State v. Boswell
| Decision Date | 30 June 1829 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE STATE v. EPHRAIM BOSWELL et al. |
FROM WAYNE.
1. Proof may be offered of the bad moral character of a witness in order to discredit his testimony.
2. The discrediting witness should not express an opinion founded upon a knowledge of particular facts; nor upon the hearsay of strangers to the witness, whose testimony it is intended to discredit. But if his information is derived from proper sources, he may be asked whether he would believe the other upon his oath, or whether the other is worthy of credit upon oath.
The defendants were indicted for a riot, and on the trial before NORWOOD, J. on the last circuit, the defendants introduced witnesses for the purpose of discreiting the evidence offered by the State, and proposed to ask whether from their knowledge of the general character of the witnsses for the prosecution, they would believe them upon oath; and this before the discrediting witnesses had expressed any opinion respecting the general character of the witnesses for the prosecution as to truth and veracity, when testifying upon oath. The presiding judge was of opinion that the question was improper at that stage of the examination, as it would enable the discrediting witnesses to express opinions unfavorable to the credibility of the witnesses offered by the State, founded rather on the general moral character of the latter than on their character for truth and veracity when speaking upon oath; or their testimony might be founded upon particular facts, or private prejudices, or
the malicious motives of injuring the reputation of the witnesses for the prosecution. By the directions of his Honor the witnesses introduced by the defendants were examined—first, as to the general character of the witnesses for the State for truth, when upon oath; secondly, as to their general character for truth in common conversation; and thirdly, as to their general moral character. The defendants were convicted and appealed to this Court.
The cause was submitted, without argument, by the Attorney-General, for the State.
TOOMER, J. One mode of impeaching the credit of a witness is to introduce evidence showing that he is not worthy to be believed on oath. The credit of the witness may be impeached by general evidence that he is not worthy to be believed upon his oath. 1 Starkie Ev., 146. The old rule of practice, laid down by Ld. Chief Baron Gilbert, confined the inquiry to the general character of the witness as a man of veracity. In the year 1804 it was decided, in this State, that to discredit a witness you might prove him to be of bad moral character; and the question was not confined to his character for veracity. 8. v. Stallings, 3 N. C., 300. This decision established a rule of practice which has prevailed since that period in our Courts and has governed their proceedings.
I perceive no necessity for any change in this rule; it enables juries, whose peculiar province it is to weigh the credit of witnesses to do it more correctly. A like practice has been adopted by the Courts of Kentucky. 3 March., 261. Should a witness, whose general character is proverbially bad as to licentiousness and lewdness, who is, in his habits regardless of the precepts of religion, and reckless of the consequences of vice, be entitled to the same credit as another, whose character is without stain, and whose whole life has been marked by piety, virtue and truth? And how could the jury know the character of the vicious and immoral without evidence? Witnesses in our country are frequently strangers to jurors. An unprincipled man, although grovelling in other vices, which he has long practiced, may, for selfish purposes, artfully conceal the weakness of his character on the score of veracity. Should not such habits lessen the weight and impair the credit of a witness, although he may have established no general character bad as to truth? Should not a jury have access to such information when suspending the scales of evidence to weigh the credit of a witness?
This mode of examination tends to elicit truth, and thus advances the administration of justice; and, when the rule is known,...
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...v. Wheeler, 104 N.C. 893, 10 S.E. 491; State v. Gee, 92 N.C. 756; State v. Laxton, 76 N.C. 216; State v. Speight, 69 N.C. 72; State v. Boswell, 13 N.C. 209. See also, State v. Parks, 25 N.C. 296; State v. Stallings, 3 N.C. The Court in State v. Smoak, 213 N.C. 79, 195 S.E. 72, emphasized th......
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