State v. Bowden

• Decision Date: 22 September 1970
• Docket Number: No. 16558,16558
• Citation: 29 Conn.Supp. 86,272 A.2d 141
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Franklin BOWDEN.

Page 141

272 A.2d 141

29 Conn.Supp. 86

STATE of Connecticut v. Franklin BOWDEN.

No. 16558.

Superior Court of Connecticut, New Haven County, at New Haven.

Sept. 22, 1970.

John J. Kelly, Asst. State's Atty., for the State.

John R. Williams and Jonathan Waxman, New Haven, for defendant.

GRILLO, Judge.

The defendant, charged with the crime of possession of narcotic drugs in violation of § 19-481(a) of the General Statutes, has filed a motion for discovery and inspection. The state resists that part of the motion requesting the following information and/or material: (a) The records of any and all prior felony convictions of, and all criminal charges presently pending against, any and all prospective prosecution witnesses. (b) The results or reports of any and all tests and experiments, including but not limited to all photographs and comparisons of fingerprints, and of all tests performed upon all alleged narcotics. (c) A list of the names and addresses of all known witnesses to the alleged crime. (d) Any and all statements relevant to this case, written, or oral and subsequently reduced to writing, of any and all prospective prosecution witnesses. (e) Any and all statements relevant to this case, written, or oral and subsequently reduced to writing, of any and all persons who are not prospective prosecution witnesses. (f) Any and all diagrams, charts, maps of photographs of the scene of the alleged crime or of any alleged victim thereof. (g) All records of electronic surveillances of any person or place which have directly or indirectly contributed to the state's case against the defendant.

The position of the state is that the items and information sought are not within the categories listed in § 54-86a of the General Statutes and thus are not producible, the state insisting that Connecticut recognizes only the limited pretrial discovery enunciated in the statute. A determination of that issue need not be made herein, since what the defendant seeks is not to add other categories to those set forth in the statute; rather, he seeks discovery of items and data which he contends are exculpatory and thus authorized by § 54-86a(a)(1) of the General Statutes. It might be noted, however, that there exist varied views as to whether criminal discovery or inspection is limited by statute or whether the court has inherent power to allow discovery without reference to the statutory limitations. See note, 7 A.L.R.3d 8, 20 § 2a; 23 Am.Jur.2d, Depositions and Discovery, § 308.

In order for the court to grant this contested request, the defendant must make a proper showing that the items sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request is reasonable. General Statutes § 54-86a(a). Blanket requests made under motion for discovery should demonstrate a better cause for inspection than a mere desire for the benefit of information which has been obtained by the prosecution in its investigation of a crime. People v. Cooper, 53 Cal.2d 755, 770, 3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964. There must be a showing of facts indicating that inspection is necessary to a fair trial. United States v. Louis Carreau, Inc., D.C., 42 F.R.D. 408, 412. '(I) ndiscriminate, free-wheeling, shotgun demands' are not countenanced. United States v. King, 49 F.R.D. 51, 53. Prosecution evidence must, however, be disclosed to protect basic constitutional rights; State v. DiNoi, 59 R.I. 348, 357, 196 A. 497; or where a disclosure is otherwise necessary for a fair trial or in the interest of justice. Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 75, 346 P.2d 407.

With reference to the definition of the word 'exculpatory,' one writer has suggested that the criterion be 'evidence that might reasonably affect the outcome of the jury's deliberations.' Note, 'The Duty of the Prosecutor to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence,' 60 Colum.L.Rev. 858, 870. 'Exculpatory' has been defined to mean 'clearing, or tending to clear, from alleged fault or guilt.' Moore v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 97, 100, 60 S.W.2d 453, 455; Baird v. State, 156 Tex.Cr.R. 644, 246 S.W.2d 192; see 33 C.J.S. Exculpatory 115.

As to the disclosure sought in paragraph (a) above: The apprehension underlying opposition to pretrial disclosure of the names of potential prosecution witnesses has been the subject of comment. Comment, 'Pre-Trial Disclosure in Criminal Cases,' 60 Yale L.J. 626, 633; see Goldstein, 'The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure,' 69 Yale L.J. 1149, 1183. To deny an accused information relating to an essential step necessary for cross-examination of a witness is, however, to deny a substantial right and to withdraw one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial. Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624. It is obvious that defense counsel, armed with information concerning the pendency of charges against a prosecution witness or of his conviction of a crime (Heating Acceptance Corporation v. Patterson, 152 Conn. 467, 472, 208 A.2d 341; State v. Perelli, 128 Conn. 172, 180, 21 A.2d 389), would most likely propound questions concerning circumstances tending to suggest a hope or expectation of leniency productive of a motive or interest likely to affect the witness' testimony. See State v. Tropiano, 158 Conn. 412, 426, 262 A.2d 147. The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the...