State v. Bowman

• Decision Date: 30 October 1907
• Citation: 59 S.E. 74,145 N.C. 452
• Parties: STATE v. BOWMAN.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

59 S.E. 74

145 N.C. 452

STATE v. BOWMAN.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

October 30, 1907

Appeal from Superior Court, Union County; Peebles, Judge.

Clyde Bowman was indicted for taking part in a lynching. He filed a plea of amnesty, alleging that in proceedings instituted by the solicitor to determine who participated in the lynching as authorized by Revisal 1905, §§ 3200, 3201, defendant was summoned, sworn, and examined by the state touching his knowledge of the lynching under investigation, which plea was sustained, and the state excepted and appealed. Affirmed.

At the hearing it was made to appear, on plea duly entered, that in proceedings instituted by the solicitor under sections 3200, 3201, et seq., of the Revisal of 1905, and at his instance the present defendant was summoned, sworn, and examined by the state touching this alleged lynching, which was then being investigated before his honor, Walter H. Neal. Judge Peebles dismissed the case against defendant, holding that on the facts, the legislation on the subject protected defendant from further prosecution by reason of this charge and thereupon the solicitor for the state excepted and appealed.

Hayden Clement, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

J. A. Lockhart, H. H. McLendon, F. J. Coxe, and T. L. Caudle, for appellee.

HOKE J.

Our statute on this subject (Revisal 1905, §§ 3200, 3201, et seq.) directs that, whenever a solicitor is advised that a lynching has occurred in his judicial district, he shall at once institute proceedings before a coroner, justice of the peace, or judge of the superior court for an investigation of the crime and the apprehension of the offender; that on such investigation, or any other, into the crime made pursuant to law, no person shall be excused from testifying on the ground that his evidence might subject him to prosecution or in any way tend to incriminate him, etc.; and the statute further provides as follows: "And such person when so examined as a witness for the state shall be altogether pardoned of any and all participation in any crime arising under the provisions of the preceding section or under existing law, concerning which he is required to testify." On the facts, therefore, which were established at the hearing, by the express provisions of the act, the defendant was fully pardoned of any and all participation in the crime now charged, as well as any and every offense against existing law concerning which he was required to testify; and the judge below correctly held that the charge should be dismissed, and the defendant protected from further prosecution concerning it. Legislation of this kind, acting in "abolition or oblivion of the offense," and applicable to all persons, or all persons in a given class, has been uniformly upheld with us, and is sustained by well-considered decisions in other jurisdictions. State v. Blalock, 61 N.C. 242; State v. Keith, 63 N.C. 140; State v. Applewhite, 75 N.C. 229; In re Briggs, 135 N.C. 119-144, 47 S.E. 403; State v. Nichols, 26 Ark. 74, 7 Am. Rep. 600; State v. Forkner, 94 Iowa, 733, 62 N.W. 683.

These cases in no way conflict with or trench upon the provisions of article 3, § 6, of our Constitution, conferring on the Governor the power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons after conviction, etc. As said in one of them "The power thus granted is held not to be exclusive." And I apprehend the ruling could further be safely made to rest upon the principle that the section in question confers on the Governor the power to exercise clemency in a particular case, and in favor of an individual or individuals, especially charged with the offense; this being an executive...