State v. Board of Education

• Decision Date: 04 May 1943
• Docket Number: No. 26332.,26332.
• Citation: 171 S.W.2d 75
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BROKAW et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF ST. LOUIS et al.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

171 S.W.2d 75

STATE ex rel. BROKAW et al. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF ST. LOUIS et al.

No. 26332.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

May 4, 1943.

Rehearing Denied May 21, 1943.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Eugene J. Sartorius, Judge.

"Not to be reported in State Reports."

Suit by the State, on the relation of A. V. L. Brokaw and others, against the Board of Education of St. Louis, Missouri, and others. From a judgment dismissing the suit, the petitioners and defendants Max G. Baron, William Schumacher and Francis C. Sullivan appeal.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Neuhoff & Miller, and John P. McCammon, all of St. Louis, for appellants.

Jacob M. Lashly and Emmet T. Carter, both of St. Louis, for respondents.

HUGHES, Presiding Judge.

On July 31, 1942, the relators, appellants here, filed a petition in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, praying that the defendant Board of Education and the several members thereof be required to account to the court for their official conduct in the management and disposition of the business and affairs committed to their charge; and that the court permanently enjoin, restrain and prohibit the defendants from proceeding with a hearing then being held before them, and from suspending, dismissing or discharging Homer W. Anderson as Superintendent of Instruction.

The petition alleges, in substance, that the relators are all residents, and are citizens, householders, and taxpayers of the City of St. Louis; that on or about the 25th day of May, 1940, effective August 4, 1940, Homer W. Anderson was duly appointed Superintendent of Instruction of the Public Schools of the City of St. Louis by the Board of Education, for a term of four years at an annual salary of $12,000 per year and is and has been since the date of his appointment occupying such position. That on July 28, 1942, the Board commenced a meeting and hearing, the purpose of which was to hear and consider a report of the Committee of Instruction recommending the dismissal and discharge of said Homer W. Anderson; that the proceedings not being completed on that date were continued to the 30th day of July, 1942, and not being completed that day were continued to 7:30 p.m. July 31, 1942; that certain of the defendants have been and are illegally acting as witnesses, prosecutors, and judges at said hearings; that the sole and exclusive power and authority to suspend, dismiss or discharge the Superintendent of Instruction or to hear charges intending to culminate in his suspension, dismissal and discharge is vested in the circuit court. There were further allegations as to the regularity of the proceedings and the sufficiency of the charges.

Upon the filing and presentation of the petition a restraining order was issued by the court, which directed that defendants show cause on August 11, 1942, why a temporary injunction should not be granted and why defendants should not account to the circuit court for their official conduct in the management and disposition of the business and affairs in their charge.

Thereafter on August 11, 1942, the Board of Education and eight of defendant members thereof filed their joint separate return which is in substance as follows:

That the petition states no grounds or no cause of action in equity or at law; that plaintiffs are not the real parties in interest and have no legal right to bring or maintain the suit; that at the time of the appointment of Homer W. Anderson there was in force and effect the following rule of the Board of Education:

"Rule 3, Section I: The officers of the Board shall consist of a president, vice-president, superintendent of instruction, commissioner of school buildings, secretary and treasurer, auditor, attorney and supply commissioner.

"Section VII: A majority of all the members elected to the Board, except in cases otherwise provided for by law, may remove any officer of the Board elected or appointed under these rules, at any regular meeting of the Board, for good cause. Dereliction of duty or incompetency shall be deemed among other things sufficient cause for removal. In proceedings for the removal of officers, testimony shall be taken as provided by Section 21 of the Act creating the Board."

The return further alleged the filing of charges against Homer W. Anderson, and the hearings thereon, after due notice, and that the same would have been continued except for the restraining order, and averred that original jurisdiction to hear such charges and to determine whether good and sufficient cause exists for the removal of the Superintendent is lodged in the Board of Education subject only to review by the circuit court, and praying for the dissolution of the restraining order and dismissal of the case.

On August 11, 1942, three of the defendant members of the Board of Education filed their joint separate return and answer, admitting generally the allegations of the petition and joining in the prayer of the petition for injunction, and stating that they had participated in the proceedings before the Board of Education over objections which were overruled by a majority of the Board, and praying that the petition be dismissed as to them individually.

Thereupon, the parties appeared in the circuit court on August 11, 1942, and an understanding or stipulation was entered into between the parties, with the sanction of the judge of the court, to the effect that the questions of the jurisdiction of the board of education to remove the superintendent, and the jurisdiction of the circuit court to entertain the petition for injunction, and the right of the petitioners to maintain the action, would be argued and submitted as questions of law, and if the court's rulings made it necessary to hear the case on the facts that plaintiffs would thereafter file a reply to the return, and the case be heard at a later date. Such reply was afterwards filed. The effect of this understanding and stipulation was that if the court determine that the Board of Education had jurisdiction to remove from office the superintendent for cause, whether that jurisdiction be original or concurrent with the circuit court, and further determine that plaintiffs had a right to maintain the action, that a temporary injunction would issue and the case be tried at a later date on controverted issues of fact as to the regularity of the proceedings before the Board, or, on the other hand, if the court determine as a question of law that the sole jurisdiction to hear charges against and remove the Superintendent was in the circuit court, that the submission was for a final determination of the case. In which latter case there would be no occasion for a temporary injunction, but if injunction is the appropriate remedy and plaintiffs are proper parties to invoke it a permanent injunction would be ordered. And so the case was argued and submitted to the court.

Thereafter, on August 24, 1942, the court rendered its decision, adjudging that it was without jurisdiction in the premises, and that the Board of Education did have jurisdiction to remove the Superintendent of Instruction for cause, and further that an action for injunction could not be maintained by ten or more citizens or householders, and thereupon the court ordered that the restraining order be dissolved, and that the petition or bill in equity be dismissed at the cost of plaintiffs. At a later date the court made a further order that the joint separate return and answer of the three members of the Board heretofore mentioned be dismissed.

The petitioners have appealed. The three Board members have also appealed and joined in the abstract filed by the relators-appellants, but have filed no brief in the case.

The principal contention of appellants is that the superintendent of instruction holds his office for a fixed term of four years, by virtue of statutory law, and is not subject to being removed from office, either with or without cause, by the board of education, but can only be removed from office for cause by proceedings in the circuit court, as provided by the statute, and, therefore, the proceedings for his removal by the board of education were contrary to law, and injunction was the appropriate remedy, and plaintiffs were proper parties to invoke it. If these questions are upheld in plaintiffs' favor, then all other questions presented by the pleadings become moot and unimportant.

Before determining the direct questions involved, it is well that we bear in mind that we are dealing with the most important institution provided by law for the welfare not only of the people of today but those of future generations, — the public schools; and it is not amiss to briefly reflect on some of those things out of which our present statutory school laws have grown. The establishment and perfection of our laws applying to the public school system is the result of the wisdom and foresight of our forefathers, followed by study and experience throughout many years. Intelligence and learning are and ever will be recognized as the prerequisite for a successful and happy people. Our first great President, whom with pride we appropriately call the father of his Country, in a farewell address to the people of the United States, admonished them, "To promote, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge." When our State was admitted to the Union, a proposition submitted by Congress for free acceptance or rejection was that section number sixteen in every township be granted to the State for the use of schools. However, education in the United States, in all of its branches, and from kindergarten to university, has been left by the Federal Constitution to the different states to provide and manage as they see fit. Our present Constitution wisely provides as follows: "A general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights...