plain error the trial court's failure to charge the jury on the defense of duress. The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the Defendant's argument had merit and granted a new trial.

The State applied to this Court for, and the Court granted, permission to appeal. The State argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in finding plain error. Its position is that first, the evidence at trial did not support a duress instruction, and second, even if it did, not all of the factors necessary for the application of plain-error review are satisfied in this case.

The Defendant continues to allege that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the defense of duress. He asserts that the evidence at trial was sufficient to fairly raise the defense of duress; therefore, the trial court should have submitted the defense to the jury and instructed that the prosecution was bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense did not apply. Failure to do so, he alleges, denied him his constitutional right to trial by jury. Because we find that the Defendant has failed to establish the prerequisites necessary to a finding of plain error, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstate the trial court's judgment of conviction on the single charge.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case requires us to determine whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to charge the jury with a theory of defense. As this Court has observed recently, "issues concerning incomplete [jury] instructions are deemed waived in the absence of an objection or special request." State v. Page, 184 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tenn.2006) (citing State v. Cravens, 764 S.W.2d 754, 757 (Tenn.1989)); see also State v. Haynes, 720 S.W.2d 76, 85 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986) (recognizing that "alleged omissions in the charge must be called to the trial judge's attention at trial...

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