State v. Board of Trustees

• Decision Date: 21 February 1916
• Docket Number: No. 11844.,11844.
• Citation: 184 S.W. 929,192 Mo. App. 583
• Parties: STATE ex rel. KING v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND OF KANSAS CITY.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

184 S.W. 929

192 Mo. App. 583

STATE ex rel. KING v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF FIREMEN'S PENSION FUND OF KANSAS CITY.

No. 11844.

Kansas City Court of Appeals. Missouri.

February 21, 1916.

Rehearing Denied April 3, 1916.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jackson County; Danl. E. Bird, Judge.

Certiorari by the State of Missouri on the relation of Jennie King, and Jennie King, guardian for Jesse King and others, against the Board of Trustees of the Firemen's Pension Fund of Kansas City, composed of A. F. Evans and others, to review the record of the Board in refusing to place the names of the relatrix and her children upon the pension list of such fund. Records quashed and the Board appeals; cause transferred on motion to the Supreme Court, and by it retransferred. Reversed, and case remanded, with direction to quash the writ of certiorari and to dismiss the petition.

A. F. Evans, H. C. Moore, and A. F. Smith, all of Kansas City, for appellant. H. S. Julian and I. J. Ringolsky, both of Kansas City, for respondent.

TRIMBLE, J.

Certiorari issued from the circuit court of Jackson county, Mo., to review the record of the board of trustees of the firemen's pension fund of Kansas City, wherein it refused to place upon the pension list of said fund the names of the widow and minor children of Jesse King, deceased, who was or had been a member of the city fire department. The return shows that the board refused to place the names on the pension list "for the reason that Jesse King's death resulted from injuries received in a fight in a saloon while off duty." It seems that King had asked and had been granted a special leave of absence as a fireman for 12 hours, and, during the time of such absence, he became engaged in a quarrel with another negro over a purely personal controversy in no way connected with the business of the fire department and was shot, receiving injuries from which he died several days thereafter. The firemen's pension fund and the board controlling and administering the same were authorized by the Act of March 25, 1903 (Laws of Missouri 1903, p. 86 et seq.), now appearing in the Revised Statutes, 1909, as sections 9879 to 9903, both inclusive. The circuit court quashed the record of the board, and it prayed an appeal to the Supreme Court, on the theory that the trial court, in overruling the board's point that its action was not subject to review because of a provision to that effect in section 9886, R. S. Mo. 1909, had held said provision to be unconstitutional. The appeal, however, was allowed to this court, and on motion we transferred the case to the Supreme Court, but that tribunal ordered it retransferred.

Many preliminary questions are raised concerning matters of procedure and the right to a change of venue which the board applied for and failed to get; also, the power of the circuit court to review the action of the board because of the aforesaid provision in said section 9886. However, our views upon the main and ultimate question involved in the case make it unnecessary to decide these preliminary points or objections raised by the board, for, if it be found that the board acted correctly, then such result disposes of the case and renders the other objections to the judgment immaterial and academic so far as this case is concerned.

The correctness of the board's action depends upon what is the true construction and meaning to be placed upon section 9892, R. S. Mo. 1909, which reads as follows:

"If any member of such fire department shall, while in the performance of his duty, be killed or die as the result of an injury received in the line of his duty, or of any disease contracted by reason of his occupation as fireman, or shall die from any cause whatever while in such service, and shall leave a widow, or child or children under the age of sixteen years surviving, said board of trustees shall direct the payment * * * monthly to such widow, while unmarried * * * and * * * for each child until it reaches the age of sixteen years such sum of money as may be determined by said rules and regulations."

The board contends that this section does not authorize the granting of a pension to a fireman's widow and minor children unless his work, duties, or occupation as a fireman sustain some relation to his death; that the fact that he was in the line of his duties as a fireman must have something to do with his death.

The construction claimed by relatrix is based upon the clause in said section which we have italicized. Her contention is that this clause means that, if a fireman dies from any cause whatever while he is a member of the fire department, then his widow and minor children under 16 are entitled to be placed on the pension list. In other words, his death does not have to be related in any manner whatever to the performance of his duties as a fireman. If he is a fireman and his death occurs, then no matter how, nor where, nor when, that death came about, his widow and children get a pension.

It seems to us that the meaning relatrix extracts from the words "or shall die from any cause whatever while in such service" is obtained by giving to the word "service" a limited and arbitrary meaning. Arbitrary because it is given without reference to the meaning shown by the context. A word having several meanings, or shades of meaning, must be given that meaning which the context shows it was intended to have. Now the word "service" may mean:

"(1) The act of serving; labor performed in the interest and under the direction of others; the work of a slave, hired man, or employé. * * * (2) Any work done for the benefit of another; the act of helping another; * * * hence, also, a benefit or advantage conferred. * * * (3) The state of being a servant; the position of a servant; employment in the interest of a person or of a cause. * * * (4) The official duty or work required of one; hence, also, any system or organization instituted for the accomplishment of such duty; as, military or naval service; the consular or the diplomatic service"—and many other meanings. New Standard Dictionary.

Relatrix takes the last meaning given above, which we have put in italics, and, applying it to the word "service," makes it mean the system or organization instituted by the city for the extinguishment of fires, or, in other words, the city fire department. With this meaning given to the word "service," the clause in the statute should be understood and interpreted as if it read "or shall die from any cause whatever while in the city fire department, or while a member of such city fire department." But suppose some of the other meanings are given to the word "service." Take for instance the first one above, "the act of serving; or the work of a * * * hired man or employé," or the first subdivision of the fourth definition given above "the official duty or work required of one." The statutory clause would then read "or shall die from any cause whatever while in the act of serving as a fireman or doing the work of a fireman or while in the official duty or work required of a fireman." We do not mean to hold that the word "service," as used in this section, is to be limited to these two meanings last given. We cite these two in contradistinction to the meaning given it by relatrix merely to show that it has different meanings according to the sense in which it is used. And the sense in which it is used must be determined from the context.

What then is that meaning as shown by the context? In the first place, a careful reading of the entire act does not reveal any instance where the word "service" is used in the sense of the system or organization instituted by the city for the extinguishment of fires. It is never used to express the fact that the fireman is a member of the fire department; that is, in the sense one uses the term when speaking of a man enlisted in the army and says "He is in the military service." The statute nowhere uses the word in that sense, but always in the sense of the labors, duties, and things to be performed by a fireman. The statute, in expressing the idea that the fireman belongs to a branch of the city's governmental activities, never says "in the fire service of the city," but always the words "member of the city fire department" are used. In the next place, the other clauses in section 9892 show that the clause "or shall die from any cause whatever while in such service" does not have the scope and meaning relatrix would ascribe to it. These other clauses give a pension: (1) If a member of the fire department be killed "while in the performance of his duty"; or (2) die as the result of an injury received "in the line of his duty;" or (3) die as the result of any disease contracted "by reason of his occupation as fireman." In all three of these the death must sustain a relation of some sort to the duties and work of a fireman, either a causal relation or a relation of time of occurrence with performance. Why should these limitations be carefully inserted in each of these three clauses, if the Legislature intended by the next clause to give a pension in case of the death of a fireman without regard to whether the death had any connection whatever with the performance of the duties of a fireman? The last clause, if it means what relatrix says it does, would give a pension to the widow and minor children of a deceased fireman no matter whether he was killed "while in the performance of...