State v. Fink
| Decision Date | 03 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | A157266 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Elaine Renee FINK, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Jesse Merrithew, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief was Levi Merrithew Horst LLP.
Jennifer S. Lloyd, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Anna M. Joyce, Solicitor General, and James Aaron, Assistant Attorney General.
Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Lagesen, Judge, and Garrett, Judge.
Defendant was convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), ORS 813.010, after police found her asleep behind the wheel of a parked vehicle with its engine still running. On appeal, defendant assigns error to the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress evidence of incriminating statements that she made to the arresting officer, arguing that the evidence was obtained in violation of her rights to counsel and against compelled self-incrimination. Reviewing for legal error, State v. Ehly , 317 Or. 66, 75, 854 P.2d 421 (1993), we conclude that the trial court did not err because the Miranda warnings provided to defendant were not rendered constitutionally inadequate by subsequent statements made by the arresting officer, and defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights by initiating a conversation with the officer that evinced a willingness to enter into a generalized discussion about the investigation. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
We take the following facts from the record at the suppression hearing, which includes an audio and video recording of defendant's interaction with the police.1 Officer Spitler was investigating a noise complaint when he encountered defendant "slumped over" in the driver's seat of a vehicle that was parked with the engine running. When Spitler woke defendant, he observed signs of intoxication and began an investigation for DUII. Throughout the interaction, defendant repeatedly told Spitler that he was "not very nice" and asked him not to talk to her. Spitler eventually arrested defendant for DUII. Spitler then placed defendant in the back of his patrol car and read her the following Miranda warnings:
As Spitler read the warnings, defendant began reciting the rights along with him. When asked whether she understood those rights, defendant indicated that she did.
Defendant then asked to speak to Sergeant Sitton, one of the other officers at the scene. Spitler left defendant in the car while she spoke with Sitton. Defendant asked Sitton for clarification as to why she was being arrested. When Spitler returned, the following interaction took place (because of its significance to the issues on appeal, we quote it at length):
(Emphases added.) In the conversation that followed, defendant made numerous incriminating remarks as she and Spitler discussed why she had driven instead of walked, her drinking habits, and the circumstances surrounding her drinking that evening. A breath test administered at the jail indicated that defendant's blood alcohol content was 0.16. Defendant was charged with DUII.
Before trial, which was tried on stipulated facts, defendant moved to suppress her statements to Spitler on the grounds that they were obtained in violation of her rights to counsel and against compelled self-incrimination under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution,2 and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.3 The trial court denied the motion, concluding that defendant received Miranda warnings, understood her rights, and voluntarily waived those rights by initiating conversation with the police. With respect to Spitler's statement that defendant could not avoid certain questions by invoking her right to an attorney, the court reasoned that Spitler was merely stating that the particular questions he was asking did not fall under the purview of the Miranda protections.4 Although it did not state so expressly, the trial court appeared to be referencing what is commonly known as the "booking question" exception, under which questions normally attendant to arrest and custody—including those needed to secure the biographical data necessary to complete booking services—fall outside the scope of Miranda . See State v. Boyd , 360 Or. 302, 312, 380 P.3d 941 (2016) (discussing exception); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz , 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality opinion) (). Because questions regarding a defendant's hair color, eye color, and address usually qualify as booking questions, replies to such questions are admissible even if a defendant previously invoked his or her Miranda rights.
On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress in two interrelated ways. First, defendant argues that, although she initially received constitutionally adequate Miranda warnings, those warnings were rendered constitutionally inadequate by a statement Spitler later made. Defendant points out that, after Spitler Mirandized her, the officer later told her that she could not avoid answering certain questions by asking for an attorney. Defendant agrees that it is "reasonably clear" that Spitler was referring to the "booking question" exception to Miranda . However, according to defendant, Spitler's statement undermined the Miranda warnings previously given and rendered her later statements in response to interrogation involuntary. Defendant also argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her rights by reinitiating conversation with the police. Defendant concedes that she initiated a discussion of the crime with Spitler. Defendant nevertheless contends that, under the totality of the circumstances—including the purportedly inadequate Miranda warnings, defendant's intoxication, and Spitler's failure to clarify whether defendant wanted to waive her rights—no waiver occurred.
We review the denial of a motion to suppress for legal error, deferring to the trial court's findings of historical fact if they are supported by constitutionally sufficient evidence in the record. Ehly , 317 Or. at 75, 854 P.2d 421. "If findings of historical fact are not made on all pertinent issues and there is evidence from which such facts could be decided more than...
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...a suspect in custody makes an unequivocal request to speak with a lawyer, all police interrogation must cease." State v. Fink , 285 Or. App. 302, 312, 395 P.3d 934 (2017) (citing State v. Meade , 327 Or. 335, 339, 963 P.2d 656 (1998) ). Police may continue speaking with a defendant who has ......
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