State v. Book

• Decision Date: 08 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05CA2831.,05CA2831.
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BOOK, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

847 N.E.2d 52

165 Ohio App.3d 511

2006-Ohio-1102

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. BOOK, Appellee.

No. 05CA2831.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fourth District, Ross County.

Decided March 8, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Scott W. Nusbaum, Ross County Prosecuting Attorney, and Sherri K. Rutherford, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.

David H. Bodiker, Ohio Public Defender, and Lori J. Rankin, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.

KLINE, Judge.

{¶ 1} The state of Ohio appeals the Ross County Common Pleas Court's judgment in favor of John O. Book regarding his motion to suppress methamphetamines. A courthouse security officer found these drugs on Book during a security screening after a magnetometer activated. The trial court found that the administrative search for the drugs "went beyond the scope of a search for weapons." The state argues that the trial court erred because the officer properly searched for drugs and weapons. Because we find that the search for drugs and weapons comports with the administrative purpose of ensuring the safety of everyone inside the courthouse, we agree with the state. However, because the officer discriminately conducted the screening, this type of administrative search does not comply with the "reasonable" clause of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, we find, albeit for a reason different from that of the trial court, that the search of Book was invalid. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I

{¶ 2} Larry William Throckmorton is a security officer for the Chillicothe Municipal Court. He testified at the suppression hearing that one of his duties is to search anyone entering the courthouse for "weapons, contraband, stuff of that nature" for the purpose of ensuring "the safety of the employees and staff." He conducts these administrative searches by having the people entering the courthouse walk through a magnetometer, and if it activates, he does a further search with a handheld device and/or pat-down. However, he admitted that, as a professional courtesy, he does not screen certain people that he knows.

{¶ 3} Book entered the municipal courthouse. He may or may not have seen a sign that read, "ALL PERSONS ENTERING THE COURT FACILITY ARE SUBJECT TO SECURITY SCREENING FOR DRUGS OR WEAPONS AND/OR SEARCH OF ANY PARCELS OR LARGE OBJECTS. ANY PERSON REFUSING SCREENING WILL BE DENIED ACCESS TO THE COURT BUILDING."

{¶ 4} Book walked the 12 feet to the magnetometer and passed through it. The alarm activated. As Officer Throckmorton used his handheld device, he noticed a bulge in Book's left front pocket. The officer asked him to remove it. Book was reluctant to do so, but he eventually pulled out a medicine container without a prescription label on it. It was two inches long and one inch wide. The officer did not think that it contained a gun or a knife. He also did not think that it contained pills. Instead, he saw a dark shadow with some type of movement inside the container.

{¶ 5} The officer instructed Book to hand him the bottle. Book refused. The officer grabbed Book's arm, and Book attempted to pull away. During a slight struggle, the officer was distracted from behind. Book removed the contents of the bottle and raised them toward his mouth. Other security officers intervened and sub-dued and arrested Book. The medicine bottle contained methamphetamines.

{¶ 6} The Ross County grand jury indicted Book for (1) aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11, (2) tampering with evidence in violation of R.C. 2921.12, and (3) illegal assembly/manufacturing of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.041. Book filed a motion to suppress the methamphetamines. The trial court granted the motion because it found that the "search went beyond the scope of a search for weapons." The court found that the search was proper until the officer requested that Book hand the container to him. The court stated, "There was no particular reason to think the search of the medicine bottle would produce a weapon or any other destructive device."

{¶ 7} The state appeals and raises the following assignment of error: "The trial court erred in granting the motion to suppress."

II

{¶ 8} In its sole assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court erred when it sustained Book's motion to suppress. The state maintains that the security officer has the authority to search for drugs in addition to weapons.

{¶ 9} Our review of a decision on a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Hatfield (Mar. 11, 1999), Ross App. No. 98CA2426, 1999 WL 158472, citing State v. McNamara (Dec. 23, 1997), Athens App. No. 97CA16, 707 N.E.2d 539, citing United States v. Martinez (C.A.11, 1992), 949 F.2d 1117, 1119. At a suppression hearing, the trial court is in the best position to evaluate witness credibility. State v. Dunlap (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 308, 314, 652 N.E.2d 988. Accordingly, we must uphold the trial court's findings of fact if the record supports them by competent, credible evidence. Id. We then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts. State v. Anderson (1995), 100 Ohio App.3d 688, 691, 654 N.E.2d 1034.

{¶ 10} The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures conducted by the state. If a search or seizure is not conducted pursuant to a judicial warrant, then it is unreasonable per se. Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. A court must suppress evidence obtained without a warrant in a criminal prosecution unless the state is able to establish an exception to the warrant requirement.

{¶ 11} An administrative search is an exception to the warrant requirement but is not an exception to the "reasonable" requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The administrative search satisfies the reasonable requirement if it complies with a three-prong test. United States v. Davis (C.A.9, 1973), 482 F.2d 893. "First, it must have a valid administrative purpose. Second, the method employed must be as limited in its intrusiveness as is consistent with satisfaction of the administrative purpose. Third, and in order to demonstrate that the purpose of the search is not to detect violations of law, persons potentially subject to it must have an available alternative to avoid the search by not proceeding on the course for which the search is required." State v. Lindamood (Mar. 28, 1997), Montgomery App. No. 16105, 1997 WL 165428, citing Davis. If the administrative search meets the three-prong test, it is valid even if the seizure of weapons or contraband leads to a criminal prosecution. Id.

{¶ 12} We now examine the first prong of the test involving the "reasonable" standard of the Fourth Amendment. To do so, we must consider the essential purpose of court-security screenings.

{¶ 13} The essential purpose of court-security screenings conducted pursuant to the court-security standards promulgated by the Ohio Supreme Court is to provide "safe and secure" court facilities "for all those who visit and work there." Supreme Court Security Standards Preamble. The Supreme Court of Ohio/Judicial Conference Committee on Court Security "recognizes * * * that courts deal with emotional issues." Id. Even though court security screenings may lead to criminal prosecutions involving weapons (see Supreme Court Security Standard 5) and contraband (see Supreme Court Security Standard 12 and the "Incident Report Fact Sheet"), "[t]his practical consequence does not alter the essentially administrative nature of the screening process, however, or render the searches unconstitutional." Davis at 908.

{¶ 14} Here, the administrative search of Book and others had the purpose of ensuring the safety of all persons that work in, or visit, the Chillicothe Municipal Court. Specifically, the security officer testified that he checks "the people that enter the Courthouse, just for the safety of the employees and staff." However, we can infer that a visitor would also benefit from this stated purpose.

{¶ 15} The evidence further shows that all persons entering the courthouse were notified by a sign that they were "SUBJECT TO SECURITY SCREENING FOR DRUGS OR WEAPONS AND/OR SEARCH OF ANY PARCELS OR LARGE OBJECTS." We find that this type of security screening is consistent with the overall purpose of providing safety to those who work in, or visit, the court. But, see, United States v. Bulacan (C.A.9, 1998), 156 F.3d 963 (holding that a court officer could search for weapons but not drugs). The reason that a security officer can search for drugs, in addition to weapons, is because of the stated purpose of the search — i.e., to provide for the safety of the employees and visitors. The presence of illegal drugs can jeopardize the safety of anyone in the courthouse. However, our analysis involving the first prong does not stop here.

{¶ 16} Under the first prong, the state must carry out the administrative purpose uniformly — i.e., objectively instead of subjectively. Lindamood, Montgomery App. No. 16105, 1997 WL 165428, at 4 ("The unreasonableness of discriminate searches is that the decision to conduct them is not determined by some objective rule, but instead is surrendered to the officer who elects when to perform them"). Stated differently, this uniform or objective approach means that the state must not let the screening officer pick and choose whom to search.

{¶ 17} Here, we find that the screenings carried out in the Chillicothe Municipal Courthouse were not uniformly applied. The officer testified that he did not screen everyone who entered the courthouse. He stated that, as a professional courtesy, he does not screen attorneys, judges, and the secretarial staff of attorneys when he has known these individuals for a long time. We hold that this application of the...