State v. Board of Com'rs of King County

• Decision Date: 31 January 1928
• Docket Number: 21057.
• Citation: 263 P. 735,146 Wash. 449
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. MASON v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF KING COUNTY (PORT OF SEATTLE, Intervener.

263 P. 735

146 Wash. 449

STATE ex rel. MASON v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF KING COUNTY (PORT OF SEATTLE, Intervener.

No. 21057.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 31, 1928

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Gilliam, Judge.

Mandamus by the State, on the relation of John C. Mason, against the Board of County Commissioners of King County, wherein the Port of Seattle intervened. From an adverse judgment defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Holcomb J., dissenting.

Hartman & Hartman and Shorett, McLaren & Shorett all of Seattle, for appellants.

John S Robinson, Preston, Thorgrimson & Turner, and Bradford & Snyder, all of Seattle, for respondents.

MAIN J.

This is an action in mandamus. The plaintiff brings the action as a citizen, taxpayer, and elector. The defendants are the members of the board of county commissioners of King county. The purpose of the action was to require the defendants to rescind and order which they had made redistricting the county as to the commissioner districts. After the action was begun the port district, a public corporation, the boundaries of which coincide with the boundaries of King county, intervened. The trial resulted in an order directing the defendants to rescind the order complained of, from which they appeal.

On July 25, 1927, the board of county commissioners of King county passed a resolution by which the boundaries of the commissioner districts of that county were changed. This resolution was supported by two of the commissioners and resisted by the third. The present action to require it to be rescinded was instituted November 21, 1927. The resolution by its terms was not to go into effect until January 1, 1928. When the resolution complained of was passed, and for some years prior thereto, district No. 1 of King county consisted of the central portion of the city of Seattle, and at the time the resolution was passed had 53,939 registered voters. District No. 2 consisted of the southerly portion of the city and the country precinct to the south and southeast and had 35,270 registered voters. District No. 3 consisted of the northerly portion of the city and the country precincts to the north and east and had 58,811 registered voters. The population of the respective districts was in like proportion to the registered voters. District No. 1, as provided for in the resolution complained of, comprised all that portion of King county lying within the limits of the city and would have 116,778 registered voters. District No. 2 would contain the precincts to the south and southeast of the city and would have 15,497 registered voters. District No. 3 would contain the precincts to the north and east and would have 15,745 registered voters. It thus appears that, under the resolution, district No. 1 would have almost eight times as many registered voters as either one of the other districts, and almost four times the number of both of the other two combined. To state it otherwise, district No. 1 with 116,778 registered voters would have one commissioner, district No. 2 with 15,497 registered voters would have one commissioner, and district No. 3 with 15,745 registered voters would have one commissioner. The trial court held that the resolution redistricting the county was arbitrary and capricious because of the inequality in the number of registered voters and the population of district No. 1 as compared to the other two.

Before reaching a discussion of the merits, it will be necessary to pass upon certain preliminary questions. Upon this phase of the case it is first argued that the respondent as a citizen, taxpayer, and elector had no capacity to maintain the action. There is an abundance of authority to the effect that when the question is one of public right, as here, and the object of mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty the one bringing the action is not required to show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, but it is sufficient if he shows that he is interested as a citizen in having the laws executed and rightly enforced. It is not necessary, however, for us here to determine that question because after the action was instituted the port district intervened, and there can be no question but what that district has a special interest. Section 9690, Rem. Comp. Stat., which is one of the sections of the port district act, in part provides that:

'The powers of the port district shall be exercised through a port commission consisting of three members, one from each of the three county commissioner district of the county in which the port district is located, when the port district is coextensive with the limits of such county.'

And further, that:

'No person shall be eligible to hold the office of port commissioner unless he is a qualified voter, and freeholder within such port district, and is and has been a resident for a period of three (3) years, except as hereinafter provided, of the commissioner district from which he is elected.'

The appellants argue that the port district is not interested because they say that it was the intention of the Legislature to fix permanently for the port commissioners the county commissioner districts as they existed at the time the port district act was passed. With this contention we cannot agree. There is nothing in the port district act which indicates that the districts there provided for should be other than the districts of the county commissioners as they should be changed from time to time. It is said, however, that if this construction be given to the port district act, then that act is unconstitutional. In support of this cases are cited which hold that, when the Legislature provides for a standard form of insurance policy and leaves the matter of the terms of the policy to the insurance commissioner, this is an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The rule of those cases has no application here. The county is one of the subordinate divisions of the state, and if the Legislature has the power to delegate to the county commissioners the right to fix in the first instance and change the boundary lines of the commissioner districts it would seem to follow necessarily that when the port district, a public corporation, was created, the Legislature had the power to determine in what manner the commissioner districts therein should be provided for. The objection urged against the right to maintain the action is not well founded.

It is next contended that the action was not begun in time. From the facts above stated it appears that the resolution was passed on July 25, 1927, and the action was instituted on November 21, 1927. Section 4076, Rem. Comp. Stat., in part provides:

'Any person may appeal from any decision or order of the board of county commissioners to the superior court of the proper county. Such appeal shall be taken within twenty days after such decision or order. * * *'

In Morath v. Gorham, 11 Wash. 577, 40 P. 129, it was held that an appeal from the order of the board of county commissioners can be prosecuted only by one who was a party to the proceedings before the board. In the present case the respondent was not a party to the proceeding. In fact, the board simply met and passed the resolution. No right of appeal existed because the respondent was not a party to the proceeding. Where the right of appeal exists, but is an inadequate remedy, it has been held that applications for writs of mandamus should be made within the time fixed for the taking of appeal. In State ex rel. Hawksworth v. Clifford, 130 Wash. 103, 226 P. 272, it was said:

'We have time and again held that where there is a statutory right of appeal but it is an inadequate remedy, applications for writs of mandamus should be made within the time fixed for the taking of appeals, and when not so made will be denied.'

There being no remedy by appeal, the respondent was not required to bring mandamus within 20 days after the resolution was passed.

In addition to this the matter is one of public concern and public right and the right to maintain the action was not barred by laches or acquiescence. In People ex rel. Hull v. Taylor, 257 Ill. 192, 100 N.E. 534, it was said:

'It is insisted that the relators have been guilty of laches, and that with knowledge of the making of the contract for the purchase of the machines at great expense, and of the intention to install them, they took no action for several months, but waited until a few days before the election to begin their action. Laches or estoppel on the part of the relators, however, has nothing to do with this proceeding. Though the relators have a special interest, the object of the suit is not a matter of individual interest but of public concern, and any citizen might have become the relator in a suit to enforce the public right. County of Pike v. People, 11 Ill. 202; People v. Board of Education, 127 Ill. 613, 21 N.E. 187. Such a suit involving the public interest is not barred by the laches or acquiescence of individuals or the conduct of a relator.'

The action was brought in time.

The third of the preliminary questions is whether mandamus was the proper remedy. As a preface to the consideration of this question, it is well to get a correct view as to what a mandamus proceeding is in this state. In State ex rel. Taro v. Everett, 101 Wash. 561, 172 P. 752, L. R. A. 1918E, 411, it was said:

'But however forceful this objection might be as applied to proceedings under the writ as ancienty administered, this court has held that it is without application to the statutory writ of mandamus; that the writ of mandamus under the Code is not a prerogative writ issuable at the pleasure of the state in aid of a private individual, but a civil procedure

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