State v. Blunt
| Decision Date | 16 May 1887 |
| Parties | The State v. Blunt, Appellant |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Appeal from St. Louis City Criminal Court. -- Hon. G. S. Van Wagoner, Judge.
Affirmed.
J. L Hornsby for appellant.
(1) The court erred in refusing to allow defendant to show the fact that deceased had been prejudiced against defendant, and that, in consequence of such prejudice, she desired to rid herself of him, thereby showing a motive for the attack made by her upon him, and thus corroborating defendant's testimony. State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159. (2) The instruction of the court defining reasonable doubt was erroneous. State v. Leeper, 78 Mo. 470; State v Owens, 79 Mo. 619; State v. McNally, 87 Mo 644; State v. Smith, 21 Mo.App. 595. (3) The court should have given an instruction for murder in the second degree in view of defendant's testimony. State v. Wieners, 66 Mo. 13; State v. Robinson, 73 Mo. 306; State v. Curtis, 70 Mo. 599; State v. Ellis, 74 Mo. 207; State v. Lewis, 74 Mo. 222; State v. Kotovsky, 74 Mo. 247; State v. Rose, 14 Mo.App. 567, 572; State v. Banks, 73 Mo. 591.
B. G. Boone, Attorney General, for the state.
(1) The only objection made or exception saved to the introduction or exclusion of evidence was to the refusal of the trial court to permit an answer to be made to this question asked a Mrs. Boas, by the defence: "Did you ever hear any one speak to Mary about her having acted foolishly in marrying a cripple like Blunt?" It is submitted, without the citation of authorities, that this question could not, by even a remote conjecture, have a shadow of relevancy to the material fact at issue, and its exclusion was, therefore, clearly proper. The case of the State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159, in regard to the admissibility of uncommunicated threats made by a deceased in regard to the accused, is cited by counsel for the defence, in support of the theory that the reply to the question above set forth was improperly excluded. We find no reasonable similarity between the case cited and the question asked. (2) The instruction as given in this case, on reasonable doubt, has received the express approval of this court in State v. Jones, 86 Mo. 627; and State v. Payton, 7 West. Rep. 129; S. C., 90 Mo. 220. (3) The court gave instructions defining murder in the first, and manslaughter in the second, degree, and the other formal and explanatory instructions in a case of homicide. The instructions given were all that were justified by the evidence. State v. Wilson, 86 Mo. 520. Defendant was not entitled to an instruction for murder in the second degree on his own testimony. He stated that his wife struck at him with a razor; it caught on his hand; he took it from her and cut her, not once, but repeatedly, across the neck. In the case of the State v. Wilson, 88 Mo. 13, 18 and 19, in which the testimony of defendant, in his own behalf, was much stronger than in the case at bar, this court approved the action of the trial court, in refusing to give an instruction for murder in the second degree, and affirmed the judgment.
Defendant, on the ninth of December, 1886, was tried in the St. Louis criminal court and convicted of murder in the first degree for killing his wife, Mary Blunt, from which judgment he has appealed to this court, and assigns for error the action of the court in refusing to admit certain evidence offered, and in the matter of giving instructions.
During the progress of the trial a witness was asked by counsel for defendant the following question: "Did you ever hear any one speak to Mary about her having acted foolishly in marrying a cripple like Blunt?" The state interposed an objection to the question, which the court sustained, and this is the only complaint made as to the action of the court in rejecting evidence, and it is not well founded, inasmuch as it had no bearing on the questions in issue in the case. If the object of the questioner was to prove threats on the part of the deceased against the accused, the question should have been so framed, and had the court then refused to allow it to be answered, the case of the State v. Elkins, 63 Mo. 159, to which we have been cited, would have applied.
The jury were told in an instruction that, "to authorize an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt alone, such doubt should be a real, substantial, well-founded doubt, arising out of the evidence in the cause, and not a mere possibility that the defendant is innocent." We have been cited to the case of State v. Owens, 79 Mo. 619, as condemning the above instruction because of the use of the word "real." It is sufficient to say of that case, that in the recent cases of State v. Jones, 86 Mo. 623, and State v. Payton, 90 Mo. 220, 2 S.W. 394, it is held that the use of the word "real," in such an instructions was not reversible error. In the case last above cited, the case of the State v. Owens, supra, is referred to, and it is said of it, "that while the use of the word 'real' was much criticized, the judgment was not reversed on that ground."
The court instructed the jury as to murder in the first degree and as to manslaughter in the second degree. No exceptions were taken to these instructions, nor is any objection to them urged here, but it is insisted that the court erred in not giving an instruction for murder in the second degree, and we are asked to reverse the judgment for that reason, although no such instruction was asked, and although the failure of the court to give an instruction on that degree of homicide is not assigned as a ground for a new trial...
To continue reading
Request your trial