State v. Bodick, No. A05-1123 (Minn. App. 6/27/2006)
| Decision Date | 27 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. A05-1123.,A05-1123. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Raymond Michael Bodick, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the District Court, Aitkin County, File No. T2-04-22423.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Tibor M. Gallo, Assistant Attorney General, and Thomas Murtha, Aitkin County Attorney, (for respondent)
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan Andrews, Assistant Public Defender, (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge; Hudson, Judge; and Worke, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Raymond Michael Bodick challenges his convictions and sentences for first-degree controlled substance crime, manufacture of methamphetamine, and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. He contends that (1) the search warrant that authorized a search of the residence where he was staying was not supported by probable cause; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; and (3) the district court erred by sentencing him for convictions that arose from the same behavioral incident. In a pro se supplemental brief, appellant also argues that the district court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence and that he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel. We affirm appellant's convictions but reverse his sentences and remand for resentencing.
Appellant argues that the search warrant that authorized a search of the residence where he was staying was not supported by probable cause. He asserts that the affidavit supporting the warrant improperly relied on information supplied by an informant without establishing the informant's veracity and did not contain sufficient corroborating information. We disagree.
In determining whether a warrant is supported by probable cause, we do not review the district court's decision de novo. State v. Harris, 589 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Minn. 1999). Rather, we give great deference to the issuing court's probable-cause determination. State v. Rochefort, 631 N.W.2d 802, 804 (Minn. 2001); State v. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d 700, 703 (Minn. 1990).
The United States and Minnesota Constitutions provide that a search warrant may not issue unless supported by probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The principal question when reviewing a determination of probable cause is "whether the issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed." State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 205 (Minn. 2005) (quotation omitted). A "substantial basis" means there is a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983). Because a determination of probable cause relies on the totality of the circumstances, "a collection of pieces of information that would not be substantial alone can combine to create sufficient probable cause." State v. Jones, 678 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Minn. 2004). When examining the totality of the circumstances, the court looks only at the information presented in the affidavit supporting the application for the warrant. State v. Souto, 578 N.W.2d 744, 747 (Minn. 1998). Under the "totality of the circumstances" test,
[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the "veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S. Ct. at 2332. "[C]ourts must be careful not to review each component of the affidavit in isolation." State v. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d 107, 109 (Minn. App. 1991).
Here, on September 18, 2003, a deputy with the Aitkin County Sheriff's Department met with a confidential first-time informant (CI) to discuss an ongoing clandestine methamphetamine lab operating at a house in the area. The CI had been in the house three to four times per week for several months and had seen methamphetamine produced there roughly 15 to 20 times. The CI described the house's location and features, including the fact that the garage windows were painted black and the house's windows were covered. The CI stated that the occupants of the house were Brad Kath, Kim Kath, and appellant, who went by the nickname "Moses." According to the CI, each of them participated in producing and consuming methamphetamine and that production and sale of the drug was the primary source of income for each resident. The CI also explained, in considerable detail, the process by which appellant and his housemates produced methamphetamine.
Subsequently, the deputy applied for a warrant to search the house and its surrounding property. In his affidavit supporting the warrant application, the deputy relayed the information provided by the CI and stated that he had gone to the house to arrest appellant on a previous occasion. As a result of that arrest, the deputy could confirm that appellant stayed with the Kaths, that appellant's nickname was "Moses," that the garage windows were painted black, and that all the house's windows were covered with blankets and sheets. The deputy also stated that Brad and Kim Kath both had prior and current charges against them for drug-related offenses. The district court judge signed the search warrant. The next day, officers searched the house and found numerous items and materials used to manufacture methamphetamine.
Appellant was charged with five counts of first-degree controlled substance crime. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the search of the house because the underlying search warrant was not supported by probable cause, but the district court denied his motion. The jury found appellant guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.021, subd. 2a (2002); conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 152.021, subd. 2a(a), 152.096 (2002); and the lesser-included offense of possession of methamphetamine in the fifth degree, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2002).
Appellant argues that the warrant did not establish probable cause because the deputy's affidavit did not establish the informant's veracity. Appellant correctly asserts that the CI was not a presumptively reliable citizen informant because the deputy did not specifically aver in his affidavit that the CI was not involved in criminal activity. State v. Siegfried, 274 N.W.2d 113, 115 (Minn. 1978). But the fact that an informant does not qualify as a citizen informant does not mean that the informant was of doubtful reliability. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 703. Where the informant is not presumed reliable, a court should examine the informant's tip in light of the totality of the circumstances, including other details surrounding the informant's tip, corroboration of the informant's tip, and other information in the affidavit. See id. at 703-04.
Here, the deputy independently corroborated the CI's information relating to the location of the house, the identity of others living in the house, appellant's nickname, and the black paint on the garage windows and the coverings over the house's windows. Appellant contends that this corroborative information was not meaningful because the details were easily obtained. Easily corroborated facts are not, by themselves, sufficient to establish probable cause. Albrecht, 465 N.W.2d at 109. But corroboration of minor details can be considered when making a probable-cause assessment based on the totality of the circumstances. McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 704;see also State v. Kessler, 470 N.W.2d 536, 539-40 (Minn. App. 1991) ().
In addition to the content of the CI's tip and the deputy's corroboration, the fact that the CI met with the deputy personally and provided a detailed description of the methamphetamine-manufacturing process also supports the district court's probable-cause determination. An informant's face-to-face meeting with an officer is significant when considering the informant's credibility and the totality of the circumstances supporting a probable cause determination. See McCloskey, 453 N.W.2d at 704; see also State v. Lindquist, 295 Minn. 398, 400, 205 N.W.2d 333, 335 (1973) (). And the detailed nature of an informant's tip, when the information described was witnessed firsthand, is a relevant factor when analyzing the totality of the circumstances. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S. Ct. at 2330. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the preference accorded to warrants in marginal cases, we conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause.
Appellant argues that the state's evidence was insufficient to convict him of manufacturing methamphetamine and conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine. We disagree.
In assessing a claim attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether the facts in the record and any other legitimate inferences would permit a jury to conclude that a defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Davis v. State, 595 N.W.2d 520, 525 (Minn. 1999). The reviewing court assumes the court believed the state's witnesses and disbelieved any evidence to the contrary. State v....
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