State v. Bowman

Decision Date09 October 1962
Citation187 N.E.2d 627,116 Ohio App. 285
Parties, 22 O.O.2d 117 The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. BOWMAN, Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals

P. Eugene Smith and Eugene A. Jablinski, Dayton, for appellee.

Winn C. Hamrick, Dayton, for appellant.

CRAWFORD, Presiding Judge.

Defendant, appellant herein, was charged in the Municipal Court of the city of Miamisburg with a second offense under Section 3773.24, Revised Code, in that on Sunday, July 30, 1961, he did unlawfully suffer Woody's Market, Inc., to be open for the transaction of business, and in that on April 6, 1961, he had been convicted of a similar offense committed on February 12, 1961.

He was found guilty by a jury and sentenced to serve ten days in the workhouse and to pay a fine of $75. Upon appeal, the Court of Common Pleas affirmed the judgment.

The prosecution was based only upon an affidavit of one G. Joseph Strickler, made and filed on August 7, 1961.

The first assignment of error is the failure to sustain appellant's motion to dismiss the affidavit filed against him for the reason that the state cannot proceed against him under Section 3773.24, Revised Code, unless a complaint is made within ten days after a violation.

Section 3773.24, Revised Code, reads in part:

'* * * In prosecutions under this section complaints shall be made within ten days after a violation.'

Section 2935.09, Revised Code, provides:

'In all cases not provided by sections 2935.02 to 2935.08, inclusive, of the Revised Code, in order to cause the arrest or prosecution of a person charged with committing an offense in this state, a peace officer, or a private citizen having knowledge of the facts, shall file with the judge or clerk of a court of record, or with a magistrate, an affidavit charging the offense committed, or shall file such affidavit with the prosecuting attorney or attorney charged by law with the prosecution of offenses in court or before such magistrate, for the purpose of having a complaint filed by such prosecuting or other authorized attorney.'

The attorneys who represent the state of Ohio, plaintiff, appellee herein, were designated for that purpose by the prosecuting attorney for the Municipal Court of the City of Miamisburg under the provisions of Section 2938.13, Revised Code. They have filed affidavits declaring their non-employment by the prosecuting witness.

Section 2935.17, Revised Code (128 Ohio Laws, pp. 97, 101), entitled 'Affidavit forms; authority of supreme Court to prescribe,' sets forth, separately, the forms of affidavit and complaint which are declared sufficient.

Counsel for appellee urge that these last two sections of the Revised Code did not become effective until January 1, 1960, and therefore cannot affect the provisions of the specific statute, Section 3773.24, Revised Code, which had previously become effective on July 17, 1959.

They cite the case of State v. Ritzler (1923), 17 Ohio App. 394, indicating that the words, 'affidavit,' 'complaint,' and 'information,' were used indiscriminately and are interchangeable and equivalent in meaning. Another case of similar import is Hebebrand v. State (1935), 129 Ohio St. 574, 196 N.E. 412.

Neither of these cases decides our present question. When statutory language is ambiguous or lacks precision it must, of course, be interpreted or construed. But when the Legislature defines and clarifies the language it has used in previous enactments, such clarification renders obsolete such prior judicial interpretation and construction. See 50 American Jurisprudence, 328, Statutes, Section 337; 82 C. J. S. Statutes § 252, p. 419.

The language of Section 2935.09, Revised Code, is clear and positive. It applies to 'all cases' except those which present a particular problem in connection with an arrest or warrant. In all other cases the affidavit is required 'for the purpose of having a complaint filed by such prosecuting or other authorized attorney.' Thus a complaint is contemplated in all these cases and the purpose of the affidavit is limited to effecting the filing of a complaint. A complaint is defined by example in Section 2935.17, Revised Code. Since this provision is made...

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16 cases
  • Marriage of Cohn, In re
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 22, 1982
    ...of statutes by reviewing courts. See Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue (1952), 413 Ill. 55, 66 ; State v. Bowman (1962), 116 Ohio App. 285, 286-87, 187 N.E.2d 627, 629; cf. People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 28 ." 77 Ill.2d 423, 428-29, 33 Ill.Dec. 13......
  • State v. Gordon
    • United States
    • Ohio Supreme Court
    • November 10, 1971
    ...of a second offense, the first offense must be made out by that degree of evidence required by law. * * *' In State v. Bowman (1962), 116 Ohio App. 285, 287, 187 N.E.2d 627, 629, it was noted '* * * A necessary element of the charge (of second offense) is that appellant has committed a seco......
  • Shelby County v. State of Illinois Property Tax Appeal Bd., 79-135
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 25, 1980
    ...by reviewing courts. See Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue (1952), 413 Ill. 55, 66, 108 N.E.2d 8; State v. Bowman (1962), 116 Ohio App. 285, 286-87, 187 N.E.2d 627, 629; cf. People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 28, 169 N.E.2d 521." (77 Ill.2d at 425, 33......
  • Roth v. Yackley
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • October 2, 1979
    ...by reviewing courts. See Modern Dairy Co. v. Department of Revenue (1952), 413 Ill. 55, 66, 108 N.E.2d 8; State v. Bowman (1962), 116 Ohio App. 285, 286-87, 187 N.E.2d 627, 629; Cf. People ex rel. Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 28, 169 N.E.2d In sum, we find that the Ge......
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