State v. Blocker

• Decision Date: 30 October 1944
• Docket Number: 15684.
• Citation: 31 S.E.2d 908,205 S.C. 303
• Parties: STATE v. BLOCKER.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

31 S.E.2d 908

205 S.C. 303

STATE v. BLOCKER.

No. 15684.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 30, 1944

L A. Hutson, of Orangeburg, for appellant.

Randolph Murdaugh, Sol., of Hampton, for respondent.

OXNER Justice.

Appellant William Blocker, and his wife, Daisy Blocker, were indicted for statutory arson. The indictment charged that they wilfully and maliciously set fire to and burned the dwelling house of Zebb Cobb on September 17, 1943. The case was tried at the April term, 1944, of the Court of General Sessions of Colleton County. The State offered in evidence an oral confession claimed to have been made by appellant and his wife on September 19, 1943, and a written confession alleged to have been made by them on September 20, 1943. Counsel for defendants objected to the introduction of these confessions on the ground that there was no proof of the corpus delicti. The objection was overruled. At the close of all the testimony a motion for directed verdict on the same ground was made and overruled. The jury found appellant guilty and there was a mistrial as to appellant's wife. The trial Judge overruled a motion for a new trial made by appellant and imposed a sentence of fifteen years in the State Penitentiary.

The principal question raised on this appeal is whether there was any evidence, apart from the confessions, reasonably tending to establish the corpus delicti so as to warrant the admission of the alleged confessions. The rule is well established that a conviction cannot be had on the extra-judicial confessions of the defendant, unless corroborated by proof aliunde of the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in a case of arson consists of (1) a burned building or other property, and (2) some criminal agency which caused the burning. In other words, the corpus delicti includes not only the fact of burning, but it must also appear that the burning was by the wilful act of some person and not as a result of a natural or accidental cause; for if nothing appears but the mere fact that a building was consumed by fire, the presumption is that the fire was the result of accident or some providential cause. State v Brown et al., 103 S.C. 437, 88 S.E. 21, L.R.A.1916D, 1295; State v. Edwards et al., 173 S.C. 161, 175 S.E. 277. Annotations on this subject will be found in 16 L.R.A.,N.S., 285, L.R.A.1916D, 1299, and Ann.Cas.1914C, 330. This rule with regard to the proof of the corpus delicti, apart from the mere confessions of the accused, proceeds upon the reason that the general fact, without which there could be no guilt either in the accused or in anyone else, must be established before anyone could be convicted of the perpetration of the alleged criminal act which caused it, for otherwise in the case of arson the accused might be convicted when there was no criminal agency involved in the burning.

While there is usually little difficulty in proving a burning, it is frequently exceedingly difficult to prove the criminal agency of some person in causing the burning. This was aptly pointed out by former Chief Justice Blease in the case of State v. Edwards, supra. He said [173 S.C. 161, 175 S.E. 278]: "Clear proof as to the corpus delicti in an arson case is always a difficult matter. The burning usually occurs in the darkness of night, when the incendiary feels assured that there is no human eye who may see his hand apply the brand, and no human ear to hear the fall of his footsteps, as he stealthily approaches and retreats from the place of his criminality. Rarely has it happened that an eyewitness to the crime of arson could be produced. The prosecution in such cases must depend, generally, on circumstantial evidence. That evidence is necessarily often of a negative character; that is, the criminal agency is shown by the absence of circumstances, conditions, and surroundings indicating that the fire resulted from an accidental cause." In speaking of the function of this Court in determining the sufficiency of the proof of the corpus delicti, he further stated: "We are not here to determine the sufficiency of the evidence to justify the jury's verdict to the effect that the fire was one of incendiary origin; but we are concerned only with the question as to the sufficiency of that evidence to require the trial judge to submit the issue of criminal agency to the jury. In other words, if there is any evidence tending to establish the corpus delicti, then it was the duty of the trial judge to pass that question on to the jury. *** Any reasonable inference that might be drawn by the jury from any circumstances established by competent testimony, indicating that the fire was not occasioned by an accidental cause, but resulted from a criminal agency, would, under our law, demand that the jury say whether or not the fire was the act of an incendiary."

The confessions were to the effect that appellant and his wife, in accordance with a previously conceived plan to burn Cobb's house, left their home with two quarts of kerosene and some matches at about ten o'clock on the night of September 17, 1943; went to the home of Cobb while he was away attending church services, where appellant's wife poured the kerosene on the back end of the kitchen, struck a match and set the dwelling on fire; and after accomplishing their purpose, appellant and his wife returned to their home. The reason assigned in their confession for their conduct was their belief that some members of Cobb's family, about five weeks prior to this, had set fire to and burned their house and their desire "to get even with them." We shall now inquire whether, apart from these confessions, there was any evidence reasonably tending to show that this burning was of incendiary origin.

Both of these families are Negroes and lived in a rural section of Colleton County, about three miles from the town of Walterboro, and had known one another for some years. Their dwellings were 10 or 15 feet apart. For several months the Cobb family used the water from appellant's well and this continued until appellant stopped them. About a month prior to the burning of Cobb's house, the house of appellant burned. Appellant then moved to another house about a half a mile from the house of Cobb. During the week of the fire in controversy a revival meeting was being conducted at a church about 150 yards from Cobb's home. Both families were members of this church. Cobb attended the services but appellant and his wife did not. At about eight o'clock on the night of the fire, Cobb left his eight children in the house and went to attend services at this church. According to Cobb's testimony, when he left there was no fire burning in the house except a lamp. The church services were concluded around 11:30 and when the congregation came out of the church, Cobb and others noticed the house on fire. They rushed to the house. Some of the household effects were moved and the children were rescued only a few minutes before the structure collapsed. The lamp was still burning and was removed from the house. The next morning a set of tracks made by a man were found leading across the field from appellant's house to the burned house and another set was found leading from the burned house back to appellant's house. No one observed any tracks made by a woman.

The sheriff's office investigated the fire. At this time appellant was working at the Navy Yard in Charleston, but commuted from his home every day. He was arrested about a mile from his home, while returning from work at Charleston late Saturday afternoon, September 18th. Appellant testified that his first knowledge of the fire was from information given him by the arresting officer, although he contended that the two families were very friendly and that both he and his wife were at their home, a half a mile away, on the night of the fire. On the next day, Sunday, the sheriff and one of his deputies compared the tracks above referred to with the shoes of appellant and they corresponded. While denying having made the tracks, appellant testified that "my shoes fitted in the tracks." The sheriff testified...