State v. Boykins

• Decision Date: 14 February 1966
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 51570,51570,1
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Earl BOYKINS, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 70

399 S.W.2d 70

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Earl BOYKINS, Appellant.

No. 51570.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

Feb. 14, 1966.

Norman H. Anderson, Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Carl R. Gaertner, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Louis, for respondent.

Richard S. Bull, St. Louis, for appellant.

HOUSER, Commissioner.

The first question is whether this conviction of robbery in the first degree should be invalidated under the rule of Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 and United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey, 3 Cir., 351 F.2d 429. After his arrest appellant was interrogated by police officers. He orally confessed to them that he participated in the holdup of Hy Feigenbaum's Market at 3501 Cass Avenue in the City of St. Louis on March 25, 1964. The police officers testified to the statements he made. Appellant claims violation of his right to obtain and consult with counsel prior to his confession, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.

Acting on information that Earl Boykins and John Hall had been involved in the holdup, two officers went to the West End Hotel, where Boykins and Hall lived. They were found in the saloon or lounge, seated in a booth with two females, Mattie Moore and Tommy Gunn. The officers stated to the men that they wanted to talk to them and requested them to step outside. Acting on the belief that the two men had something to do with the holdup in question the officers arrested them. They were arrested outside the hotel and placed in a police car. Ten minutes later the officers re-entered the hotel and arrested the two females. This occurred about 3:30 p. m. on March 30, 1964. All four were taken to the police station and booked. On the way to the police station the four were asked who their associates were. All four suspects were interrogated. At times they were questioned individually, at times collectively. Different officers interrogated them at different times. At the outset Earl Boykins was very briefly interrogated about the robbery. At first he positively denied any knowledge of or participation in any robberies or holdups whatever. Tommy Gunn confessed first. She said, among other things, that Earl Boykins' gun was at the hotel. She led officers to a .32 calibre S. & S. automatic revolver at the hotel. Earl Boykins had 'passed' the revolver to Mattie Moore when the officers entered the hotel bar. After the officers and the two men stepped outside the hotel Mattie Moore 'got rid' of the gun by wrapping it in some carpeting and leaving it on a table on the landing adjacent to the women's lavatory at the hotel. The revolver, together with seven shells and a cartridge clip, was recovered at 6:30 or 7:30 p. m. on March 30, 1964. The owner of the market at 3501 Cass, Hyman Feigenbaum, the victim of the robbery, was brought to the police station. He identified the revolver as the one he kept at the market and as the revolver taken from the market during the holdup. Hall then confessed. Finally, confronted with the gun, and having been told by the other three that they had confessed, Earl Boykins made his statement, detailing the facts which showed all four guilty of armed robbery on the occasion in question. His confession was made at 7:30 or 8 p. m. on March 30, 1964. After Boykins confessed to the officers the assistant circuit attorney appeared and took a further statement from him. After the initial denial by Earl Boykins and before he gave his first incriminating statement the officers advised him of his rights. An assistant circuit attorney also advised him 'at great length' of his rights to obtain counsel and consult with a friend or say nothing if he chose. He was told that he did not have to make any statement if he didn't want to 'and several other things were mentioned to him along the same lines.' He was 'fully advised of all of his constitutional rights.' The officers testified that no threats, force or promises were used in obtaining the statement from Earl Boykins.

Appellant contends that he was interrogated at a time when the investigation was no longer 'a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on a particular suspect,' namely, this appellant, as shown by the fact that he had been arrested for the very purpose of investigation of his connection with the crime; that there were two interrogations: the first by police officers, the second by the assistant circuit attorney--that while he was informed of his right to obtain counsel before the second interrogation he was not informed of his rights prior to the start of his first interrogation. Appellant cites Gideon and Escobedo and quotes from Russo, and objects that the testimony showing that he was informed of his rights consisted of bare conclusions; that there was no specific testimony reciting what was actually said to appellant.

Appellant's rights were not violated but on the contrary were fully protected. Under the uncontradicted evidence Boykins was advised of his constitutional rights before he gave the incriminating statements. He was told that he had a right to obtain counsel, consult with a friend or remain silent and say nothing, if he so chose. Notwithstanding he was given this advice before he said anything implicating himself he talked and confessed without consulting friend or attorney. His incriminating statements were not made as a result of threats, force or promises. There is not the slightest intimation of physical or mental coercion.

We are of the opinion that in post-arrest proceedings, although the inquiry has focused upon a particular individual, incriminating statements made by him to the police may be used at the trial of charges later filed against him, where before he incriminates himself he is fully informed of his constitutional rights, of his right to counsel and to consult with a friend or to remain silent, and where no mental or physical coercion is employed.

Escobedo, Gideon and Russo are not in point. Escobedo had a lawyer whom he had employed before he was questioned. When arrested and interrogated he asked to be allowed to consult with his counsel. The lawyer, standing by at the place of the questioning, requested leave to consult with his client. Both requests were denied. Escobedo was not advised of his right to remain silent. During the interrogation he was handcuffed, required to stand, and he was nervous, upset, and agitated. He had not slept for over a week. Escobedo was coerced. Escobedo presents an aggravated situation altogether different from that of Boykins. Under the facts in Gideon the defendant was held entitled to the assistance of defense counsel at the trial. That question does not arise in Boykins' case. This record shows that Cletus E. Rudolph, Esq. of the St. Louis bar appeared for Boykins, was present at all stages throughout his trial and assisted him in the...