State v. Boyd
Decision Date | 22 September 2016 |
Docket Number | SC S063260,CC 201026332,CA A151157 |
Citation | 380 P.3d 941,360 Or. 302 |
Parties | State of Oregon, Respondent on Review, v. Robert Darnell Boyd, Petitioner on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Laura A. Frikert, Deputy Public Defender, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for petitioner on review. With her on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Defender, Office of Public Defense Services.
Rebecca M. Auten, Assistant Attorney General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for respondent on review. With her on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General.
Before Balmer, Chief Justice, and Kistler, Walters, Landau, Baldwin, and Brewer, Justices, and Garrett, Justice pro tempore.**
The issue in this case is whether police unlawfully interrogated a criminal defendant after he invoked his rights to counsel and against compelled self-incrimination, guaranteed by Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The state argues that defendant had asked a “confusing” question and that police responded by seeking “clarification,” which did not amount to unconstitutional interrogation. Defendant argues that he had merely asked why he had been taken into custody and whether he could make a phone call, that there was nothing particularly confusing about the requests, and that police responded with questions that were reasonably likely to—and in fact did—elicit incriminating evidence. As a result, he contends, that incriminating evidence should have been suppressed. The trial court agreed with the state and denied defendant's motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Boyd , 270 Or.App. 41, 346 P.3d 626 (2015). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that defendant is correct that the police unconstitutionally interrogated him, in violation of Article I, section 12.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. Defendant's girlfriend, Archibald, was found dead on the street, the victim of a severe beating. Witnesses saw her on the ground and saw defendant running away from the scene. A few minutes later, police arrested defendant, who had Archibald's blood on his hands, shoes, and pants. The arresting officers advised defendant of his constitutional rights and questioned him. Defendant told the police that he was not sure what happened. He saw that his hand was bleeding and “figured” that he had been in a fight or had punched a car window. He said that he recalled that Archibald had become angry with him because she thought he had pushed her and that she had hit him several times. But he denied hitting her, insisting that he would never hit a woman. He repeatedly asked about Archibald's welfare.
The officers took defendant to the police station. There, Detective Myers questioned him while Sergeant Lewis observed. Defendant again said that he could not remember what had happened and that, given the injury to his hand, he must have “either punched somebody's car or punched somebody.” He said that he knew that he “was pissed off, because I was arguing with my girl.” He then stated that “I don't know why I'm here, so—please don't talk to me anymore on that aspect until you bring me a lawyer.”
Myers told defendant to change into jail clothes. As defendant did that, he asked Myers why he had been arrested. Myers told him that Archibald was dead and that he was being arrested for her murder. Defendant became agitated, expressing disbelief:
Lewis observed the foregoing interchange between defendant and Myers.
About seven hours later, Lewis learned that defendant had been transferred to a holding cell with a sink and running water. Concerned that defendant could have washed his hands and destroyed potential evidence, he went to defendant's cell. He checked defendant's hands and, apparently satisfied that defendant had not washed them, turned to leave. Defendant spoke to Lewis, asking, As Lewis later recalled in testimony at a suppression hearing, the following exchange then occurred:
Lewis went to get Myers, who arrived at defendant's holding cell within minutes. Once there, Myers reminded defendant that he had earlier asked to speak with a lawyer and asked him if he still wanted one. Defendant said that he did not want a lawyer but wanted to talk to Myers about what had happened. Myers advised defendant of his Miranda rights and again asked if defendant wished to speak to him without a lawyer present. Defendant said, yes. In the ensuing interview, defendant described an altercation with Archibald during which she had hit him repeatedly, making him angry so that “he felt like bashing her fucking head.” He recalled that he had pinned Archibald against a van and then hit her once, causing her to fall and hit her head on the ground. Defendant asserted that, after hitting Archibald, he had “blacked out and just took off walking.” When Myers told defendant that Archibald's injuries were inconsistent with a single punch, defendant requested an attorney, and the interview ended.
The state charged defendant with Archibald's murder. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to Myers, arguing that they were obtained in violation of his right against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He argued that the police had “either circumvented or coerced” him into making those statements in spite of his explicit invocation of his right to speak to an attorney. The trial court denied the motion, holding that defendant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. The trial court explained that the interview with Myers had occurred “only upon defendant's request to have further contact with * * * Myers” and only after Myers readministered Miranda warnings.
During the trial to the court, the state introduced evidence of defendant's statements to Myers, in particular, defendant's statement about being angry with Archibald and that he “felt like bashing her fucking head.” Defendant did not dispute that he had killed Archibald. His defense was that he lacked the requisite culpable mental state. In support of that defense, he took the stand and testified that he had never intended to hurt Archibald, that he had been unaware of punching her at the time, and that he did not remember doing so after the fact. In rebuttal, the state presented the testimony of a psychological expert who had relied in part on defendant's statements to Myers to reach his conclusion that defendant was malingering. The trial court convicted defendant of murder, ORS 163.115, and sentenced him to imprisonment for life.
On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statements to Myers after he invoked his right to counsel, and that the error was prejudicial. He also asserted an unpreserved argument that the trial court should have suppressed the statements that he made to the police before he invoked his right to counsel, on the ground that the advice of his rights when he initially was contacted by the police was defective.
The Court of Appeals affirmed. The court concluded that, because Lewis's responses to defendant's questions were not of a sort that the officer should have known would be likely to produce an incriminating statement from defendant, it was not a reinitiation of interrogation. Boyd , 270 Or.App. at 47, 346 P.3d 626. The court explained that defendant himself had reinitiated interrogation, by “request[ing] to speak to Myers, indicating his desire...
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