State v. Boyd

• Decision Date: 05 January 1998
• Citation: 959 S.W.2d 557
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Michael Joe BOYD, Appellant.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 557

959 S.W.2d 557

STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Michael Joe BOYD, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Tennessee at Jackson.

Jan. 5, 1998.

Rehearing Denied March 2, 1998.

Paul J. Morrow, Jr., Office of the Post-Conviction Defender, Nashville, Daniel A. Seward, Memphis, for Appellant.

John Knox Walkup, Attorney General and Reporter, Michael E. Moore, Solicitor General, Kathy Morante, Deputy Attorney General, Nashville, John W. Pierotti, District Attorney General (at Trial), Terry Harris, Assistant District Attorney (at Trial), Memphis, for Appellee.

OPINION

ANDERSON, Chief Justice.

The issue in this post-conviction death penalty appeal is whether the jury's reliance on an invalid aggravating circumstance was harmless error, or whether resentencing is required because there is reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same had the jury given no weight to the invalid aggravating factor. The jury relied on a valid aggravating factor, that the defendant had a prior conviction for a violent felony offense (second-degree murder), and an invalid aggravating circumstance, that the victim was killed during the commission of a felony. ¹

A majority of this Court held in State v. Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317 (Tenn.1992), that the felony murder aggravating factor found in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7) duplicates and mirrors the elements of the offense of felony murder and therefore, when applied as an aggravating factor to a felony murder conviction, it fails to narrow the class of death eligible defendants as is required by article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. ² After conducting a harmless error analysis, however, both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that under the facts of this case the sentence would have been the same had the jury given no weight to the invalid aggravating factor. Both courts denied the post-conviction petition. We agree and affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.

BACKGROUND

The defendant, Michael Joe Boyd, was convicted of felony murder stemming from the shooting death of William Price during an armed robbery in November of 1986. Price and a companion, David Hippen, had solicited two women, Barbara Lee and Renita Tate, to accompany them to a Memphis motel. Upon their arrival at the Lorraine Motel, Price gave one of the women a $100 bill to rent two rooms. Michael Boyd, who was Lee's boyfriend, drove up to the scene with two other men and approached Price's van. Boyd pointed his pistol at Hippen and demanded money. Price grabbed Boyd's arm, Boyd fired the gun, and a struggle ensued. When Price tried to drive away from the scene, Boyd "emptied" the gun at him, striking him with five or six shots which caused his death.

The prosecution relied on three aggravating circumstances to seek the death penalty in the sentencing phase of the trial: (1) that the defendant had a prior conviction for a violent felony, (2) that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death to two or more persons other than the victim murdered, and (3) that the killing occurred in the perpetration of a felony. ³

A judgment showing that the defendant had been convicted in 1983 for second-degree murder was introduced by the prosecution to support the prior conviction for a violent felony aggravating circumstance. In mitigation, Boyd testified that someone asked for change for a $100 bill and he was going to make change when Hippen pulled a gun. He said a struggle took place, during which Price was shot. Boyd testified that he was sorry the victim had been killed but that he did not intend to rob or shoot the victim.

The jury returned the sentence of death based on two aggravating factors, prior conviction of a violent felony and felony murder, and the conviction and sentence were affirmed by this Court on appeal. State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074, 111 S.Ct. 800, 112 L.Ed.2d 861 (1991). The defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief that alleged numerous constitutional errors, including the violation of article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution under State v. Middlebrooks. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial. We granted this appeal and now affirm the Court of Criminal Appeals' judgment.

ANALYSIS

In Middlebrooks, we determined that the felony murder aggravating circumstance set forth in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7) duplicated and mirrored the elements of the offense of felony murder and, when applied to a felony murder, failed to narrow the class of death eligible murderers as required by article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ⁴ We stressed that a proper narrowing device must provide

a principled way to distinguish the case in which the death penalty was imposed from the many cases in which it was not ... and must differentiate a death penalty case in an objective, even-handed, and substantially rational way from the many murder cases in which the death penalty may not be imposed. As a result, a proper narrowing device insures that, even though some defendants who fall within the restricted class of death-eligible defendants manage to avoid the death penalty, those who receive it will be among the worst murderers- --those whose crimes are particularly serious, or for which the death penalty is particularly appropriate.

We concluded that it violates article I, § 16 of the Tennessee Constitution to use the felony murder aggravating circumstance to support imposition of the death penalty for a conviction of felony murder. 840 S.W.2d at 343-346. The felony murder aggravating factor may, of course, be used to support imposition of the death penalty if a defendant is convicted of premeditated murder, or if the felony used for the aggravating circumstance is different from and in addition to the felony used for the felony murder offense. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d 573, 583 (Tenn.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 133, 136 L.Ed.2d 82 (1996).

Because the Middlebrooks rule enhanced the integrity and reliability of the sentencing process, we have since applied the rule retroactively. See Barber v. State, 889 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1184, 115 S.Ct. 1177, 130 L.Ed.2d 1129 (1995). Accordingly, as both parties here recognize, the jury's reliance on the invalid felony murder aggravating factor was constitutional error properly recognized in this post-conviction proceeding.

The critical inquiry, therefore, is whether the error was harmless and whether a resentencing hearing is required. To assist in this inquiry, we review the analytical framework first announced in State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d 238 (Tenn.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1339, 127 L.Ed.2d 687 (1994). There, we held that a Middlebrooks error does not require a resentencing hearing if the reviewing court concludes "beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentence would have been the same had the jury given no weight to the invalid felony murder aggravating factor." Id. at 262. Our holding was based on United States Supreme Court precedent in which that Court had said that if a jury considers an invalid or improper aggravating circumstance, either "constitutional harmless error analysis or reweighing at the trial or appellate level suffices to guarantee that the defendant received an individualized sentence." Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 1137, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992); see also Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990).

In Howell, we adopted a harmless error analysis that guarantees the precision that individualized sentencing demands and provides a principled explanation for our conclusion in each case. We also stressed the need "to completely examine the record for the presence of factors which potentially influence the sentence ultimately imposed." These factors include, but are not limited to, "the number and strength of remaining aggravating circumstances, the prosecutor's argument at sentencing, the evidence admitted to establish the invalid aggravator, and the nature, quality, and strength of mitigating evidence." Id. at 260-61. Only after a thorough and critical consideration of these factors can a determination be made as to harmless error. See, e.g., Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 541, 112 S.Ct. 2114, 2123-24, 119 L.Ed.2d 326 (1992)(O'Connor, J., concurring)("appellate court's bald assertion that an error of constitutional dimensions was 'harmless' cannot substitute for a principled explanation of how the court reached that conclusion.").

We have since applied the Howell harmless error analysis on numerous occasions in which the jury considered an invalid aggravating circumstance in conjunction with one or more valid aggravating circumstances. In the following cases, the error was found to be harmless and the sentence was affirmed. State v. Hines, 919 S.W.2d at 583; State v. (Sylvester) Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 829, 116 S.Ct. 99, 133 L.Ed.2d 53 (1995); Barber v. State, 889 S.W.2d at 187; State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1114, 115 S.Ct. 909, 130 L.Ed.2d 791 (1995); State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253 (Tenn.1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1086, 115 S.Ct. 743, 130 L.Ed.2d 644 (1995); State v. Howell, 868 S.W.2d at 262. Conversely, we concluded that the constitutional error required resentencing in State v. Walker, 910 S.W.2d 381 (Tenn.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 88, 136 L.Ed.2d 45 (1996), and Hartman v. State, 896 S.W.2d 94 (Tenn.1995).

We disagree with the dissent's assertion that "the high standard for harmless error analysis set forth in Howell has been significantly compromised in some cases." On the contrary, the...