State v. Boston

• Decision Date: 15 March 1938
• Docket Number: 43483.
• Citation: 278 N.W. 291,226 Iowa 429
• Parties: STATE v. BOSTON.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

278 N.W. 291

226 Iowa 429

STATE v. BOSTON.

No. 43483.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

March 15, 1938

Appeal from District Court, Scott County; Wm. W. Scott, Judge.

Equity action to restrain defendant by injunction from alleged unlawful practice of medicine. From the decree of the trial court, both parties appealed.

Reversed on plaintiff's appeal, with instructions.

Affirmed on defendant's appeal.

Block Block & Agnew, of Davenport, and John Mitchell, Atty. Gen for appellant.

A. T Holmes, of LaCrosse, Wis., J. M. Maloney, of Davenport, L. E. Linnan, of Algona, and W. B. Sloan, of Des Moines, for appellee and cross-appellant.

RICHARDS Justice.

During the period within which occurred the transactions hereinafter related, defendant held a license issued by the proper state authorities to practice chiropractic. At no time was he licensed to practice medicine and surgery. It is claimed by plaintiff that certain practices on part of defendant were unauthorized under the license he held and constituted unlawful practice of medicine and surgery. To restrain such practices by injunction this action in equity was instituted by the State of Iowa. The district court granted the full relief prayed by plaintiff, excepting that in enjoining defendant from one of these practices, that is, the prescribing of specific courses of diet, the court provided that the decree should not enjoin defendant " from using his reasonable judgment in recommending to a patient certain changes of diet, exercise or such of his general habits as affect his health." From the portion of the decree that appears above as a quotation plaintiff has appealed and claims with respect thereto that prescribing of diet should have been wholly enjoined. Afterwards defendant appealed from the decree as a whole.

Defendant held himself out, including the using of newspaper and telephone directory advertising, as practicing physiotherapy, electrotherapy, colonic irrigation, and diet. In some advertisements he designated himself as being a chiropractor and physiotherapist. In his office in Davenport where he treated patients defendant had a number of mechanical appliances, some of which brought electric and galvanic currents into contact with the patient's body. Rays emanating from other machines or appliances raised the temperature of portions of the patient's body, while another appliance imparted a physical vibration to the part of the body with which it was contacted. There was a " colonic irrigator" wherewith about two gallons of water was used as an enema, the procedure lasting from 20 to 30 minutes. Defendant also advised patients with respect to diet. It is to these and other modalities that the decree of injunction applied. Later in this opinion a portion of the decree is set out.

The question presented is whether the district court correctly held that the use of these things in the treatment of human ailments was not chiropractice, but constitutes practice of medicine. Section 2555, Code 1935, so far as pertinent to this case, is in these words:

" 2555. Chiropractic defined . For the purpose of this title the following classes of persons shall be deemed to be engaged in the practice of chiropractic:

1. * * *

2. Persons who treat human ailments by the adjustment by hand of the articulations of the spine or by other incidental adjustments."

In this statute is found the only source of defendant's authority to treat human ailments. Likewise therein is a legislative definition of what such treating of human ailments consists, i. e., adjustment by hand of the articulations of the spine or other incidental adjustments. When defendant professed to use and used modalities other than those defined in section 2555, as curative means or methods, the conclusion seems unavoidable that he was attempting to function outside the restricted field of endeavor to which the Legislature has limited the practice of chiropractic. The only authority bearing on this question that has come to our attention is Heintze v. New Jersey State Board of Medical Examiners, 107 N.J.L. 420, 153 A. 253. In that case, Heintze, referred to in the opinion as prosecutor, had been convicted in the lower court of the penal offense of practicing medicine and surgery without having been licensed so to do. Prosecutor, Heintze, was a chiropractor. The opinion does not set out the New Jersey statutes defining the nature of the practice of chiropractic, but the defendant in the case at bar admits in argument that these statutes, chapter 4 of the Public Laws of 1920, afterwards repealed, defined the treatment of chiropractic as " by hand." We quote from the opinion in the cited case:

" The prosecutor is a chiropractor licensed under chapter 4 of the laws of 1920, which was later repealed. but saving licenses issued thereunder. He used the word ‘ Doctor’ as a title; diagnosed; and treated patients, not only by manual manipulation within the act of 1920, but by the use of vibrator, electric light, galvanic current, etc. His female assistant, in his presence, gave directions for a vegetarian diet and the use of flaxseed tea. That such practice is outside of a license to use chiropractic, and within the domain of medicine and surgery, seems entirely plain. Clearly, therefore, the case was in one or more respects within the statute, prescribing a penalty for practicing without a medical license. It may well be that the use of the word ‘ Doctor’ by a regularly licensed chiropractor is permissible; we do not rest on that; but the other practices just mentioned are not."

Defendant draws from section 2559, Code 1935, certain inferences to support the proposition that as a chiropractor he had the right to practice in the manner shown. Section 2559 provides that a license to practice chiropractic shall not authorize the licensee to practice operative surgery, osteopathy, nor administer or prescribe any drug or medicines included in...