State v. Bodie

• Decision Date: 19 June 1890
• Citation: 11 S.E. 624,33 S.C. 117
• Parties: STATE v. BODIE.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

11 S.E. 624

33 S.C. 117

STATE v. BODIE.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 19, 1890

Appeal from general sessions circuit court of Aiken county; KERSHAW Judge.

Nathan Bodie appeals from a conviction of manslaughter. The charge of the trial court was as follows:

"Gentlemen of the Jury: I congratulate you, as well as myself, upon the approach of the determination of this painful investigation through which we have passed the last several days. It is my duty now to charge you upon the law of homicide, and it is your duty to investigate the testimony in this case, ascertaining the facts, discrediting what you believe to be untrue, and fastening in your memory what you believe to be true, and then, having ascertained the facts apply them to the law as I shall give it to you, and then return a verdict in accordance with the facts and the law. If, in the expression of what I have to say to you, I should unfortunately, in your opinion, give rise to the belief in your mind that I am expressing an opinion upon the facts, I beg you to discard it. I have no right to an opinion upon a question of fact. It is only upon the law that I have a right to express myself; and, if I should err in the slightest particular upon that point, the supreme court would set it aside, and this case would be tried over again, if you should find against the defendant, and therefore, if I should, in your opinion express an opinion you will discard it from your mind altogether, and be guided by your own honest, conscientious belief as you find it from the evidence. In every homicide the first inquiry is, of course, did the deceased party come to his or her death at the hand of the party charged? Sometimes this is a matter of painful investigation, but in this instance you are relieved from any further inquiry into that fact, because it is not denied that the deceased, Joel A. Gunter, came to his death at the hands of the defendant, the prisoner at the bar. Then your inquiry will be, what was the nature of that killing? A man has been killed, a citizen has had his life taken, and you are called upon to inquire what was the nature of that killing. Was it a crime? If it was not a crime, the defendant will go acquitted at your hands. If it was a crime, what was the nature of that crime? Every homicide is either justifiable, excusable, or felonious. Justifiable homicide takes place when it is the duty of a man to take the life of another. Whenever that happens, of course there is not a crime committed. Hence he goes away justified, because he has not only done no wrong, but he has actually done a duty, when he took the life of the party. When the sheriff, in obedience to the commands of a court of competent jurisdiction, executes the sentence of the court, and takes the life of a man condemned to death, the sheriff does no wrong, but he does his duty, and therefore is justified. And justifiable homicide occurs also when a man takes the life of another to prevent a known felony from being committed by him. The next subdivision or classification of homicide is 'excusable.' This is where a man, though not justifiable, is excusable in the eyes of the law, in obedience to the instincts of our nature and the weakness and infirmities of human nature; as where a man engaged in a lawful business, without any negligence or fault in any way, happens, accidentally, without any intention or fault, to kill a man; in that case he is excused. It is not justifiable, for it is not his duty to take life, but it is excusable homicide, and he goes acquitted of any intended homicide. Another case of excusable homicide is homicide in self-defense. It occurs when a man who has no other probable means of saving his life, or of defending his person from enormous bodily harm from one who combats against him, upon a sudden quarrel, kills the person assaulting him under necessity. Not only is a man entitled to the benefit of the law of self-defense when he is actually in danger of his life, but when the circumstances are such as to justify a man of ordinary reason and firmness in the belief that his life is in jeopardy, and you consider the circumstances to be such as to justify that belief, then he is entitled to the law of self-defense, because a man here is judged by his motives, and, if he honestly believes that he is obliged to take life in self-defense, and the circumstances are such as to justify that belief, then he is entitled to the law of self-defense. Of course, in excusable homicide, as in justifiable homicide, the verdict of the jury must be "not guilty" wherever they find him to be justified in the act. It is rested in the books upon the ground of necessity,--self-defense is,--that is to say, unless a man can show you that there was a necessity, or that the circumstances justified his belief that it was necessary to take life in order to save himself from death or serious bodily harm, he is not entitled to the plea of self-defense. It rests upon necessity. And it is said that when two parties are engaged in a sudden quarrel, and one is assaulted in such a manner as to endanger his life or person, if he can escape, he ought to escape. It is his duty, under the law, as used to be said "to retreat to the wall;" the meaning of which is to retreat unless there is more danger in retreating than standing still. Now these are the general principles of law applicable to self-defense. Another has no defense, called 'felonious,' and that is the only kind of homicide that the law punishes, and that is of two classes,--one is murder, and the other manslaughter. Murder is the killing of a person with malice aforethought, expressed or implied. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a person without malice,--without malice expressed or implied. It is also defined to be a killing upon sudden heat and passion and upon provocation. That is a familiar definition of manslaughter.

"Now as to these two classes. The first, murder, as you know, is punished capitally, and the second class, manslaughter, is punished by imprisonment, and so forth. The distinction between them is: murder, the killing with malice; manslaughter, the killing without malice. Malice may be defined to be an evil spirit, a depraved and wicked spirit, such as is found in a heart totally devoid of social duty, and fatally bent upon mischief. In the language of some of our old books, malice is either expressed or implied. Express malice is where one person kills another with a sedate, deliberate, meant, and formed design; such formed design being evidenced by external circumstances which discover the inward intention, such as lying in wait, antecedent menacing threats, former grudges, and concerted schemes to do somebody harm. Malice is implied from any deliberate, cruel act, committed by one person against another; for instance, as where a man kills another without any, or without considerable, provocation, the law implies malice in such a case. I have said that manslaughter was also defined to be the killing of a person under sudden heat and passion, and upon provocation. That leads me to define to you what provocation is. Now, no words, however opprobious or offensive, will in the eyes of the law be sufficient provocation for a blow of any kind, much less the taking of life; but words, or menacing, threatening language, accompanied by some act which indicates immediate intent to carry that threat into execution, will be considered sufficient provocation; but, as I said to you, not a slight provocation. It must be a great provocation to justify the taking of human life. Well, then, these are the principles applicable and proper to be charged to the jury in any case of homicide; but in this case there are some circumstances of a peculiar character, arising from the claim of proprietorship of land and the right to use a road. Upon this subject, after considering it with some care, I have adopted the law as laid down, with some very slight modification, in the requests to charge by the defendant. These requests are based upon the supposition on their part that there was a trespass committed by the deceased, and that the object of the prisoner at the bar was to remove the trespasser; and these principles of law mostly apply only in case you find that Mr. Bodie was engaged in an effort to remove a trespasser from his land. They are all based upon that supposition,--that his object was to remove a trespasser. Now, if you find that, instead of that, Mr. Bodie's purpose there was something else; that he took that pistol, and you find in that act that he was actuated by any ill feeling towards the deceased; that that was his purpose, with which he went there, expecting to have a deadly combat with him,--then these propositions of law do not apply. In all questions of this kind, where self-defense is interposed as a plea, the defendant must satisfy you, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but by the preponderance of testimony, that he is entitled to the protection of that defense. It is his duty to prove it. When the state proves the killing here, then the defendant must prove his defense. The state is bound to prove all beyond a reasonable doubt. The state is bound to prove every point against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, or else the state must fail to obtain a conviction. But when the matter has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, or when the matter has been established, then the defense must satisfy you, by a preponderance of testimony, not beyond a reasonable doubt, but as matter of belief, that he was acting in self-defense. The preponderance of testimony means simply this: that you weigh the testimony, and, if it is inclined to the one side more than the other, then that side has the preponderance. It is like weighing a

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