State v. Boozer, 1076

• Decision Date: 13 December 1955
• Docket Number: No. 1076,1076
• Citation: 80 Ariz. 8,291 P.2d 786
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. H. T. BOOZER, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

Page 786

291 P.2d 786

80 Ariz. 8

STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. H. T. BOOZER, Appellant.

No. 1076.

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Dec. 13, 1955.

F. Preston Sult, Eloy, Lewis, Roca, Scoville & Beauchamp and John P. Frank, Phoenix, for appellant.

Robert Morrison, Atty. Gen., H. B. Daniels, Asst. Atty. Gen., and T. J. Mahoney, County Atty. of Pinal County, Florence, for appellee.

UDALL, Justice.

This is an appeal by Dr. H. T. Boozer (defendant-appellant) from a judgment of conviction of the crime of abortion, being in violation of Section 43-301, A.C.A.1939. The defendant, a medical practitioner in the town of Superior, was charged by the county attorney of Pinal County with having unlawfully procured the miscarriage of one Dora Jean Williams in June, 1954. The jury returned a verdict of guilty, a motion for new trial was duly made and denied, judgment of conviction was entered and this appeal followed.

Taking the evidence as a whole, construed in a light most favorable to the state, the jury was fully justified in finding that Dora Jean Williams, accompanied by her husband, came to defendant for the purpose of procuring a criminal abortion, this without any regard to whether she needed it for the sake of her health. She and her husband both testified that they had learned from others that Dr. Boozer would perform such an operation, and that Mrs. Williams was in good health when they went to Superior the latter part of June, 1954, to learn if defendant would perform an abortion upon her, and that such an operation was in no wise necessary to save her life. They stated the step was taken to avoid the shame and disgrace of a pregnancy incurred prior to marriage and also for financial reasons. Dr. DePinto, a Phoenix obstertrician, testified that when he first examined Mrs. Williams on April 2, 1954 (before her marriage), he found her to be pregnant. Six weeks later, as a married woman, she returned for another examination and he found a normal two and one-half months pregnancy to exist with no indication of any complications. The defendant, upon taking the witness stand, admitted that he had procured the miscarriage of Dora Jean Williams-for a cash fee of $300 payable in advance-but contended that the operation was performed because of her physical condition. Specifically he stated that the mouth of the womb was considerably inflamed and that '* * * amniotic fluid was oozing out * * *' hence he felt a miscarriage was inevitable and it was imperative to remove the contents of the womb to avoid the danger of infection that might possibly be fatal to the mother. He asserted it was with this intent that he performed the operation. By its verdict it obviously appears the jury disbelieved the defendant.

There are three assignments of error presented and a number of supporting propositions of law. We shall state and consider these assignments in such order as seems best.

We find no merit in defendant's first assignment relative to the alleged 'general unfairness permeating the record'. Four examples of this so-called unfairness are cited us which we shall treat briefly. Defendant decries the excessive use of repulsive exhibits, specifically the fetus, placenta and blood clots passed by Mrs. Williams at a Phoenix hospital where she miscarried as a result of the operation previously performed by defendant upon her person. We are cited to the case of Hightower v. State, 62 Ariz. 351, 356, 158 P.2d 156, wherein this court laid down the rule that the state need not prove the removal of the fetus as part of the corpus delicti of the crime of procuring a miscarriage. Therefore, defendant argues, these 'gory details'-as he terms them-had no relevant place in the courtroom. Such a conclusion does not follow, for the reason that until defendant took the witness stand after the state had rested and admitted that the actually had performed an abortion upon the person of Mrs. Williams, part of the necessary proof of guilt was that the acts performed on her body were for the purpose of accomplishing a criminal abortion rather than some other type of operation. Thus these items came within the rule that even repulsive exhibits may be exhibited to the jury where relevant to the case. Miranda v. State, 42 Ariz. 358, 367, 26 P.2d 241. Furthermore, the exhibits proved that the operation was upon a pregnant woman-part of the necessary proof under our statute. Sec. 43-301, supra. As a matter of fact counsel for defendant made no objection at the trial to the admission of the fetus as an exhibit, nor did he endeavor in any way to protest the presence in the courtroom of any of these objects.

Defendant next complains of repeated innuendoes by the prosecutor by means of what he terms 'various devices' whereby the impression was given the jury that the defendant had committed many other similar offenses. Two such instances-termed 'the device of the mysterious witnesses'-consisted of: (1) announcement by the county attorney at the beginning of the trial, and in the presence of the jury, that three women witnesses whose names were endorsed upon the information had been subpoenaed, but the state was 'unable to locate' them; (2) a request by the prosecutor later in the course of the trial asking leave to add the names of four other women witnesses to the information, only one of whom was later called as a witness. We see nothing improper or ulterior in these acts. We must assume that the prosecutor was acting in good faith although it seems to us it would have been the better practice, under the circumstances, to have made these statements out of the hearing of the jury.

Defendant concedes the rule that in an abortion case where, as here, the intent of the defendant is a crucial issue, the state is free to show other acts of abortion for the purpose of establishing his intent in the particular case. Hightower v. State, supra. Two women witnesses were called for this express purpose; the one appeared with an attorney and claimed the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. This claim was respected and the witness excused from testifying. The other, Mrs. June Hines, took the witness stand on rebuttal and testified that defendant had performed an unlawful abortion upon her for the sum of $150. This evidence was clearly admissible.

One of the business records obtained from the defendant's office by the prosecutor under a search warrant was a 'little black book' which contained the names of a goodly number of his out-of-town patients, principally women. This book was never offered or admitted in evidence, yet without objection on this ground on the part of defense counsel, the prosecutor interrogated at length the defendant's bookkeeper about entries therein. We are convinced after a most careful examination of the transcript that there was nothing so highly prejudicial in this examination or in failure to offer the book in evidence as to require a reversal.

It should be noted that no specific ruling of the trial court on the admission or rejection of evidence is assigned as error-there is merely a general charge of unfairness. Defendant attempts to excuse his failure to object to many of the matters now complained of on the ground that 'the harm was done before an objection could be interposed'. In this instance we do not recognize such an excuse as being a valid one. A motion to strike and for the court...