State v. Boulais
| Decision Date | 07 November 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 2002–710.,2002–710. |
| Citation | 834 A.2d 380,150 N.H. 216 |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Christopher BOULAIS. |
Peter W. Heed, attorney general (Nicholas Cort, assistant attorney general, on the brief and orally), for the State.
Woods Law Office, P.A., of Exeter (Stephen J.C. Woods on the brief and orally), for the defendant.
The defendant, Christopher Boulais, appeals his conviction in Salem District Court (Jones , J.) on six counts of disorderly conduct. See RSA 644:2, II(b) (1996). On appeal, Boulais argues that the trial court misconstrued RSA 644:2, II(b) and that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. We reverse.
The record supports the following facts. In 2001, while employed at Sunsational Tanning Salon in Salem, Boulais made numerous remarks to female customers and employees which were the basis for six disorderly conduct charges.
The first two charges involved a woman who worked at the salon. Shortly after she was hired, Boulais told the employee that he wanted to "unzipper [her] pants and eat [her] for breakfast." On the same day, while the employee was standing on a ladder, Boulais leaned toward her waist area and stated: "Perfect height for my breakfast." Boulais made these comments when he was alone with the employee. She testified that Boulais' remarks made her uncomfortable, shocked and fearful.
The third and fourth charges involved a customer of the salon. When the customer was alone with Boulais in the salon, he told her that he could give her "some good protein." She found this remark disgusting. Boulais also told the customer that he wanted her to "stand over his head." The customer testified that immediately after this encounter, she cried and was upset.
The fifth charge stemmed from an incident involving another employee of the salon. This woman testified that while she was working at the salon, Boulais told her: "Go have sex with your boyfriend, and if he can't make you happy ... then come see me." Like the other women, she testified that Boulais' remark was made outside of the presence of others. She further testified that it made her uncomfortable, mad, upset and scared.
The sixth charge involved a customer of the salon. She testified that when she saw Boulais at a restaurant near the salon and asked him what he was "up to," Boulais responded that he was "[s]ix three, 220 pounds, 10½ inches, fully extended." There were several other customers and workers in the restaurant when Boulais made this remark. The customer testified that she was humiliated and embarrassed by Boulais' comment and that she wanted to punch him in the face but she chose not to because she is "a little bit too much of a lady."
We first address Boulais' argument that the trial court misconstrued RSA 644:2, II(b). Because we hold that the trial court misinterpreted the statute and that Boulais did not violate it, we need not address his remaining arguments.
When construing a statute, we first examine its language, ascribing the plain and ordinary meaning to the words used by the legislature. Franklin Lodge of Elks v. Marcoux, 149 N.H. 581, 585, 825 A.2d 480 (2003). We do not consider words and phrases in isolation, however, but within the context of the statute as a whole. Id. This enables us to better discern the legislature's intent and to interpret statutory language in light of the policy or purpose sought to be advanced by the statutory scheme. Id. Indeed, it is especially appropriate to consider the evil or mischief the statute was designed to remedy. Id. Because the interpretation of a statute is a question of law, we review the trial court's decision de novo . Pennelli v. Town of Pelham, 148 N.H. 365, 366, 807 A.2d 1256 (2002).
Boulais was charged under RSA 644:2, II(b), which provides: "A person is guilty of disorderly conduct if ... [h]e [d]irects at another person in a public place obscene, derisive, or offensive words which are likely to provoke a violent reaction on the part of an ordinary person...." The statute thus makes it unlawful to utter "offensive words which are likely to provoke a violent reaction." RSA 644:2, II(b). There is no dispute that Boulais' remarks were offensive. Thus, we must determine whether the trial court correctly construed the element of "likely to provoke a violent reaction."
We begin with an analysis of the plain and ordinary meaning of "violent." "Violent" is defined as "characterized by extreme force" and "marked by abnormally sudden physical activity and intensity." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2554 (unabridged ed.1961). By using the word "violent," the legislature intended to criminalize those offensive words which are likely to provoke extreme force or abnormally sudden physical activity. The trial judge found that the violent reaction element of the statute could be satisfied if the listener experienced feelings of outrage, discomfort, and humiliation. This broad reading of "violent reaction" is inconsistent with the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by the legislature. We disagree with the trial court's ruling that remarks that cause only an internal emotional response in the listener could meet the violent reaction element and be the basis for a disorderly conduct charge.
Our conclusion is supported by our prior construction of this provision. We have stated that the purpose of the disorderly conduct statute is to preserve the public peace. See State v. Chaplinsky, 91 N.H. 310, 312, 18 A.2d 754 (1941), aff'd sub nom . Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Thus, "[d]erisive and annoying words can be taken as coming within the purview of the statute ... only when they have this characteristic of plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace." Id. at 320–21, 18 A.2d 754.
The legislative history of RSA 644:2 is also consistent with this interpretation. The disorderly conduct statute, adopted as part of the Criminal Code of 1971, was recommended to the legislature in the Report of Commission to Recommend Codification of Criminal Laws . In commenting on the disorderly conduct statute, the Commission referred to the Model Penal Code. See Commission to Recommend Codification of Criminal Laws, Report of Commission to Recommend Codification of Criminal Laws 100 (1969). As we did in State v. Murray, 135 N.H. 369, 605 A.2d 676 (1991), we use the Model Penal Code commentaries as guidance in construing RSA 644:2, II(b).
Id. § 250.2 comment 4(b) at 337...
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