State v. Bock, 84-1333
| Decision Date | 18 October 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-1333,84-1333 |
| Citation | 357 N.W.2d 29 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Carol Ann BOCK, Appellee. STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Paul Roman BOCKHOLT, Appellee. STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Debra Dorine DAWDY, Appellee. STATE of Iowa, Appellant, v. Cindy Lou ZAMORA, Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Marcia Mason, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Patrick C. McCormick, County Atty., for appellant.
P.D. Furlong, Sioux City, for appellees.
Considered en banc.
The State has appealed from rulings of the district court in four pending criminal cases involving the interpretation of a recent amendment to Iowa Code section 321.281 (1983). The amendment in question was contained in House File 2486, signed into law on May 14, 1984, effective July 1, 1984. 1984 Iowa Legis.Serv. No. 6 at 32-48 (West).
The preamble to this bill identifies it, in part, as:
An act relating to the offense of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated by providing ... a definition of alcohol concentration.
Prior to the time House File 2486 became effective, it was a serious misdemeanor to violate Iowa Code section 321.281(1) (1983) which provided:
A person shall not operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state in either of the following conditions:
a. While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, a narcotic, hypnotic, or other drug, or any combination of such substances.
b. While having thirteen hundredths or more of one percent by weight of alcohol in the blood.
Section 4 of House File 2486 amended section 321.281(1) in the following manner (deletions are stricken and new material is underscored):
A person shall not operate a motor vehicle u in this state in either of the following conditions:
a. While under the influence of an alcoholic beverage or other drug or a combination of such substances.
b. While having an alcohol concentration of thirteen hundredths or more .
1984 Iowa Legis.Serv. No. 6, 34 (West).
In addition, section 2 of House File 2486 sets forth a new definition of alcohol concentration. That definition is as follows "Alcohol concentration" means the number of grams of alcohol per any of the following:
a. One hundred milliliters of blood.
b. Two hundred ten liters of breath.
c. Sixty-seven milliliters of urine.
1984 Iowa Legis.Serv. No. 6, 33 (West).
Each of the four appellees is a defendant in a pending criminal action based on section 321.281(1)(b), as amended by House File 2486. The trial information in each case alleges that the defendant
did, while under the influence of an alcoholic beverage, and/or while having an alcoholic concentration of 13/100ths or more of one gram of alcohol per 210 liters of breath, ... operate a motor vehicle ... in violation of [Iowa Code] section 321.281.
Each defendant filed a motion to strike from the information the words "while having an alcoholic concentration of 13/100ths of one gram of alcohol per 210 liters of breath" on the ground that such acts, even if proven, do not constitute a violation of the statute cited in the information. In addition, these defendants in a memorandum of law filed in support of these motions argued that section 321.281(1) as amended, is so vague as to deprive them of due process of law under both state and federal constitutions.
The district court granted the motion to strike in each case. In reading the amended version of subparagraph b of 321.281(1) in conjunction with the newly enacted definition of "alcohol concentration," the district court concluded that a violation of subparagraph b only occurs where the number of grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath is sufficient to produce a quotient of 13/100ths under the following formula:
Number of Grams 13
--------------- = ---
210 100.
The court solved this equation as follows:
27.3 13
---- = ---
210 100.
It then found and concluded:
Therefore, the statute says that it is illegal to drive with an alcohol concentration of 27.3 grams per 210 liters of air or more. The court, therefore, concludes that it is not a crime in Iowa to drive with thirteen hundredths grams of alcohol per 210 liters of air as is charged in the information.
The State urges on this appeal that the district court misapplied the provisions of House File 2486 which amended section 321.281(1)(b). The four defendants predictably urge that the district court was correct and, in any event, that the statute, as amended, is unconstitutionally vague. We consider these arguments only after facing a threshold challenge to our jurisdiction.
The appellees have moved to dismiss the present appeal on the ground that the order of the district court was not one which the State might appeal as of right under the provisions of Iowa Code section 814.5(1). The State, in resisting this motion, urges that the orders from which appeal has been taken were orders "dismissing an indictment, information, or any count thereof" and, as such, appealable as of right under section 814.5(1)(a).
The appellees correctly note that under the interpretation which we placed on section 321.281 in State v. Bratthauer, 354 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 1984), the allegations which the district court struck from the information did not constitute a separate count but rather was an alternative theory with respect to a single crime. Based upon our Bratthauer rationale, we agree that the State had no appeal as of right from the district court's order. We note, however, that we have held that under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 304 it is not fatal that a case is improperly brought by appeal if certiorari would have been a proper remedy or vice versa. State v. Glanton, 231 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Iowa 1975). The right to seek certiorari review from orders in criminal cases has been severely restricted by the adoption of Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 305 in 1982, which denies such relief in any case where discretionary review is available under Iowa Code chapter 814. We conclude, however, upon our reading of section 814.5(2) that discretionary review was not available to the State in the present case. 1 Accordingly, we review the claims which the State has advanced notwithstanding the fact that it has proceeded in accordance with the wrong procedure.
As noted in our prior discussion, the order from which the State has appealed is not a final judgment. The motion which produced that ruling was labeled as a motion to strike a portion of the information. The ruling itself can best be characterized as a separate adjudication of points of law in a criminal action. It significantly affects the issues in each of the pending cases by limiting the means by which the State may present its case.
We have previously approved the use of separate adjudication of points of law in a criminal action based on the language of Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(2), which provides, in part "[a]ny defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion." State v. Hawkins, 356 N.W.2d 197, 199 (Iowa 1984); State v. Wilt, 333 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983); State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 579 (Iowa 1980); State v. Iowa District Court, 271 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Iowa 1978). In so doing, however, we have consistently applied the limitations regarding the use of separate adjudication of points of law which have been established in the civil practice under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 105. Because of these restrictions, we review the present orders only with respect to alleged legal errors which appear on the face of the district court's ruling or infirmities which appear on the face of the statutes being assailed.
This appeal relates primarily to the application of sections 2 and 4 of House File 2486 which (a) deletes from section 321.281(1)(b) any reference to a percentage of alcohol by weight, and (b) simultaneously adopts a new definition of "alcohol concentration." The State in urging reversal of the orders striking the portion of the information charging a violation of section 321.281(1)(b), suggests that the district court failed to perceive the manner in which these amendments changed the method of measuring alcohol concentration.
It is the State's contention that the amendments in issue changed the manner in which the proscribed concentration is expressed from a stated percentage of a volume of blood (which required a conversion of chemical tests on urine and breath samples) to the number of grams of alcohol which are contained in a given quantity of blood, breath, or urine. The State suggests that application of this newly enacted definition of alcohol concentration does not produce a consequence or conclusion which may be stated in the form of a decimal or percentage as the district court attempted to do.
The defendants disagree and urge that the number of grams of alcohol per volume of blood must be converted to a percentage of alcohol concentration in order to apply the provisions of the act. They urge that we approve the district court's conclusions that, as the act is now written, a concentration of 27.3 grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath is required before a violation of law is established.
The issue presented is one of statutory interpretation. We have consistently held that the ultimate goal in interpreting statutory provisions is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature. State v. Foster, 356 N.W.2d 548, 550 (Iowa 1984); State v. Whetstine, 315 N.W.2d 758, 760 (Iowa 1982). We look to the object to be accomplished, the evil sought to be remedied, and the purposes to be advanced. To the extent permitted by its language, we place on a statute an interpretation which will effect its purpose rather than defeat it. Foster, 356 N.W.2d...
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