State v. Bowley, 96-385
| Decision Date | 24 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-385,96-385 |
| Citation | 282 Mont. 298,938 P.2d 592 |
| Parties | STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jimmy Rae BOWLEY, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Eric Rasmusson, Boulder, for Defendant and Appellant.
Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Christina Lechner Goe, Assistant Attorney General, Helena; Valerie D. Wilson, Jefferson County Attorney, Deborah Butler, Deputy Jefferson County Attorney, Boulder, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The Fifth Judicial District Court, Jefferson County, denied Defendant Jimmy Rae Bowley's (Bowley) oral motions to withdraw his plea of guilty to the felony offense of criminal sale of dangerous drugs. Bowley appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, concluding that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied Bowley's oral motions to withdraw his guilty plea.
We consolidate the issues raised on appeal into the following issue:
Did the District Court abuse its discretion in not allowing Bowley to withdraw his guilty plea?
On October 20, 1995, Bowley was arraigned and pled not guilty to the felony charge of criminal sale of dangerous drugs (marijuana--Schedule I Narcotic Drug--second offense), in violation of §§ 45-9-101(1) and (4), 50-32-101(17) and 50-32-222 (Schedule I), MCA. A trial was scheduled for March 8, 1996. On March 1, 1996, the District Court vacated the trial set for March 8, 1996, and scheduled in its place a change of plea hearing.
At the March 8, 1996 change of plea hearing, the District Court began interrogating Bowley by explaining only the nature of his offense, his possible punishment, and his right to an attorney. Next, the District Court elicited the factual basis for Bowley's At the conclusion of the change of plea hearing, the District Court granted the prosecutor's motion to revoke Bowley's surety bond and to place him in the custody of the Jefferson County Jail until a presentence investigation was conducted. In response to this, Bowley moved to withdraw his guilty plea, which the District Court denied:
guilty plea by requesting that Bowley explain his actions. Bowley answered that he sold marijuana to a woman. Subsequently, the District Court granted the prosecutor's motion to amend the information to indicate that this was Bowley's first offense. Only after eliciting the factual basis of Bowley's guilty plea did the District Court inform Bowley of his constitutional rights. Thereafter, Bowley pled guilty.
You're remanded back to the sheriff.
And if you can get Mr. Condo to extend the bond, that will be great.
On March 11, 1996, Bowley's bond was reinstated and he was released from the Jefferson County Jail.
On March 19, 1996, Bowley, his attorney and the prosecutor executed a written Acknowledgment of Rights & Pre-Trial Agreement (Pre-Trial Agreement). This Pre-Trial Agreement was not filed with the District Court until May 17, 1996, the date scheduled for Bowley's sentencing hearing. Pursuant to the Pre-Trial Agreement, Bowley agreed to plead guilty to the felony offense of criminal sale of dangerous drugs and the prosecutor agreed to recommend a five-year suspended sentence. Furthermore, in lieu of the one year mandatory minimum prison sentence, the prosecutor agreed to recommend an alternative sentence comprising one year of inpatient or outpatient drug treatment; supervision by the Adult Probation and Parole; compliance with the rules and regulations of Probation and Parole; remaining drug free and submitting to random testing at the request of Bowley's probation officer.
On May 17, 1996, before the District Court began the sentencing hearing, Bowley moved the court to discharge his attorney and to withdraw his guilty plea. The District Court, again, summarily denied his motion:
During the sentencing hearing, the District Court heard testimony from Bud Walsh, a Probation and Parole Officer II, concerning his presentence investigation of Bowley. Walsh recommended that Bowley receive a five-year sentence to the Montana State Prison to run concurrently with any other sentence Bowley might receive in state or federal court. In response to this recommended sentence, the District Court asked the prosecutor to explain why the probation officer's recommendation differed from the plea agreement:
Your Honor, the State hasn't--Mr. Walsh, based on his investigation, gave you his recommendation. The State isn't diverting from that at this point, Your Honor.
I think that the Court is well aware that the State agreed to a five-year commitment with a minimum, with it all suspended, if Mr. Bowley would do treatment. Mr. Walsh also indicated that Mr. Bowley has been in treatment twice, or at least once before, and it's obviously not done any good, because here he is again with a drug charge. And he never told--he told Mr. Walsh that he still uses.
So at this point, I don't think it matters too much regarding Mr. Bowley, whether or not you give him five years in the State Prison or whether you suspend it. He's still incarcerated with the federal system, and that has yet to be tried.
And I don't have a problem with any sentence running concurrent with the federal system either. [Emphasis added.]
The District Court next heard from Bowley's attorney and finally addressed Bowley:
So you've admitted two or three times that you did it. And you would just be postponing the inevitable if you withdrew your plea. So I'm not going to let you withdraw your plea.....
Immediately thereafter, the District Court sentenced Bowley to a five-year sentence in the Montana State Prison to run concurrently with any other sentence Bowley might receive in state or federal court. From this judgment and sentence, Bowley appeals. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Before accepting a plea of guilty, a trial court must satisfy statutory requirements such as those contained in §§ 46-12-210 and 46-16-105(1), MCA. Because a criminal defendant waives numerous constitutional rights and protections when pleading guilty, "it is a well-settled legal principle that a guilty plea must be a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." State v. Radi (1991), 250 Mont. 155, 159, 818 P.2d 1203, 1206 (citing North Carolina v. Alford (1970), 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162). Furthermore, a trial court may permit a plea of guilty to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted at any time before or after judgment, for good cause shown. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA. "The fundamental purpose of allowing the withdrawal of a guilty plea is to prevent the possibility of convicting an innocent [person]." State v. Johnson (1995), 274 Mont. 124, 127, 907 P.2d 150, 152 (citations omitted).
We have not established a rule or standard under which a trial court must address a request to withdraw a guilty plea; rather, each case must be considered in light of its unique record. State v. Enoch (1994), 269 Mont. 8, 11, 887 P.2d 175, 177. Furthermore, we review a district court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea to determine if the court abused its discretion. Enoch, 887 P.2d at 177. To determine whether good cause existed and whether a district court abused its discretion by denying a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea, we consider three factors:
(1) the adequacy of the court's interrogation at the time the plea was entered regarding the defendant's understanding of the consequences of the plea;
(2) the promptness with which the defendant attempts to withdraw the plea; and
(3) the fact that the plea was the result of a plea bargain in which the guilty plea was given in exchange for dismissal of another charge.
Johnson, 907 P.2d at 152 (citing Enoch, 887 P.2d at 177; Radi, 818 P.2d at 1206).
During both the March 8, 1996 change of plea hearing and the May 17, 1996 sentencing hearing, the District Court summarily rejected...
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